The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins

ABSTRACT

In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.

KEYWORDS:

• Husserl
• Phenomenology
• Philosophy of Action

Introduction

I am crossing the street. Halfway to the other side, I see a car approaching at great speed. I involuntarily speed up my pace without even paying attention to the fact that I am doing so. The car, however, shows no sign of slowing down, so I am urged to turn toward my movement, deciding to walk even faster, this time voluntarily. Eventually, I barely make it to the other side of the street before the car speeds by me.

In this example, one can observe the origin of an action: a drive-movement is triggered by empirical stimuli. I am affected by this drive-movement and, if I am enticed enough, turn toward it. In doing so, I do not just passively follow up my drive, thereby turning it into my non-voluntary doing, but rather voluntarily carry on the movement, thereby performing an action in the strict sense of the term. In a nutshell, this is how Husserl phenomenologically analyses the genesis of action. As Ullrich Melle notes,¹ between 1909 and 1914 the father of phenomenology analysed emotive and volitional phenomena within the context of a broader investigation into consciousness, the end result of which was a systematic description of its three main domains: the theoretical, the practical, and the evaluative. Although this wider project never reached a conclusion, remaining instead in a fragmentary state, the scope of Husserl’s research is still impressive, spanning more than 1000 manuscript pages, which, in 1926–27, were collected by Ludwig Landgrebe in a folder that he appropriately labelled “Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins”. After more than 90 years, this collection is going to be published under the same title in the Husserliana Gesammelte Werke. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss, in conversation with the main studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of action and volition that have been published in recent years,² Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in “Wille und Handlung”, which is the third volume of this Husserliana edition.

In what follows, I clarify how a “voluntary action” (willkürliche Handlung) has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing” (unwillkürliches Tun), and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” (Tendenz) of the will. I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process” (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, I delimit the full scope of actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness” (Willkürlichkeit). After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can” (Bewusstsein des Ich kann). Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will” (Willenspassivität). As part of my discussion, I also address the long-debated issue of whether Husserl’s genetic analysis of volitional consciousness calls into question the foundational model of his static analysis.

I. Voluntary Action as a Volitional Process

In the chapter entitled “Die Handlung as willentlicher Vorgang” of the Studien, Husserl describes the most universal essence of an action as follows:

What is that which is absolutely universal in an action? Apart from such distinctions yet to be considered, what makes up its most universal essence? Well, that it is a process, which is a volitional process. Not: my volition or anyone’s volition taken as a state and, on the other side, a process of external nature or a second process of internal nature, and either my state or my psychical process of the will, a “cause” in the natural sense that empirically motivates the occurrence of the other process. This is a completely new thought. On the contrary, a process with the ontic character of positing of the will, of practical, productive [positing; NS]. And this character goes through and through, although we have a distinct point of inception, the starting point, etc. This belongs to the essence of action. That is, if I represent to myself an action, then I must represent all this.³ [Hua XLIII.3, 13]

According to Husserl, the will is not an empirical cause of action.⁴ For example, from the phenomenological point of view, the ego’s will to cross the street is not an empirical cause that is followed by the action of walking, as if this action were, indeed, a physical or psychophysical effect of the ego’s willing.⁵ Instead, a phenomenological analysis of action shows that its most universal feature is that it is a “volitional process” (willentlicher Vorgang). When the ego wills to cross the street, the bodily movement of walking is a process which is volitional in each of its phases. As Husserl says: “[i]n every voluntary movement I have a starting point with which this action begins, but the entire movement has not merely ‘arisen from a will’, but is, in its entire course, volitional, in every phase characterised as volitional” (Hua XLIII.3, 3). Therefore, he points out, “[…] the process is called action only insofar as it is characterized as a process of the will, namely it is action in and with this character of the will (creative character). Every acting is therefore eo ipso a willing […]” (Hua XLIII.3, 24).

