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Research Article

Are the informal economy and cryptocurrency substitutes or complements?

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ABSTRACT

This research considers a new dimension of the effects of the underground sector by examining the spillovers on cryptocurrency holdings. Cryptocurrencies offer a relatively greater ability to dodge taxes and ensure the anonymity of holders, providing attractive avenues for underground operators to stash their informal-sector earnings. Our results, based on data from more than 50 nations, show that a greater prevalence of the underground economy in a nation is indeed associated with greater cryptocurrency holdings. This result holds across an alternative measure of the shadow economy, and when the bi-directional causality between the shadow economy and cryptocurrency holdings is considered. In other noteworthy findings, greater FDI crowded out cryptocurrency holdings, while greater financial globalization and greater economic uncertainty, ceteris paribus, increased them.

JEL CLASSIFICATION:

I. Introduction

The influx and global diffusion of electronic money in recent years have begun to challenge the traditional dominance of paper money and undermined the abilities of central banks to control the money supply and, thereby, to effectively combat inflation (or to implement monetary policy more broadly). Given its relative recency, and the evolving technologies and globalization, the full implications of electronic money have not yet been understood (Böhme et al. Citation2015; Bradbury Citation2013; Goel and Hsieh Citation2002; Kim Citation2017; Schilling and Uhlig Citation2019). In fact, some researchers have even questioned whether Bitcoin is really a currency (Kunimoto and Kakamu Citation2022).

Cryptocurrencies have been identified as facilitating illegal activities like drug trafficking, smuggling (Goel Citation2008), terror funding (Goel Citation2020), and human trafficking, etc.Footnote1 prompting some international agencies to conduct related training for law enforcement.Footnote2 This has hampered the formulation of effective policies to monitor and/or control such money, especially when some of the related activities are clandestine in the informal sector (Bal Citation2015; Dniprov et al. Citation2019; Stolbov and Shchepeleva Citation2020; Yadav et al. Citation2022).

This paper examines the spillovers from the shadow or the underground sector onto cryptocurrency holdings using data from a large sample of countries. Are the informal economic activities and cryptocurrency holdings complementary or substitutes? Shadow activities and cryptocurrencies would be complementary when the anonymity and borderless nature of cryptocurrencies provide good avenues to stash underground earnings and avoid taxation/detection.Footnote3 It could be the case that, beyond economic greed, weak institutions might significantly drive individuals’ incentives to hold cryptocurrencies and that these incentives might vary across institution types. Institutional capacity varies significantly across nations (see La Porta et al. (Citation1999)). In some developing nations with weak institutions, individuals might prefer cryptocurrency holdings to traditional banking.Footnote4 The growth of cryptocurrencies in developing nations has induced some international bodies to suggest restraints on their rapid growth (https://unctad.org/news/unctad-spells-out-actions-curb-cryptocurrencies-developing-countries). The nexus between cryptocurrency holdings and the shadow economy, being formally studied here, potentially compounds the challenges for regulatory bodies, with shadow activities being clandestine and cryptocurrencies being global in nature and largely beyond specific jurisdictions of individual nations, especially (developing) nations with weak institutions.

Cryptocurrencies may also be tied to shadow banking practices (Claessens and Ratnovski Citation2013). Coca and Nistor (Citation2022) provide a recent review of the digital shadow economy. Furthermore, cryptocurrency technologies might impact online gambling (Gainsbury and Blaszczynski Citation2017; Goel Citation2021), and frequently underground earnings are related to gambling practices, both as a source of gambling funds and of returns from gambling. For now, while the literature on the causes and effects of cryptocurrencies is slowly emerging, the aspect studied in this paper seems novel.

Our results, based on a recent sample of 53 nations over the years 2018–2021,Footnote5 support the main hypothesis that a greater prevalence of the shadow economy is associated with a greater prevalence of cryptocurrency holdings. This result holds across different modelling specifications and when potential bi-directional causality between the shadow economy and crypto holdings is taken into account. Besides being novel, the results have policy value for governments trying to check the shadow economy and grapple with the implications of digital currencies (see Benigno and Robatto (Citation2019)).

The structure of the rest of the paper includes the background and the model in the next section, followed by data and estimation, results, and conclusions.

II. Background and model

Background

The background for this paper can be seen as related to the causes of the spread or prevalence of digital currencies, and to the effects of the underground or shadow markets (in this case on cryptocurrency holdings).

