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Abstract
A troubling new political economy of geographical intelligence has emerged in the United States over the last two decades. The contours of this new political economy are difficult to identify due to official policies keeping much relevant information secret. The U.S. intelligence community increasingly relies on private corporations, working as contractors, to undertake intelligence work, including geographical intelligence (formally known as GEOINT). In this article we first describe the geography intelligence “contracting nexus” consisting of tens of thousands of companies (including those in the geographical information systems and mapping sector), universities and nonprofits receiving Department of Defense and intelligence agency funding. Second, we discuss the “knowledge nexus” to conceptualize how geographical knowledge figures in current U.S. intelligence efforts, themselves part of the U.S. war on terror and counterinsurgency (COIN). To analyze the contracting nexus we compiled and examined extensive data on military and intelligence contracts, especially those contracts awarded by the country's premier geographical intelligence agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), for satellite data. To analyze the knowledge nexus we examined recent changes in the type of geographical knowledges enrolled in and produced by the U.S. intelligence community. We note a shift from an emphasis on areal and cultural expertise to a focus on calculative predictive spatial analysis in geographical intelligence. Due to a lack of public oversight and accountability, the new political economy of geographical intelligence is not easy to research, yet there are reasons to be troubled by it and the violent surveillant state it supports.
过去二十多年来, 美国出现令人堪忧的崭新地理情报政治经济。此一新的政治经济图像并不容易辨识, 因为官方政策对相关的资讯进行保密。美国的情报社群, 逐渐仰赖私人企业以承包商的角色进行情报工作, 其中包含了地理情报 (正式名为GEOINT) 。我们在本文中首先描述地理情报一系列的 “合约纽结”, 该纽结由接受国防部与情报单位赞助的成千上万公司 (包含在地理信息系统与製图部门的公司) 、大学与非营利组织所构成。再者, 我们探讨 “知识纽结”, 用以概念化地理学知识在美国当前的情报工作中所扮演的角色, 这些工作隶属于美国反恐战争与反叛乱工作 (COIN) 的一部分。我们大量收集并检视军事及情报的合约资料, 特别是由国家最高地理情报单位”国家地理空间情报局 (NGA)” 所授予的卫星数据, 用以分析合约纽结。在分析知识纽结方面, 我们检视晚近由美国情报社群编入或生产的地理知识种类变化。我们注意到, 地理情报从强调区域和文化的专业, 转变为着重计算性的预防性空间分析。由于缺乏公共监督和可究责性, 新的地理情报政治经济并不容易进行研究, 但我们仍需担忧此一课题及其所支持的暴力监控国家。
Una nueva e inquietante economía política de la inteligencia geográfica ha hecho su aparición en los Estados Unidos durante las dos últimas décadas. No es fácil identificar los contornos de esta nueva economía política debido a políticas oficiales que mantienen secreta la información más relevante. Cada vez más la comunidad de la inteligencia de los EE.UU. depende de corporaciones privadas, que trabajan como contratistas cuandoquiera se necesite trabajo de inteligencia, la inteligencia geográfica incluida (formalmente conocida como GEOINT). En este artículo primero que todo describimos el “nexo contratista” de la inteligencia geográfica, el cual consiste en decenas de miles de compañías (incluso aquellas en los sistemas de información geográfica y el sector cartográfico), universidades y entidades no lucrativas, que reciben financiación del Departamento de Defensa y de la agencia de inteligencia. En segundo término, discutimos el “nexo del conocimiento” para conceptualizar cómo figura el conocimiento geográfico dentro de los actuales empeños de la inteligencia de EE.UU., ellos mismos una parte de la guerra norteamericana contra el terrorismo y de la contrainsurgencia (COIN). Para analizar el nexo contratista compilamos y examinamos una gran cantidad de datos sobre contratos militares y de inteligencia, en especial aquellos adjudicados por la principal entidad de inteligencia geográfica del país, la Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia Geoespacial (NGA), para datos satelitales. Para analizar el nexo del conocimiento examinamos los cambios recientes en el tipo de conocimientos geográficos escogidos y producidos por la comunidad de la inteligencia norteamericana. Notamos un cambio apreciable en el énfasis sobre experticia regional y cultural, por una mayor atención sobre un bien calculado análisis espacial predictivo en términos de inteligencia geográfica. Debido a la falta de visibilidad y responsabilidad pública, la nueva economía política de inteligencia geográfica no es fácil de investigar, pero aun así hay buenas razones de preocupación por ésta y por el violento estado vigilante que ella apoya.
Acknowledgments
Susan M. Roberts acknowledges the support of the University of Turku, Finland, and the Fulbright Program. We would like to acknowledge valuable feedback received from colleagues at the University of Turku, University of Oulu, University of Tampere, University of Amsterdam, University of Wageningen, the Turku School of Economics, Columbus State University, and Harvard University, who heard presentations based on versions of this article. The authors thank the anonymous referees and the Editor, whose critical comments and advice were very helpful in sharpening the argument.
Notes
1. Despite its name, no captures are known to date in more than 400 covert drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between 3,000 and 4,600 people have been killed in those countries.
2. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) contains the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and oversees the National Intelligence Program (NIP).
3. Data from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS–NG). For a fuller discussion of DOD contracting, see Turse (2008).
4. In an interview in 2008, the Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital confirmed that there are around 100,000 government personnel in the IC and another 37,000 “core” contractors. He estimated the cost per civilian government worker at $125,000 and $207,000 per contractor (Sanders 2008). If correct, that would indicate an IC salary budget of approximately $20 billion per year.
5. The number is at least this high because the government was unable to categorize 327,000 clearances as either a government employee or contractor (ODNI 2012a).
6. A 1996 report revealed that the NRO funding levels were six times that of the Defense Mapping Agency (as the NGA was called at the time) and twice as much as that of the CIA and NSA (Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1996).
7. Title 10 USC §467 (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—Definitions 2004) defines GEOINT as “exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth.”
8. The move was part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure and suffered significant cost overruns of 128 percent (General Accountability Office 2012).
9. For example, in 2004 the NGA issued a presolicitation for a Global Geospatial Intelligence contract with Esri, to extend through January 2013. This was apparently for the PALENTERRA software and database that has been implemented for the USGS National Map.
10. According to satellite observers, the first KH-11 to launch since 2005 was NRO L-49 on 20 January 2011 (Ray 2011).
12. In 2012 the U.S. government spent about $13 billion on protecting classified information, double the amount a decade ago (Shane 2012).
13. Some senators, notably Paul (R-KY) and Wyden (D-OR) have raised objections to the search powers of the Patriot Act. Paul held up the renewal vote for several days in 2011. In March 2013 Senator Paul filibustered the nomination of John O. Brennan as director of the CIA for almost thirteen hours in protest at the administration's lack of transparency over its legal authorities to use UAVs to kill individuals.