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Abstract
To articulate their understanding of Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’, commentators have often taken what I refer to as a ‘respect-first view’ on resemblance, in which they categorize resemblance as based on resembling respects. Holding this view, Donald Baxter argues that Hume’s view on the distinctions of reason leads to a contradiction. As an alternative, I offer ‘the resemblance-first view’, which is not dependent on resembling respects. I argue that this view is textually supported, and that it rescues Hume from the proposed contradiction.
Notes
1 References to the Treatise are abbreviated as ‘T’ and cited by book, part, section, and paragraph in the Norton and Norton edition, followed by the page number in the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch (SBN) edition.
2 References to Descartes are abbreviated as ‘AT’, and followed by the volume and page numbers in the Adam and Tannery edition, as given in the Cottingham et al. translation.
3 For various mediaeval theories of distinctions of reason and their complicated relations to Descartes, see Skirry [Citation2004] and Brown [Citation2011].
4 As Baxter [Citation2011: 162] rightly says, the ‘difference’ should be understood as the numerical distinctness. For example, Hume claims that perception of time is not different from perceptions of successive objects, by saying that it is not a sixth impression in addition to impressions of five notes [T 1.2.3.10: SBN 36].
5 As Baxter [Citation2011: 163] points out, since Hume thinks that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility [T 1.1.7.6: SBN 19–20], here separability by thought entails metaphysical separability.
6 Indeed, Skirry [Citation2004] develops this kind of interpretation of Descartes, stressing the influence of Duns Scotus’s ‘formal distinction’.
7 For example, Arnauld and Nicole [Citation1996: 38] characterize the distinction of reason in terms of abstraction to ‘ignore all the particular circumstances’ of an object, which Hume would reject.
8 Hume’s predecessors might also be ommitted to something like the separability principle. Indeed, Brown [Citation2011: 40–2] points out that Scotus and Suárez (and Descartes, influenced by them) sometimes suggest that things distinguished conceptually are numerically identical. Still, Hume’s strong and explicit adherence to the separability principle distinguishes him from others. At least, Descartes, who presumably has a direct influence on Hume, does not (at least) explicitly show a commitment to such a principle. Hume’s sticking to it suggests that he tries to take a different approach to the distinction from how his predecessors treat it.
9 Brown suggests that Suárez and Descartes also could appeal to a relational feature of an object in their notions of distinctions of reason [Citation2011: 42–4]. Thus, although I focus on the difference between Hume and his predecessors, this would suggest an important similarity between them.
10 Baxter [Citation2011: 179] expresses the view as follows: ‘the presence of respects is prior to the sorting into classes.’
11 Baxter seems to think of the distinctions of reason in a different way, but, as shown below, I think that his interpretation can be described in the same way as Tweyman’s. According to the above explanation by Tweyman, we need only one comparison in order to distinguish between figure and colour. In other words, in the case of a white globe, we need only one comparison between a white globe and a white cube because, in that comparison, we can achieve a contrast between the similarity of colour and the dissimilarity of figure. However, Baxter [Citation2011: 156, 170] appears to think that we need a further comparison in order to accomplish distinctions of reason. In the case of a white globe, it must be compared with a white cube and a black sphere, for example. In my view, however, Baxter does not show why this additional comparison is necessarily required. Based on the respect-first view of resemblance, we can see that a white globe is similar to a white cube with respect to colour and dissimilar to it with respect to figure. Now, the contrast between colour and figure has been achieved and one comparison is sufficient for the distinctions of reason, given the respect-first view. Thus, Baxter’s position can be expressed along the same lines as Tweyman’s.
12 Garrett [Citation1997: 63–4] also points out the close connection between abstraction and distinctions of reason, although Broughton [Citation2000: 284] understands them as separate.
13 Hoffman [Citation2011: 1135–6] suggests a point similar to my interpretation of Hume’s account of existence. I agree with his interpretation, but I will develop a different implication of Hume’s view on it.
14 Nevertheless, Hume sometimes refers to existence of objects (see, for example, [T 1.1.5.8: SBN 15]). It seems puzzling how this kind of talk is possible, given his denial of distinctions of reason for existence. Hume is unclear on this point, but, at least, existence should be conceived of without any distinction between itself and an object, no matter what, precisely, such a conception of existence would be. While this matter is important, it is not my focus in this paper. My focus is on the general structure of distinctions of reason, rather than on determining Hume’s exact view of existence.