To clarify the precise sense in which an action is a volitional process, let me introduce Husserl’s analysis of “straightforward action” (schlichte Handlung), namely an action that is straightforwardly executed by the ego, such as, for example, the ego’s simultaneous willing to cross the street and walking to the other side. Husserl writes:

It belongs to the essence of [straightforward; NS]⁶ action to be this type of whole: to be fiat and productive action, that is, a springing forth from the fiat and, further, to be carried in its appearance by a certain volitional moment of the springing forth and in accordance with the sense of the course of the will [Willensverlaufs] […]. [Hua XLIII.3, 12–13]

For Husserl, the ontic fiat and the action springing forth from it are the “positum” (Satz) of a phansic “realising positing of the will” (realisierende Willenssetzung) or, as he also calls it, a “practical” (praktische), “productive positing” (schöpferische Setzung) (see Hua XLIII.3, 8, 13; see also Hua XXVIII, 45, 155).⁷ In Husserl’s jargon, a “positum” (Satz) is the objective correlate of an intentional act of consciousness qua “posited” (gesetzt) in such an act. That is to say, a positum is the unity of the “sense” (Sinn) and “validity” (Geltung) that something exhibits qua the intended object of an intentional experience (See Hua III.1, §133). For instance, if the ego perceives a yellow lemon, in its act of sensible perception this intended object is posited as having the sense “a yellow lemon” and the validity “actually existing object”. Instead, the validity that pertains to the intentional object posited in act of memory is that of “previously existed object”, while in expectation it is that of “object coming into existence”. In the case of the experience of action, the intended object is posited as having the validity “object coming-to-be” and “object to-be-realized-practically”. As Husserl says: “the productive positing of the fiat at the beginning of the simple action is such that the process is posited in advance as coming-to-be [seinwerdender] and as a practical it-shall-be [praktisch seinsollender] (to be realised practically)” (Hua XLIII.3, 13). Husserl thus uses the terms “realising”, “productive”, and “practical” in association with the positing of the fiat and of the action to emphasize that the intentional object of an act of will is posited as a “volitional” process, that is, as a process that the ego brings about (wirkt) through its doing (Tun).

Importantly, though, through the fiat a process is not just posited as something that, sooner or later, will be practically realized by the ego. More radically, the volitional process takes place immediately as a “consequence of the will” (infolge des Willens), i.e. as a consequence of the ego’s performance of the fiat. Accordingly, Husserl often calls the fiat an “affirmation of the will” (Willensbejahung), or “decision of the will” (Willensentscheidung), and describes the relation between it and the action in terms of a “fulfilment of the will” (Willenserfüllung) or “satisfaction of the will” (Willensbefriedigung): the fiat is an empty “intention of the will” (Willensintention) that is either fulfilled or disappointed by the givenness of the action (see Hua XLIII.3, ch. 2, §2). Furthermore, since the fiat is not the effect of an empirical cause, but is spontaneously performed by the ego (see Hua XLIII.3, 5; 9–10), the action springing forth from it is “voluntary” (willkürlich).⁸ For example, the voluntary action of crossing the street starts with the ego’s spontaneous performance of the fiat, and, in all its phases, from the initial steps to the arrival at the other side, it remains a volitional process that the ego intends to realize on the basis of its practical, productive ability to do something.

