The electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the determinants of municipal waste collection expenditure, specifically the effects of electoral cycles on municipal waste collection expenditure. We use a database with information on Spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants for the period 2002–2011. Our results reveal that incumbents adopt an opportunistic behaviour, increasing spending on waste in the preelection year and reducing it in the election and post-election years. Therefore, we confirm an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in Spain. Additionally, we find that the levels of income, unemployment and upper-level governments’ transfers have a positive impact on waste collection spending. Finally, population density, level of urbanization, average age of the population of the municipality and less fragmented governments negatively influence waste collection spending.

KEYWORDS:

• Waste collection expenditures
• Political Budget Cycles
• local governments
• GMM

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​