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ABSTRACT
In ‘Theism and Dialetheism’, Cotnoir explores the idea that dialetheism (true contradictions) can help with some puzzles about omnipotence in theology. In this note, I delineate another aspect of this project. Dialetheism cannot help with one big puzzle about another classic ‘omni’ property, omnibenevolence—the famous problem of evil. For someone (including a dialetheist) who thinks that the existence of evil is a knock-down argument against traditional theism, it is a knock-down argument against dialetheic theism, too.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For related work, see Beall and Cotnoir [Citation2017] and Beall [Citationforthcoming].
2 Thus setting aside a (dialetheic) theology in which God is simply not omnibenevolent after all—thereby (I think) conceding traditional theism: cf. Martin [Citation1974: 232]. See Schellenberg [Citation2015: ch.7] for why we should expect an ‘ultimate’ God to be omnibenevolent.
3 Priest [Citation1998] suggests that Nicholas of Cusa held God to be a ‘trivial object’.
4 Another problem in the vicinity: with , consider the absurdity stone, a stone so absurd that, if God created it, then
(cf. [Tedder and Badia Citation2018]). A response would be to note an analogy to Curry’s paradox, for which the implication connective of DK is safe.
5 See Beall [Citationforthcoming: objection 6 and n29].
6 This touches on the question of when two paradoxes are of the same kind. See the taxonomy, following Nagasawa [2008], in Beall and Cotnoir [Citation2017: n1], distinguishing between paradoxes intrinsic to omni-properties, and paradoxes relating to empirical features of the world. For paradoxes that arise between two omni-properties, see Mizrahi [Citation2013].
7 We could add a premise about omniscience, too: either God knows about the existence of evil or He does not [Nagasawa Citation2008]. But this would complicate, without adding anything to, the discussion—the atheistic conclusion is the same—so I’ve omitted it.
8 Standard dialetheic logics (like LP or DK) include the law of excluded middle, and I don’t question that here (see Beall and Cotnoir [Citation2017]). I also assume a conditional obeying modus ponens. The glutty theology of Beall [Citationforthcoming] takes FDE to be correct, which allows for ‘gaps’, and which on its own does not have a detachable conditional; so this paper is orthogonal to that and related work.
9 As God told Job [Job 40:8]. To which, Job says, ‘I am unworthy—how can I reply to you?’ Plantinga famously suggests that evil could be due to ‘Satan and his cohorts’ [Citation1974: 58].
10 Thus I am upgrading the logical problem of evil (e.g. Mackie [Citation1955: 200]), replacing simple inconsistency with absolute absurdity. For non-logical problems of evil, see, for example, Maring [Citation2012] and Poston [Citation2014].
11 Cf. Frankfurt [Citation1964: 263]: ‘If an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible, then he can not only create situations which he cannot handle but … can handle situations which he cannot handle.’
12 Setting aside fictionalism (cf. Kroon [Citation2004]), or perhaps the ultimate unpopular idea—Meinongian dialetheic theism.
13 Thanks to Aaron Cotnoir and Jc Beall for constructive discussion on earlier drafts of this note; to the audience at the 2017 New Zealand Association of Philosophers Conference; and to two anonymous referees for very helpful clarifying comments.