II. The Degrees of Voluntariness: Attentive Actions vs Mechanised Actions

In order to fully and precisely delimit the scope of possible actions, I now turn to the analysis of the possible degrees of “voluntariness” (Willkürlichkeit). Indeed, Husserl remarks that there are different degrees to which an action can be voluntary. To exemplify this, he contrasts highly voluntary actions, such as carefully crossing a rickety bridge, which are, so to speak, executed with great “attentiveness” (Achtsamkeit) and “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) (see Hua XLIII.3, 11), with inattentive actions such the hand movements in piano playing or smoking, which can be executed without paying any attention to them (see Hua XLIII.3, 9–12). In this respect, I venture to say that in Husserl’s phenomenology we actually find what Steven Crowell argues to be missing therein, namely “an approach to the categorial structure of action that arises from the description of non-deliberated action”.⁹ Indeed, just as with non-voluntary doings and drives (see, respectively, §III and §IV below), inattentive actions are not attended to by the ego and flow “quasi-mechanically” (gleichsam mechanisch), yet they still count as voluntary actions; the only difference is that, in the case of inattentive actions, the “voluntariness (ontically: the volitionality) is at the same time of a different character” (Hua XLIII.3, 10). These actions, in fact, represent a case of the ““mechanisation” of acting. [That is, NS] the triggering of non-voluntary courses, which previously were voluntary” (see Hua XLIII.3, 105 note 12). A paradigmatic case, I suggest, is inattentive walking: as adults, we almost never pay attention to and attentively perform this action. Yet, as children, when we have to learn how to walk properly, we do so.

Although mechanized actions, such as inattentively moving the hands in piano playing and smoking, or the legs in walking, are not voluntary in the eminent sense, “all these movements of the body”, Husserl maintains, “have the character of freedom, insofar as they are not empirically motivated,” but instead “[…] flow “in the sense” of the initiatory willing of smoking [or of the initiatory willing of playing the piano or walking; NS],” (Hua XLIII.3, 10). That is to say, although mechanized actions are volitional processes that run in a non-voluntary or quasi-mechanical manner, they are triggered by the ego’s spontaneous performance of the fiat and are not the effect of an empirical cause¹⁰:

A movement volitionally flows, but “quasi mechanically” as in smoking or making a visit, or as in the movement of the hands in piano playing, etc. On the other hand, the motivation is not phenomenological-causal, namely in the ordinary empirical sense of how external processes of things phenomenally [erscheinungsmäßig] motivate processes of things. [Hua XLIII.3, 10]

Another interesting aspect regarding mechanized actions is the following. Contra Alexander Pfänder, Husserl argues that the performance of action does not require the objectification of the act of will in reflection (see Hua XLIII.3, 71–72)¹¹: in order to act, I do not need to reflect on, and hence objectify, my own willing of the action, a fact already pointed out by Mertens.¹² It is sufficient that I objectify the action as the intentional correlate of my act of will. Yet, Husserl argues that, in the case of mechanized actions, even the ego’s objectification of the action is unnecessary. For example, if I walk “quasi-mechanically” (gleichsam mechanisch), I do not need to pay attention to my action of walking.¹³

That said, one should be careful not to conflate “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) with “attentiveness” (Achtsamkeit). For Husserl, there is a distinction between the two:

Let us take cases in which I do not only pay attention to the path but must pay attention to it, as opposed to cases in which the attention is indifferent and the flow of the action has the character of flowing “by itself”. I walk along a shaky bridge, a beam over a creek: here I must constantly pay attention to the path, and each step is volitional in a specific manner. It may be that I go very slowly and I perform a particular fiat for each step; in that case, I have a compound action. It may be also that I go quickly, at a stride, but with “great attentiveness”. […] attentiveness is obviously not merely attention [Aufmerksamkeit] to the action, but a character of activity in the will. The “pay attention! [Sei aufmerksam!],” “be attentive! [Sei achtsam!]” that the teacher says to the student does not concern the mere attention [Aufmerksamkeit], but also the active manner of performance of the will in contemplating, in conduct in general. Likewise, when the boss shouts to the subordinate: “Mind out! [Aufgepasst!],” the action should not proceed mechanically as in sleep, but the flow of the will should be characterised differently. [Hua XLIII.3, 11; see also Hua XLIII.3, 82]

By “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit) and “attentiveness” (Achtsamkeit) Husserl means the ego’s thematic objectification and manner of active performance of the action, respectively.¹⁴ The reason for which attention should not be conflated with attentiveness is that even if “creative [i.e. fully voluntary; NS] actions are always attended to [beachtet]” (Hua XLIII.3, 10), what makes them voluntary in the eminent sense is not merely the fact that the ego pays attention to them. In fact, Husserl remarks, “I can also pay attention to the action, to the motion of the finger when playing or the like, while the movement does not lose this quasi mechanical character. It just runs further” (Hua XLIII.3, 10; see also XLIII.3, 81).

