The Normative Error Theorist Cannot Avoid Self-Defeat

ABSTRACT

Many philosophers have noted that normative error theorists appear to be committed to saying ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which seems paradoxical. In defence of error theory, some have claimed that the word ‘reason’ in that statement is ambiguous between ‘normative reason’ and a purely descriptive sense of ‘reason’ that the error theorist can accept. I argue, however, that there is no descriptive sense of ‘reason’ that can prevent the paradox from re-emerging. Moreover, these implications of error theory probably provide good grounds for rejecting the view.

KEYWORDS:

• error theory
• nihilism
• self-defeat
• moral error theory
• epistemic normativity
• normative reasons
• Moore paradox

Notes

1 For overviews of the literature, see Williams [2015a, 2015b].

2 ‘Just Plain Ought’ is also known as ‘ought simpliciter’ or ‘all-things-considered ought’. For a defence of the idea that there is a Just Plain Ought, see Case [2016]. For a critique of that claim, see Baker [2018].

3 Pascal’s wager-like cases, in which practical reasons overwhelm epistemic reasons, might be an exception to ordinary circumstances. For an argument that epistemic reasons can be commensurable with practical reasons, see Booth [2014].

4 I assume that, if normative error theory is true, the instantiation of normative properties would be impossible.

5 See Shafer-Landau [2003: 231–346] and Huemer [2005: 199–214] for responses of this kind.

6 For a critique of Streumer’s claims about the believability of error theory, see Lillehammer and Möller [2015].

7 Kolodny [2005], for example, is sceptical that there are specific reasons to be rational in this way. For a comprehensive discussion of the normativity of rationality in this sense, see Way [2010]. But this sense of ‘rationality’ is distinct from all-things-considered ought, or Just Plain Ought.

8 I would like to thank, in no particular order, Alastair Norcross, Michael Huemer, Chris Heathwood, Terence Cuneo, Graham Oddie, Jim Skidmore, Derek Baker, Tyler Paytas, Rishi Joshi, Oliver Traldi, Joshua Blanchard and Stephen Kershnar for comments on previous drafts of this paper. I also owe thanks for the three anonymous reviewers at this journal.