Autonomy as Rule by the Self

Abstract

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett [2013b] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.

Keywords:

• agency
• autonomy
• Garnett

Notes

¹ Where B is subject to A's will on Garnett's [2013b: §2.1] view iff (i) A's desire that p plays a significant causal role in bringing it about that B attempts to bring it about that p; (ii) where the process described in (i) proceeds via some change to B's opportunity set, it is the case neither that B could reasonably refuse to act in accordance with A's desire, nor that B would endorse the interference, were she to know of it; (iii) where the process described in (i) proceeds not via some change to B's opportunity set, it is the case both that (a) A intends to bring it about that B brings it about that p and (b) B would not endorse A's intention to get him to act by these means, were B to know of that intention (and where the endorsement in (ii) or (iii) is not itself a product of B's prior subjection to a foreign will).

² As Garnett [2013b: §2.2] acknowledges, this means that an agent who is difficult to control but unluckily finds herself subject to a foreign will is substantially autonomous. Garnett's statement that his account understands autonomy as the absence of rule by others is therefore not quite correct; autonomy is on that account understood as resistance to rule by others.

³ In the context in which Garnett employs it, this understanding is meant to capture all parts of oneself that might rule over other parts. He goes on to equate this with all parts of one's mind, and my addition of mental capacities thus seems a safe one.

⁴ It may be that some traits have both internal and external components. We can regard any such trait as agent-internal.