A primary cause of firms and individuals operating in the underground or shadow sectors has been to evade burdensome regulations and/or taxes. While the traditional arguments for tax evasion pre-date the arrival of digital currencies (see, for example, Alm (Citation1988)), the advent of digital currencies, with their international and clandestine nature, might provide individuals a new avenue to avoid taxes. Given its newness and its international prevalence, the governance and taxation of digital or cryptocurrencies are questionable, with nations still trying to formulate effective strategies (Bal Citation2015; Böhme et al. Citation2015; Dniprov et al. Citation2019; Schilling and Uhlig Citation2019; Stolbov and Shchepeleva Citation2020; Yadav et al. Citation2022)). For instance, tracking ownership of cryptocurrencies and then exercising jurisdictional control (via regulation or taxation) is challenging, given the international, borderless, nature of internet-based digital currencies, (see Yadav et al. (Citation2022)). The prevalence of digital currencies, with their global reach and relative independence of the regulatory reach of individual nations, provides individuals and firms with another avenue to stash their earnings (legal or illegal) and avoid taxes (Marmora Citation2021). The formal analysis in this paper will determine whether shadow activities and cryptocurrency holdings are indeed complementary across nations.

On the flip side, privacy issues associated with internet transactions also relate to digital currencies. This might act as a deterrent to cryptocurrency holdings (Bradbury Citation2013; Goel Citation2019; Goel and Nelson Citation2009),Footnote6 although, with greater internet piracy, some might view cryptocurrency holdings as safer than say electronic banking. This latter effect might explain the prevalence of crypto holdings in some developing nations.Footnote7

Different scholars, in the relatively nascent literature on digital currencies, have studied various aspects. While we do not have data on the amount of cryptocurrency holdings by country, Li et al. (Citation2020) note that the performance of cryptocurrencies may be determined by the market size (also see Bianchi and Babiak (Citation2022)). The nexus between cryptocurrencies and the shadow economies, studied in the present paper, would make a correct/accurate determination of the performance of cryptocurrencies problematic. Related to the performance of virtual currencies is the aspect of their value (see Bolt and Van Oordt (Citation2020)), and potential default (Grobys and Sapkota Citation2020).

The determinants of Bitcoin trading volume have been examined by Bouraoui (Citation2020). The author finds that, in the sample of 21 emerging economies considered, access to the banking system significantly impacts local Bitcoin trading volume.

Another angle studied in the literature is whether liquidity risk is adequately priced or reflected in cryptocurrency markets (Feng, Wang, and Zhang Citation2018; Han Citation2022; Zhang et al. Citation2021). We account for the risk dimension in our analysis by considering macroeconomic uncertainty, exchange rate, central bank autonomy, and the degree of globalization.

Shadow economies are prevalent worldwide, although the extent of their prevalence in individual nations varies (Buehn and Schneider Citation2012; Schneider Citation2022). The broad term of shadow or underground activity includes illegal activities and otherwise legal activities that are not reported to the authorities to escape regulations and/or taxes. Thus, precisely measuring the extent of the shadow economy remains a challenge (Dybka et al. Citation2019; Frey and Weck-Hannemann Citation1984; Schneider Citation2012; Schneider and Buehn Citation2013). Despite the measurement shortcomings, some estimates of the shadow economy that are comparable across nations have emerged (Buehn and Schneider Citation2012). Based on these international estimates, a number of empirical studies of the causes and effects of the shadow economy have been conducted over time (see Berdiev, Goel, and Saunoris (Citation2022), Goel and Nelson (Citation2016), Goel and Saunoris (Citation2022), Marmora and Mason (Citation2021),Schneider and Enste (Citation2000)). However, the aspect studied in the present research, namely, the nexus between the shadow economy and cryptocurrencies, seems unique. Our empirical model is discussed next.

Model

Based on the above discussion, we formulate the main hypothesis, which we will test by applying the data discussed in the data section to the model outlined below:

Hypothesis H1: Greater prevalence of the shadow or the informal sector is associated with greater cryptocurrency holdings, ceteris paribus.

The underlying logic is that the earnings from the underground activity are unrecorded, and cryptocurrencies, being mostly outside the regulatory and taxation nets, provide an easy way for individuals and firms to stash their earnings from the black markets. Some underground operators might choose to receive their payments in cryptocurrencies directly. By operating in the shadow sector, many firms and individuals are breaking the law, and thus their cost of breaking an additional law (e.g. by not voluntarily disclosing their digital currency holdings) might be relatively low.

