Discrimination in matchmaking: evidence from the price policy of a French marriage bureau

Abstract

This article shows how a matchmaking agency may improve the quality of serious meetings between individuals seeking long-term relationship, thanks to a price discrimination policy. Its filtering is based on objective and official characteristics (sex, age and contract's environment) and on implicit criteria: the few asked characteristics by its clients.

Acknowledgment

I am indebted to Samuel Cameron from the University of Bradford (UK) and to Valérie Harrant from the University of Reims (France) for many helpful comments.

Notes

¹ The married people cannot seek a better partner thanks to a matchmaking agency. The goal of this act is to prevent the registration of the not very serious people, but it penalizes the agents still married who seek a new spouse and it deprives the market of some individuals who possess required characteristics.

² Unfortunately, this second database does not distinguish the offers voluntarily discriminated by the agency with the required people, afraid by the price. Data are often lacking in this second file.

³ It is why ‘matrimonial adviser’ or ‘adviser in human relations’ are sometimes synonymous of ‘matchmaking agency’.

⁴ However, the appearance can evolve in the short run, thanks to councils of readjustment about the signals emitted by the customer (councils of elocution, clothing, …).

⁵ A subscribed individual who meets nobody may ask himself where is the service for which he paid.