15 I am not saying that all resemblances are of this kind. My view on resemblance in general is a hybrid of the resemblance-first view and the respect-first view. My claim is intended only for such a resemblance between things that have inseparable parts such as colour or shape. Aside from such cases, resemblances can be based on resembling respects. When I say, for example, that I am similar to my friend in wearing glasses, this talk of resemblance should be based on the respect-based account, since the glasses are separable from myself.
16 Naturally, an additional question arises: ‘What is the nature of such a difference among resemblances?’ Since the difference in this context means difference in kind (namely, dissimilarity), a question arises as to whether the dissimilarity between resemblances is a respect-based one. Hume does not clearly discuss relations between resemblances, but I think that the dissimilarity can be understood as a respect-based dissimilarity. For example, resemblance(white) is dissimilar to resemblance(globe) with respect to the kind of resemblance: namely, resemblance(white) is dissimilar to resemblance(globe) because the former lacks the latter kind of resemblance. Unlike the case of colour and shape, the resemblance is in a way separable from its parts. For example, consider the resemblance between a white globe and a white cube. Although resemblance cannot exist without the two objects, given that we can think of each object without the resemblance relation, we can distinguish the resemblance from the objects. Thus, the difference between resemblances can be based on the aspect of dissimilarity.
17 This suggests that it is not contingent on explaining distinctions of reason, Hume prepares three objects (white globe, white cube, and black globe). If I am correct, distinctions of reason essentially need two different comparisons. This is contrary to Tweyman’s view that they are achieved in just one comparison.
18 Thus, in my interpretation, there are no two objects that do not resemble. I think that Hume admits this fact. In addition to the fact that at least any object resembles others in its existence, he regards resemblance relation in such a broad manner as to allow that everything is similar to another thing. He says that resemblance is necessary for any comparison of objects. ‘(N)o objects will admit of comparison, what have some degree of resemblance’ [T 1.1.5.3: SBN 14]. Even objects that are contrary to each other can be said to resemble [T 1.1.5.6: SBN 15]. This broad interpretation of resemblance seems to allow that there are no objects that do not resemble.
19 Baxter [Citation2011: 176] expects a seemingly similar view that the respects of resemblance are distinct relations, and argues that such a view cannot avoid the contradiction. But I think that such a view differs from my view. According to him, that view relies on what he calls implicit respects. It says that, when a white globe is similar to a white cube with respect to its colour, the respect of dissimilarity of shape is kept implicit. My interpretation does not posit such an implicit respect of dissimilarity. Rather, the dissimilarity is explained by different kinds of resemblance, not implicit respects.
20 Given that resemblance is something that cannot be perceived independently of its relata, it would be reasonable to additionally ask exactly what kind of entity it is. I cannot fully answer this question here, but some interpretations of it would be compatible with my view. For example, Jani Hakkarainen claims that Humean resemblance is ‘ungrounded internal relation’ [Citation2012: 63] between simple perceptions, which are understood as tropes. Since he thinks that such a resemblance does not require the point of resemblance to be specified in advance [ibid.: 61–2], this seems to be compatible with the resemblance-first view. Yumiko Inukai [Citation2010] argues that, given Hume’s commitment to atomism, for Hume relations are likely to be something felt in the imagination. If so, even such a felt resemblance could be something that holds without mentioning points of resemblance.
21 This also enables my view to accommodate Hume’s claim that resemblance supervenes on the relata [T 1.3.1.1–2: SBN 69–70]. Assume that there is resemblance(white) between a white globe and a white cube. Since a resemblance relation is dependent on its relata, in order to change this resemblance, we need to change the relata. For example, if we would like to change the resemblance(white) into a resemblance(globe), we need to change the white cube with something global. Thus, a change in relata is necessary for a change in resemblance. This suggests that Hume is not an advocate of the resemblance-nominalism, where resemblance is supposed to determine the nature of resembling objects. In my view, resemblance relations still depend on the nature of the relata. Again, what I am opposing is the claim that resemblance depends not only on its relata, but also on resembling respects.
22 As long as resemblance is not supposed to exist on its own, my interpretation of Hume does not set him radically apart from his nominalist predecessors. Brown [Citation2012] suggests that, in the mediaeval to early modern period, one of the issues that distinguishes nominalism about relations from realism is that of whether relations are thought of as something over and above their relata.
23 I would like to thank Amy Schmitter and Donald Ainslie for patiently commenting on earlier versions of this paper. I also thank Yasuo Deguchi, Yumiko Inukai, Masashi Kasaki, Hsueh Qu, Nathan Sasser, Ryo Tanaka, an audience from the 43rd International Hume conference, and three referees of this journal for their valuable comments.