What confers a higher voluntary character on the action, and thus determines it as having been performed with great “attentiveness” (Achtsamkeit), apart from “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit), is the way in which the fiat is related to the action itself:

But where the action goes on “by itself,” flows “quasi mechanically,” there it proceeds “in the sense” of the will (but also the natural and willed outcome of the primary action does this). Furthermore, it has a creative character, insofar as it has primarily “arisen from the fiat” all over and is not merely a secondary natural following. In general, that which occurs in the primary action is not merely occurring, but creation of the will. But now there is, therein, the great difference that the action is continuous creation, either onetime or enduring [einmalige oder beständige], [i.e.; NS] that the practical positing of the fiat, the volitional thesis, either stands only at a point, at the starting point, and from it, so to speak, the entire primary action springs forth (in compound actions as many times as we find simple sub-actions [Teilhandlungen] of a primary kind), or that the thesis is something continuous, so to speak, covering the entire action is in each phase. [Hua XLIII.3, 12]

At the two opposite ends of an action there is, on the one side, the fiat, which is designated as the “source-point of the will” (Springpunkt des Willens) or simply “creative source-point” (kreativer Springpunkt), although Husserl also refers to it as an “impulse” (Impuls) or “starting point” (Ansatzpunkt), and, on the other side, the “creative end point” (kreativer Endpunkt) or “goal point” (Zielpunkt), which, once the action is done, has the “character of accomplished intention” (Charakter der vollbrachten Absicht), or of an “achieved goal” (erreichtes Ziel). However, in the passage above, Husserl tells us that in the case of fully attentive actions the fiat is not just, as in mechanized actions, the starting point of the volitional process, but rather it covers this process in its entirety, thereby mastering it in the most voluntary manner possible. Indeed, by continuously performing the fiat, the ego brings about and directs each phase of the action, as in the case with, e.g. cautiously crossing a beam over a creek. Or, if the action is not “simple” (einfach) but “compound” (zusammengesetzt), that is, it is made up of further independent actions, then the ego can take full voluntary control by repeating the performance of the fiat as many times as there are sub-actions. For Husserl, in a compound action there must be, indeed, as many fiats as there are independent sub-actions that make up the compound (see Hua XLIII.3, 41). As an example, one can consider a voluntary bodily movement in which the ego compensates, by performing each time a new voluntary sub-movement, for the effects of forces that would otherwise interfere with the achievement of the final goal (cf. Hua XLIII.3, 4), as happens in an obstacle course, where each hurdle hop is a sub-action of the compound action of running, whose goal is to cross the finish line.

To sum up, for Husserl there is a spectrum of voluntariness, which, at one end, has actions that are fully attended to and attentively performed by the ego, such as carefully pouring wine so as not to spill it, and, at the other end, mechanized actions performed without the ego’s attention or attentiveness, such as eating a chewing gum without even thinking about it. All the actions belonging to the spectrum count as voluntary insofar as, irrespective of their exact degree of voluntariness, they start as a consequence of the ego’s spontaneous performance of the fiat and are not just triggered by practical stimuli. The latter case is in fact represented by what Husserl calls non-voluntary doings (unwillkürliches Tun), which I discuss in the next session.