The general format of the empirical model that we estimate is the following (with individual observations in the underlying data at the country (i) and year (t) level – see Section 3.1 for details):

CRYPTO = f(informal economy (Informal1 or Informal2), Economic prosperity (GDPpc), Economic freedom (EconFREE), Exchange rate (EXCHrate), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Central Bank independence (CBindependence), Economic uncertainty (ECONuncertain), Financial globalization (FINglobal), Island nation (ISLAND)) … (1)

The dependent variable (CRYPTO) is cryptocurrency holdings in a nation and the main variable of interest on the right-hand side is the prevalence of the shadow economy. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on Informal1 (or Informal2), across alternative specifications would signify that Hypothesis H1 is valid. provides complete details on all the variables.

Table 1. Variables definitions and sources.

Our baseline specification includes, in addition to the informal sector size, the GDP per capita (GDPpc) of a country, and the level of economic freedom (EconFREE – measured via an index (see )). The former is included as a proxy for the average living standard which may have a bearing on the preference for new modes of financial transactions. Arguably, people with higher incomes have a greater appetite for the risk associated with owning digital assets. While the room for unrestricted economic decisions available to the public is captured through economic freedom.

Various extensions to the baseline specification are checked to account for the influence of factors like exchange rate volatility (EXCHrate), foreign direct investment (FDI – net inflows, as a percent of GDP), economic uncertainty (ECONuncertain – measured as the standard deviation of inflation over last three years), the effect of spatial location e.g. whether a country is an island (ISLAND), financial globalization (FINglobal – an index), and policy institutions (CBindependence – an index). These factors cover not only the domestic macroeconomic environment but also account for geographical features and the level of international integration of a country.Footnote8 For example, economic freedom and financial globalization capture transaction costs, while economic prosperity is related to affordability, education, and institutional strength in a country. Furthermore, economic uncertainty, central bank independence, and the exchange rate would proxy for potential returns from digital investments.

In subsequent analysis, we employ instrumental variables for the informal economy to overcome its possible endogeneity. Our instruments include country characteristics capturing its colonial past, the regional location, and the corruption perceptions (CORRUPTION).Footnote9 Corruption has been shown to be related to shadow activities (Dreher and Schneider Citation2010), while a nation’s colonial past and location can be seen as impacting the prevalence of underground activities. The next section outlines the data used and the estimation procedures employed to estimate equation (1).

We can also argue that the instruments are independent from the outcome variable: (a) The geographical location of a country (REGION) cannot be the cause for the acceptability of alternative means of payment. Thus, we look at the regional distribution of our sample, the countries where cryptocurrencies are in use are dispersed all over the globe and across different income categories (). Therefore, the location is unlikely to have any direct effect on the potential to use cryptocurrency.

The same is the case with COLONY. There is no reason to suggest that particular colonial origins make a country more likely to use crypto. For instance, if we check the simple Pearson’s correlation between crypto use and COLONY, it comes out to 0.009 and is insignificant with a p-value of 0.905.

Finally, corruption perceptions can affect crypto use. But we can argue that their effect goes through the shadow economy rather than operating directly (see Goel, Mazhar, and Saunoris (Citation2020) for a related angle). Thus, if we regress crypto use on instrumental variables, the CORRUPTION coefficient comes out significant. But it becomes largely insignificant (at a 10% level) once we control for the shadow economy.Footnote10 In addition, the probability value of the joint significance of the three instruments is 0.117. This suggests that our instruments are independent of the outcome variable.

III. Data and estimation

This section discusses the data and estimation techniques.

Data

The main outcome of interest is the global prevalence of cryptocurrencies. This information comes from a survey that asks respondents whether they own or use cryptocurrencies.Footnote11 The information is available for three years from 2019 to 2021. The use of cryptocurrencies has increased over the years: from 10.26 in 2019 to 13.5 in 2021. In terms of its spatial or geographic distribution, it is most prevalent in Nigeria, where 42% of those surveyed claimed to have owned or used digital currencies. At the other extreme, we have Japan where only 4% of those surveyed claimed to own or use digital currencies.Footnote12 presents the countries in our sample along with their regional and income classifications.

The main variable of interest, as mentioned above, is the size of the informal sector. For this information, we use the Elgin et al. (Citation2021) estimates. The main advantage of these estimates is their availability in two different forms: the Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model-based estimates (Informal2) and those derived using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach (Informal1). Our baseline results use MIMIC estimates because of their greater relevance with the empirical underpinnings of this analysis. The other variant is employed to check the consistency of our estimates. The correlation between Informal1 and Informal2 is 0.99 in our sample ( in the Appendix).

