Can Duties to the Self Bind if They Are Waivable?

ABSTRACT

It is often argued that, because she would always be in the position to waive it, a person cannot owe a duty to herself. In a recent AJP article, Janis David Schaab argues that a person can owe a duty to herself even if it can be waived, thus rendering unwarranted a scepticism about such duties, as well as efforts to show that they are unwaivable. Here I argue that, for all that Schaab says, waivability continues to threaten the very possibility of duties to self. As such, scepticism about their existence remains justified, as do attempts to vindicate them by demonstrating that they cannot be waived.

KEYWORDS:

• duties to the self
• duty
• obligation

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For helpful comments, I thank Janis David Schaab, David Cummiskey, Mike Dacey, Rafeeq Hasan, Nina Hagel, and Susan Stark.