The Concept of Yi (义) in the Mencius and Problems of Distributive Justice

¹Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy 2012 Annual Meeting, at the Center for East Asian and Comparative Philosophy, City University of Hong Kong, and the Columbia University Neo-Confucian Seminar. I thank those who gave feedback on the paper on those occasions, as well as the anonymous referees, whose comments helped improve this paper significantly. I bear sole responsibility for its remaining inadequacies, omissions, and errors.

Abstract

This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as ‘appropriateness’, ‘right’, ‘rightness’, even ‘justice’) in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive emphasis in justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources, and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods. Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our ethical attention from ‘who gets what?’ to ‘how should we relate to others?’ within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity.

Keywords:

• Confucianism
• Confucian ethics
• relational ethics
• virtue
• appropriateness (yi)

Notes

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy 2012 Annual Meeting, at the Center for East Asian and Comparative Philosophy, City University of Hong Kong, and the Columbia University Neo-Confucian Seminar. I thank those who gave feedback on the paper on those occasions, as well as the anonymous referees, whose comments helped improve this paper significantly. I bear sole responsibility for its remaining inadequacies, omissions, and errors.

² Cf. Lau's [1984] translation of ‘duan 端’ as ‘germ’.

³ Some examples of such opposition are found in Mencius 1A1, 6B4, 7A25. See also [Hall and Ames 1987: 93].

⁴ These generic norms are no different from the non-foundational, non-universalistic, and non-absolute principles employed in public policy and practical decision-making mentioned earlier. I choose to use the term ‘norms’ to side-step the tendency of many readers steeped in the Chinese Philosophy vocabulary debates to treat principles as essentially foundational.

⁵ Mencius himself did not make this point explicitly, although it is implicit in his interactions with the King. Mencius’ own explanation, that his accepting a position without pay to begin with was because he had no intention to stay long in Qi [2B14], made after he departed from Qi very reluctantly, ‘hoping against hope’ that the King would ‘change his mind’ and employ him [2B12], seems to be more of a face-saving excuse than a good explanation.

⁶ That this is what Mencius expected is made clear in 2B12, when Mencius explained that he took his time departing from Qi because he ‘hoped against hope that the king would change his mind’. He continued, ‘If the king had employed me, it would not simply be a matter of bringing peace to the people of Qi, but of bringing peace to the people of the whole empire as well.’

⁷ In the relationship between ruler and ruled, Mencius demands that rulers put the people's interests first [7B14].

⁸ This system is described as ‘jing 井’, literally meaning ‘a well’, because the appearance of this character resembles the division of the plots.