Political cycle and effective corporate tax rate: evidence from China

ABSTRACT

This research aims to investigate the changing of effective corporate tax rate during the political cycle of Provincial Party Congresses with the data from Chinese industrial businesses from 1998 to 2009. The study shows that the effective tax rate for enterprises fluctuates with the political cycle of Provincial Party Congresses. The effective tax rate, in particular, tends to rise in the year before and during the Provincial Party Congresses, then decline year after year. Further study reveals variation in the impact of political cycles on officials and enterprises with various characteristics; for example, the impact of the corporation effective tax rate is more obvious for male officials, private firms, and so on. At the same time, the paper does not find a significant age ‘ceiling effect’ among prefecture-level officials in China. And the regional rule of law construction does not have a significant effect on the political cyclicality of corporate effective tax rates, whereas the political cyclicality of effective corporate tax rates is more pronounced in regions with higher government investment intensity. Finally, this paper puts forward policy recommendations such as improving officials’ promotion and assessment mechanisms and optimizing the government’s policy implementation.

KEYWORDS:

• Political cycle
• effective tax rate
• promotion incentive
• the regional rule of law

JEL CLASSIFICATION:

• C23
• H11
• H26

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).