Don't Fence Me In: Boundaries, Policy, and Deliberation in Maine's Lobster Commons

Abstract

Describing the necessary conditions for collective action in the interest of natural resource conservation, common property theory asserts the need for clear boundaries. This pertains to material boundaries that circumscribe target resources and social boundaries that circumscribe resource user group identities. In reality, socioecological systems are rarely closed or static, so boundary imposition can generate transaction costs and perhaps reduce adaptive capacity if implemented without allowances for broad and repeated public deliberation. Participant observation, interview, survey, archival, and focus group data from Maine's lobster fishery demonstrate that flexible, broadly negotiated, informal boundaries characterized the fishery for decades, embedded in localist institutions under de facto comanagement. Federal regulatory pressures and industry changes triggered formalization of a more statist comanagement regime, overlaying codified boundaries under the guise of resource conservation. Fishing boat captains leveraged the legal boundary-drawing precedent to consolidate fishery access and decision making away from crew, neighbors, and family. Precipitating factors included trap limits and tangles, entry limits and resource declines in other fisheries, law enforcement, abandonment of apprenticeship, recreational entry, and mail-in ballots. Instrumentalism eroded diversified, multivalent social networks, and ecological outcomes are uncertain. This evidence suggests that despite seminal contributions of common property scholarship, some policy applications might be overly reductive or sidestep democratic debate between individual and communitarian concerns. Attention to dynamic interactions across institutions can ensure that emergent political alliances and incremental changes in distributive and processual norms around resource allocation are not overlooked.

Al describir las condiciones necesarias para la acción colectiva en favor de la conservación de los recursos naturales, la teoría de la propiedad común proclama la necesidad de marcar límites claros. Esto concierne a los límites naturales que circunscriben determinados recursos y los límites sociales que circunscriben las identidades grupales de usuarios del recurso. En realidad, los sistemas socioecológicos son raramente cerrados o estáticos, de suerte que la imposición de límites puede generar costos de transacción y quizás reduzcan la capacidad adaptativa si son implementados sin la provisión de una deliberación pública amplia y repetida. La observación participativa, la entrevista, el estudio de campo, el archivo y los datos de gupos focales relacionados con la industria pesquera de langosta, en Maine, demuestran que los límites informales, flexibles y ampliamente negociados caracterizaron estas pesqueras durante décadas, incrustados en las instituciones localistas bajo administración compartida de facto. Las presiones reguladoras federales y las transformaciones industriales desataron la formalización de un régimen co-administrativo más estatista, que revistió los límites codificados bajo el disfraz de la conservación de recursos. Los capitanes de los barcos pesqueros apuntalaron el precedente del dibujado legal de límites para consolidar el acceso pesquero y la capacidad decisoria lejos de la tripulación, vecinos y familia. Los factores que precipitaron esta situación incluyeron las limitaciones en el uso de trampas y redes, los límites de entrada y declinación del recursos en otras pesqueras, la aplicación estricta de la ley, el abandono de las pasantías de aprendizaje, el ingreso recreacional y la votación por correo. El instrumentalismo erosionó las redes sociales polivalentes y diversificadas, y los resultados de orden ecológicos son inciertos. Esta evidencia sugiere que a pesar de las contribuciones seminales de la ciencia sobre propiedad común, algunas de sus aplicaciones políticas podrían resultar muy reductivas o sacarle el bulto al debate democrático entre las preocupaciones individuales y las comunitarias. La atención a las interacciones dinámicas entre instituciones puede asegurar que no sean pasadas por alto las alianzas políticas emergentes y los crecientes cambios en las normas distributivas y de procedimiento concernientes a la asignación de recursos.

Key Words:

• common pool resources
• governance
• marine resources
• political ecology
• privatization

关键词:

• 公共池塘资源
• 治理
• 海洋生物资源
• 政治生态
• 私有化

Palabras clave:

• recursos del común
• gobernanza
• recursos marinos
• ecología política
• privatización

Acknowledgments

I am indebted for the thoughtful comments of section editor Karl Zimmerer and three anonymous reviewers and to readers of earlier drafts, including Dianne Rocheleau, Bill Turner, Jody Emel, Jim Acheson, Jeff Popke, Holly Hapke, Ron Mitchelson, Xavier Basurto, Lisa Campbell, and Robin Alden. The National Science Foundation provided primary research funding. Additional resources were provided by Maine Sea Grant, Maine Department of Marine Resources, the Kendall Foundation, University of Maine, Clark University, and East Carolina University. Data collection would not have been possible without the generous assistance of innumerable fishing community members and public servants.

Notes

1. Most Maine women who fish commercially identify themselves as “fishermen.” The vast majority of lobster license holders are male (97 percent in a 2002 random mail survey, n = 29).

2. N = 12, SD = 3.2, CI = ±0.3, p < 0.1.

3. N = 29, SD = 1.8, CI = ±0.6, p < 0.1.

4. Groundfishermen pursue bottom-dwelling species such as cod, haddock, and flounders.

5. N = 18, SD = 1.3, CI = ±0.3, p < 0.1.

6. N = 18, SD = 1.5, CI = ±0.6, p < 0.1.

7. In the two surveys of 2002 license holders and the survey of 2005 permit holders, the lobster fishery also included crabs, and the groundfishery included several species, so species counts would be much higher than fishery counts, especially for those involved in groundfishing.

8. Entry is a term of art in fishery management. It is adapted in this article to describe both customary and regulatory entry into the fishery. Lobstermen themselves simply talk of “going” lobstering, including to describe any initial vocational decision “to go.” Only rarely will they speak of whether or not other lobstermen will “let” someone “go” lobstering.

9. Down east is a relative term once used along the Eastern seaboard, originally referring to downwind sail transit with prevailing southwesterlies. When used to specify a region of Maine from a statewide perspective, present usage most often refers to the eastern quarter or third of the state coastline.

10. N = 29.

11. N = 29.