The latest year for which the estimates of the informal sector are available is 2018. Therefore, the variable informal sector is coming with a lag of three years with respect to the outcome variable and is contemporaneously exogenous in our analysis. Given the high persistence in the informal sector size, we can claim that this time structure has no adverse side effect on our inference. The average size of the informal sector in our sample is 22% in the year 2016 and 21.6 (as percent of GDP) in the year 2018 with a standard deviation that is 11.3 in both years.

Details about the variables used, including definitions, summary statistics, and data sources, are provided in . in the Appendix includes a list of countries included in the analysis. The sample size is constrained by the availability of cryptocurrency data.

Estimation

For estimating the effect of the informal sector on the prevalence of crypto use we develop a simple panel least squares model. The model permits control of panel-level serial correlation and adjusts standard errors for the possible heteroskedasticity in the error term due to cross-country linkages (Beck and Katz Citation1995).

The panel fixed-effects regression model is not appropriate for our purposes because of the high persistence in the size of the informal sector, the main explanatory variable of interest. However, to account for the possible secular changes shaping the outcome of our interest we use time dummies. The use of time dummies somewhat enables us to capture the effects of the recent coronavirus pandemic (see Naeem et al. (Citation2022)). The country-level fixed effects are considered through regional dummies.Footnote13 Finally, the issue of potential reverse causality is separately treated through the use of the instrumental variable regression.

IV. Results

Baseline models

The baseline results, reported in , support the main hypothesis – the shadow economy and cryptocurrency holdings are complementary and the positive spillovers from the shadow economy are present in all the models estimated. In terms of magnitude, a ten percent increase in the shadow economy (Informal1) would increase cryptocurrency holdings by about 6% (based on the corresponding elasticity evaluated at the respective means).

Table 2. Spillovers from the underground economy to cryptocurrency: baseline models.

Greater economic freedom (EconFREE) and greater economic prosperity lower crypto holdings, with relatively greater statistical support for the former. These results can be seen as capturing dimensions of the opportunity costs of crypto holdings. In economically free nations, for instance, the economic systems work smoothly and there are less intrusive regulations. Thus, there would be fewer incentives for individuals to seek alternate (digital) financial assets.

Interestingly, greater FDI tends to crowd out crypto holdings. FDI inflows in a nation are a reflection of the promising economic climate there, which would likely also attract domestic investments, diverting funds away from digital currencies. The corresponding impact is modest, however. A ten percent increase in FDI inflows would decrease cryptocurrency holdings by about one percent (Model 2.2).

Furthermore, EXCHrate, FINglobal, and ECONuncertain increase crypto holdings, ceteris paribus. So, while own economic freedom lowers CRYPTO, greater financial globalization has the opposite effect. Financial globalization captures external financial opportunities and cryptocurrencies might provide a lower transaction cost means to access external financial markets. Additionally, economic uncertainty and exchange rate can be viewed as capturing hedging opportunities that cryptocurrencies might provide. Finally, island nations and nations with greater central bank independence were no different from others. The island nation result makes sense when one thinks about the fact that the internet-based borderless nature of digital currencies mitigates any disadvantages that island nations might otherwise have.

Considering simultaneity issues

It is possible that the relationship between the shadow economy and cryptocurrency holdings is bi-directional, with cryptocurrency holdings being affected by and possibly affecting the underground sector.

To account for this, presents results with Informal1 considered as an endogenous variable. The instruments used are COLONY, REGION, and CORRUPTION.Footnote14 Corruption and shadow economies have been found to be related (Dreher and Schneider Citation2010; Goel and Saunoris Citation2017, Citation2019), and shadow activities might have colonial legacies (Goel and Nelson Citation2016).

Table 3. Spillovers from the underground economy to cryptocurrency: accounting for possible reverse causality.

The different diagnostic tests support the instrument choice and the results generally (reported towards the bottom of ) support what was reported in . Our main hypothesis of complementarity between the shadow economy and cryptocurrency holdings stands the test of potential endogeneity consideration.

Other considerations: considering an alternate measure of the shadow economy

Given the issues with adequately measuring the underground sector (Frey and Weck-Hannemann Citation1984), it seems useful to test the validity of the findings with an alternative measure of the shadow economy.