III. The Consciousness of the “I Can” and the Genesis of Voluntary Actions from non-Voluntary Doings

Having clarified the full scope of voluntary action, I now turn to the discussion of Husserl’s analysis of its genesis from a “non-voluntary doing” (unwillkürliches Tun). In order to do this, let me describe the so-called “consciousness of the I can” (Bewusstsein des Ich kann), which can be introduced by means of the following analogy drawn by Husserl:

I cannot believe what I do not hold as possible. The belief involves a holding as possible. I cannot will what I do not hold as practically possible (as realisable). The volition involves the consciousness of practical realisability. [Hua XLIII.3, 404 note 1]

Just as the ego cannot believe what it holds to be impossible, so too, the ego cannot will what it holds to be practically unrealizable.¹⁵ After all, believing is the ego’s taking something as being actual, and being actual entails being possible. For example, if I believe that it is raining outside, then I hold as possible that it is raining outside. Analogously, the fiat, conceived as the modality of “affirmation of the will” (Willensbejahung), is characterized as the ego’s intention to realize something on the basis of its practical ability and, therefore, it would be, if not impossible, at the very least irrational for the ego to will something without being conscious of its practical feasibility. For example, if I will to make a cake, then I hold that I am able to do it.

The consciousness of the “I can”, thus, is the ego’s holding the object of volition as “feasible” (ausführbar), “practicable” (gangbar), or “realisable” (realisierbar). How exactly does the analysis of this consciousness bring Husserl to view that the genesis of voluntary actions lies in non-voluntary doings? To answer this question, let me clarify the following passage:

We can make our own the phrase “wherever there is a volition, there is a path”; certainly, in the determinate sense, every volition, as a deciding, affirmative actual volition, refers to a path of the will, which is representatively one with the will. […] the event must be conscious not only as an event, and as a possible event, but it also must be conscious as a volitionally “practicable path” (which does not hold and is not possible for every event). But a practicable path points back to the same, or similar, much used paths, and since the volition as such already presupposes that, then from the outset we are pointed back to much-used paths, which were not still paths for a (deciding) willing, or to a representation [Vorstellung] of practicability that does not already involve the representation [Vorstellung] of a course of the will (indeed, we will not accept an endless regress). [Hua XLIII.3, 102–103]

The ego is conscious of the action’s course, a course which leads to the accomplishment of the willed goal, as a practicable path. This is because the ego experiences this volitional course as the same path toward the goal that it has successfully undertaken before or, at least, as similar to other such paths.¹⁶ Indeed, the consciousness of the “I can” concerns the ego’s holding that it is able to do something in reality, and not just the ego’s ability to do so in a world of phantasy. As Husserl notes: “I can represent to myself that I move the moon, that I knock over a house with my hand, etc., but I “cannot” perform the fiat of the decision to (sic.) it, and in reality I cannot perform the introducing fiat of the action, the action itself” (Hua XLIII.3, 12). However, even though the consciousness of a practicable path necessarily points back to paths that the ego has actually taken, this referring back must ultimately lead to “activities of the I” (Ichtätigkeiten) that are not voluntary actions, that is, not activities performed by the ego as a consequence of its will (fiat); otherwise, an infinite regress would be unavoidable, since the performance of any previous will of an action would require, in order to account for the practicability of the latter, refer back to the performance of a still previous will of an action, and so on ad infinitum.

But what are the events that, although they do not occur as a consequence of the ego’s will, still count as volitional phenomena? Husserl replies:

We are pointed back from voluntary happenings as actions to non-voluntary happenings that are thus no actions but that are volitional happenings in the broader sense, namely happenings springing forth from the I as its non-voluntary doing. [Hua XLIII.3, 103]

Not all “activities of the I” (Ichtätigkeiten) are actions for Husserl. As we saw, an action is an activity voluntarily performed, insofar as it springs forth from the ego’s fiat. However, there are activities that, although they belong to the I, do so as its “non-voluntary doing” (unwillkürliches Tun). Without the ego’s fiat to carry them out, non-voluntary doings do not presuppose the consciousness of the “I can” for their performance (see Hua XLIII.3, 113). Instead, they are processes triggered by empirical stimuli. Because of this, one may think that non-voluntary doings count as pure natural processes obeying empirical causal laws. However, Husserl argues that non-voluntary doings still count as volitional phenomena, since the ego has the possibility of turning them into voluntary actions.¹⁷ As he says: “It belongs to the essence of a field of the non-voluntary that it can become a field of the voluntary; a possibility of voluntary perpetration corresponds to every possibility of non-voluntary perpetration” (Hua XLIII.3, 104).¹⁸ The paradigmatic example of this possibility is represented by kinaesthetic movements:

