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ABSTRACT
In this paper I identify a distinct form of epistemic injustice and oppression which I call ‘hermeneutical sabotage’. Hermeneutical sabotage occurs when dominantly situated knowers actively maintain or worsen the dominant hermeneutical resources for understanding the experiences or identities of marginalised groups. They do this through actively distorting the resistant hermeneutical resources developed by marginalised groups, and by introducing new, prejudiced hermeneutical resources. I develop a taxonomy of four forms hermeneutical sabotage can take, giving an example of each, and explain the difference between ‘hermeneutical sabotage’ and other types of epistemic injustice. I demonstrate the importance of having the concept of hermeneutical sabotage for recognising how it can be used, intentionally or unintentionally, to further the aims of harmful political movements. I give examples of hermeneutical sabotage which furthers the aims of transphobic, racist, and anti-immigrant political movements.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Katharine Jenkins and Mona Simion for their comments on this paper, and to members of the Scottish Feminist Philosophy Network postgraduate group and Scottish Epistemology Early Career Researchers, who provided valuable feedback.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Contrary to Fricker (Citation2015: 80), I consider hermeneutical marginalisation intrinsically disadvantageous. Hermeneutical marginalisation can be a component of epistemic oppression, and will always be actualised as a hermeneutical injustice as it is not possible to entirely avoid communication with others (Ruíz Citation2020: 702–3).
2 While the perpetrator of hermeneutical sabotage in this case will disadvantage themself by worsening prejudices in the dominant hermeneutical resources that apply to them, they should not be considered one of the primary victims of their own hermeneutical sabotage because they do not worsen their own hermeneutical marginalisation.
3 A similar argument, that ‘transwoman’ and ‘transman’ position trans people in a third sex category, is made by Serano (Citation2016: 29–30).
4 The words used to refer to trans people are frequently contested within trans communities, and over time terms rise and fall in popularity. These changes can reflect minor linguistic preferences or can convey changes in the understanding of trans identities or shifts in emphasis that are important for contemporary political projects (see Serano Citation2014 for a more detailed discussion of this). I am not suggesting that ‘trans woman’ is the only appropriate term, or that those who use or used ‘transwoman’ in a trans-inclusive way are wrong to do so. However, uses of ‘transwoman’ by those opposed to the goals of trans liberation movements are not part of the productive contestation of terms that occurs within trans communities.
5 While trans women may be the primary targets of hermeneutical sabotage in this case and experience the greatest harm because of that sabotage, they are unlikely to be the only group that experience harm. For example, a cisgender lesbian in a relationship with a trans woman may also find that epistemic resources necessary for understanding her lived experiences, such as the word ‘lesbian’, are undermined by the propagation of hermeneutical resources that exclude trans women from the category of women. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
6 I do not claim that the categorisation of people as ‘asylum seekers’ is how border and immigration law should work, only that because people are categorised as ‘asylum seekers’, having the original concept associated with the term enables people to communicate aspects of their experiences which are lost when the prejudices in the dominant hermeneutical resources are worsened through the association of a prejudiced concept with this term.
7 I remain neutral as to whether the case Luzzi describes is a form of hermeneutical injustice as he claims, but this issue is orthogonal to my point.
8 Examples of how the terms used to describe transgender women reflect positions on trans rights issues include uses of ‘transwoman' and misgendering (Hinsliff Citation2019; Lawford-Smith Citation2021) by those opposed to self-ID based reform of the UK Gender Recognition Act (2004) and trans women’s access to gender segregated spaces for women.