Accordingly, tests the robustness of the results in by employing Informal2 as the main independent variable. Although, the correlation between Informal1 and Informal2 is high (), this exercise adds some validity tests. The results quite closely support what is reported in . Importantly, the main hypothesis of positive spillovers from the shadow economy on cryptocurrency holdings is supported. Thus, tying to the title of the paper, shadow economy and cryptocurrency are complements. The concluding section follows.

Table 4. Spillovers from the underground economy to cryptocurrency: robustness check with an alternate measure of the underground economy.

V. Conclusions

The recent influx of digital currencies, with their global trading reach and relative anonymity, has provided new avenues for the public to trade and store/conceal earnings and this has challenged policymakers to effectively manage/monitor financial transactions. The rapid, mostly unregulated, growth of digital currencies in certain nations has induced some United Nations bodies to advise caution or restrain in their use (https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1124362).

This paper examines the spillovers from the shadow or the underground sector onto cryptocurrency holdings, using data from a large sample of countries. Whereas different aspects of digital currencies have been studied in recent years (e.g. Bal (Citation2015), Bradbury (Citation2013), Coca and Nistor (Citation2022), Schilling and Uhlig (Citation2019)), the nexus between cryptocurrencies and the shadow economy studied in this paper appears to be unique. It seems plausible that the relatively secretive nature of both underground activities and digital currencies would induce some complementarity in their prevalence. Besides adding to the literature, the results have implications for the effective management of digital currencies and the channels that might affect them.

Our empirical results show positive spillovers from the shadow sector on cryptocurrency holdings, and this finding is robust to considerations of potential endogeneity and the measurement of the shadow economy. The complementarity between the underground economy and cryptocurrency holdings is a new insight into the literature on the effects of the shadow economy (Schneider and Enste Citation2000). An implication of this is that as nations are able to control shadow economies, such efforts might have payoffs in terms of their abilities to manage digital currencies.

On the other hand, periods of greater economic uncertainty would be associated with the flight of some capital to digital currencies. Thus, monetary policies to lower economic uncertainty would result in likely unforeseen spillovers on digital currency holdings. This finding can be seen as complementary to studies that have examined the effects of uncertainty on other investments (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (Citation1994), Goel and Ram (Citation1999)).

Furthermore, the effects of economic prosperity (denoted via GDPpc), negative in all cases and statistically significant in about a third, are consistent with the favour that digital currencies are finding in developing nations. Finally, we find that nations with greater net FDI inflows have lower cryptocurrency holdings, ceteris paribus. The tradeoff between FDI inflows and cryptocurrency holdings does not seem to be generally recognized. On the other hand, a nation’s greater financial globalization increases cryptocurrency holdings (due to greater information and lower transaction costs).

As corresponding data on more nations and years become available, additional aspects of the emerging diffusion of digital currencies can be studied. An interesting avenue for future research, for example, would be to see to what extent cryptocurrencies are able to impact traditional banking. Another aspect that requires greater formal research relates to a formal determination of the limitations of crypto markets.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

3 There is some anecdotal evidence of the positive association between digital currencies and black market activities (https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-announces-historic-336-billion-cryptocurrency-seizure-and-conviction). However, formal investigations of the underlying relationship have been missing and the present paper tries to fill this gap.

5 The relatively short span of our data is constrained by the availability of comparable data across nations and the relatively newness of cryptocurrencies (for details, see https://www.statista.com/statistics/1202468/global-cryptocurrency-ownership/).

6 Kim (Citation2017) deals with the transaction cost of digital currencies.

8 Shadow economies might be impacted by banking crises (Colombo, Onnis, and Tirelli Citation2016).

9 Dimant and Tosato (Citation2018) review the empirical literature on the causes and effects of corruption and Goel and Mehrotra (Citation2012) how different financial payment instruments (not including cryptocurrencies) might impact corruption.

10 The results of this regression are not reported to save space.

11 The precise question is phrased as follows: ‘Which of these financial products and investments do you currently use/own? (multi-pick)’. The information in this analysis concerns respondents who selected the option ‘Cryptocurrency (e.g. Bitcoin)’. For sources, see .

14 Given the modest number of observations in our analysis, it is necessary to avoid using too many instrumental variables e.g. Hansen, Hausman, and Newey (Citation2008). Therefore, COLONY represents a former British colony with respect to all other colonies and non-colonies; while REGION is regional location of a country, varying from 1 to 7, with higher numbers representing countries in the Southern or Eastern regions of the globe.

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Appendix

Table A1. Income classifications and regional distribution of sample countries.

Table A2. Correlation matrix of key variables.