Let us take the subjective courses (movements of the I) in one of our kinaesthetic systems. Non-voluntary movements of the eyes proceed following optical stimuli. In this I think myself into the phantasy and now have the consciousness: if I willed, I would let the eyes move so and so. These are the movements that – independently from the stimuli – are subject to my voluntariness. [Hua XLIII.3, 100]

The so-called “kinaestheses”, i.e. bodily movements, are not necessarily voluntary, but can become so, as in the case of the saccadic eye movements described above. Another example often used by Husserl is breathing; I usually breathe involuntarily, yet I am always able to breathe at will by stopping, starting again and accelerating or decelerating by breath (see Hua XLIII.3, 79; 96; 113; 305; 410; 412; 420; 422; 508–509). Of course, the ego’s ability to turn non-voluntary doings into voluntary actions can experience “inhibitions” (Hemmungen) or “resistances” (Widerstände). Considering again the example of breathing, I can voluntarily stop my breathing only for a short period of time before I experience increasing resistance against my will, which eventually leads me to breathe again. However, Husserl maintains that inhibitions and resistances “are themselves phenomena of the will” (Hua XLIII.3, 65), which therefore represent “a separate thema” of a phenomenology of volition (Hua XLIII.3, 108).

IV. Tendency and Affection in the Sphere of Passivity of the Will

The ego’s non-voluntary doings are not the most original volitional phenomena. On the contrary, they originate from tendencies in the sphere of “passivity of the will” (Willenspassivität).¹⁹ These passive tendencies of the will precede the ego’s “turning toward” (Zuwendung)²⁰ and determine the scope of the ego’s possible volitional acts (see Hua XLIII.3, 79–80). Yet a problem arises here. As Husserl notes: “[t]he complication is, however, that tendencies already play such a great role in the sphere of representation [Vorstellungssphäre]” (Hua XLIII.3, 70–71), namely in the doxic sphere. Elaborating on this point, he writes:

The complication here is that tendencies, drives, triggering of drives (to follow), etc., already belong to the constitution of every givenness of perception [Wahrnehmungsgegebenen], to the original of transient perception and probably of perception in general (since a certain constitution of unity still takes place everywhere). The tendencies that are effective in the original confirmation of perception and in the performance of perception itself are tendencies like others; they can be transformed into actual willings, or they are (that would be the relevant question for them) originated from originary willings, willings of a lower level. But that is precisely where the problem lies. [Hua XLIII.3, 82–83]

Tendencies, or, as Husserl also calls them, “drives” (Triebe),²¹ are all-pervasive, since they are present in both the theoretical and the practical domain of consciousness. Given this, the question, “is an original willing to be acknowledged in drive?” (Hua XLIII.3, 83) is a cause of great concern for Husserl. Indeed, this question has far reaching consequences for Husserl’s static foundational model of consciousness, according to which a volitional intentional act of the ego is founded upon a valuing intentional act, which, in turn, is founded upon a theoretical intentional act. If an original willing is present in every drive, including the drives which, as shown above, are at play in the genesis of a theoretical act, then genetic analysis, by thematizing the temporal dimension of experience and hence bringing to the fore the constitutive role of drives, calls into question the foundational model of static analysis.²² The will would, in fact, be presupposed in the constitution of doxa, since even a theoretical intentional act of the ego turns out to be constituted on the basis of a drive of the will.

However, I contend that in the Studien, Husserl eventually rules out the possibility that a willing, strictly intended as a form of practical intentionality, lies in the phenomenological genesis of every egoic act, thereby having no content peculiar to it and being, instead, a general mode of consciousness. While in the early manuscript, written in 1914, he poses this problem (see Hua XLIII.3, ch. VI), in his later manuscripts, which span from 1919 to 1923 (see Hua XLIII.3, ch. IX, X, XI, XII), he clarifies the relationship between will and tendency (drive), and manages to reconcile the all-pervasive presence of the latter discovered in genetic analysis with the foundational model of the former presented in static analysis. How does Husserl accomplish this? Basically, by disambiguating the notion of “tendency”, which takes a distinct form in the theoretical and the practical domain of consciousness. Let us take a closer look at the details of Husserl’s disambiguation.

