Right Action as Virtuous Action

ABSTRACT

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.

KEYWORDS:

• right action
• virtuous action
• virtue ethics
• deontology
• consequentialism

Notes

¹ Motive-centred theorists may object to the target-centred account's implication that agents may perform right actions by accident. However, although agents do not merit praise for accidentally doing the right thing, it remains plausible that one can do the right thing for the wrong reason, at least on some occasions (see Van Zyl [2009] for an excellent discussion of accidental rightness). In addition, it is possible for target-centred accounts to allow that an agent's motives are relevant to the rightness of her action in some contexts [Swanton 2003: 231; Van Zyl 2014: 122–4].

² The qualification ‘non-trivial’ allows for the possibility that virtuous agents always aim to act well. Since acting well is amorphous, it may not distort the variety of ends of action. I do not mean that this end is trivial in all philosophical contexts.

³ There are additional reasons to prefer VE over consequentialisms. First, since some constitutive ends of virtue are agent-relative—e.g. those of prudence and filial piety—VE is superior in allowing for ultimate, agent-relative reasons for action. Second, consequentialist accounts require a base theory of value that is independent of aretaic notions, such as hedonism, preference satisfaction, or objective list theory. For a persuasive argument that such theories are implausible, see Swanton [2003: ch. 2].

⁴ RPV = Rightness (is) Prior (to) Virtuousness. It is unclear whether Crisp accepts RPV but, unless he does, he cannot conclude that speaking out is unjust from the premises that it is wrong and within the sphere of justice.

⁵ For a controversial example, Jeffrey Reiman [2002] argues that capital punishment is just in some circumstances but is never required by justice.

⁶ It does follow if the reciprocity of the virtues is assumed. However, the reciprocity of the virtues is a claim that is almost always supported by something like the assumption that each virtue issues in nothing but right conduct. If this is how one supports the reciprocity of the virtues, it is circular reasoning to use the reciprocity of the virtues as support for the claim that each virtue issues in nothing but right conduct.

⁷ I thank two anonymous referees and Stephen Hetherington for helpful comments and suggestions.