First of all, Husserl points out that the most primitive lived experiences in the sphere of praxis, which are the bodily movements at the origin of external actions and the inner tendencies at the origin of inner actions,²³ should not be confused with the bodily movements (nor, arguably, with all the other perceptual, imaginative, and recollective tendencies), which, in the sphere of doxa, are performed in order to bring the perceptual object to closer determination:

Doxically we have the most primitive lived experiences as lived experiences of sensation […]. Practically the primitive [lived experiences; NS] are the bodily movements (even though they may not be apprehended as doxic), and the inner tendential processes are just as primitive. [Hua XLIII.3, 115; emphasis mine]

Consider again the example of crossing the street. There are two types of original “bodily movements” (Leibesbewegungen), called by Husserl also “drive-movements” (Triebbewegungen) (see Hua XLIII.3, 80–81), which need to be distinguished: (1) the “unconscious” saccadic eye movements directed at the approaching car, which are tendencies triggered by the empirical stimuli, and which strive toward a clearer and more adequate perception of the car; (2) the “unconscious” walking faster, which is also a tendency triggered by the empirical stimuli coming from the car, but which strives toward getting to the other side of the street so as to avoid the “unpleasant” feeling of being hit. At the core of the distinction between these two types of passive tendency there is, thus, a fundamental difference in interest. Whereas passive doxic tendencies are animated by the theoretical interest in the “optimum of fullness” (Optimum der Fülle), i.e. in bringing the perceptual object to full self-givenness, passive practical tendencies are animated by the practical interest in the enjoyment of the feeling aroused by the self-givenness of the object (or in turning away from such a feeling if it is unpleasant, as with the example of the car).

Both these types of passive tendencies are unconscious, namely they proceed without the ego’s turning toward (Zuwendung) (see Hua XLIII.3, 78). At the same time, though, they exert an “affection” on the ego, namely they entice the ego’s activity of turning toward. Importantly, for Husserl, this latter activity is not necessarily an “affirmation of the will” (Willensbejahung):

[…] it should be noted that turning toward is something common to the doxic and the practical-orectic sphere, and so to every “consciousness”. […] It is therefore a false juxtaposition, affection for turning toward and “affection” as affirmation of the will; it is, one and the other, an entirely different “affection” with a phenomenologically different sense. In truth we have turning toward, transition into a cogito in all spheres of acts. [Hua XLIII.3, 117]

The type of ego’s turning toward depends on whether the affection is exerted by a doxic or a practical tendency at the passive level. It can either be: (1) an “attentional affection” (attentionale Affektion), which entices a turning toward in which the ego posits the sensible object pre-constituted through the passive doxic tendency as actually existing; or (2) a “practical, realising affection” (praktische, realisierende Affektion), which entices a turning toward in which the ego posits the pleasing object pre-constituted through the passive practical tendency as something to be realized (see Hua XLIII.3, 110).

Furthermore, the ego’s turning toward can take place at the constitutive level of either receptivity or spontaneity. In the case of attentional affection, at the receptive level the ego merely accepts, through an objectifying act of sensible perception, what has been pre-constituted through the passive doxic tendency in the field of sensation, such as when I listen to a train whistle that was resonating in the background of my perceptual field. In the case of practical affection, at the receptive level the ego just follows up the passive practical tendency, thereby turning it into a mere non-voluntary doing, such as when, while crossing the street, I just follow up my drive-movement of walking faster.

At the spontaneous level, the ego does not limit itself to objectify or follow up, as it is, what has been passively pre-constituted through the doxic or practical tendency, respectively. In spontaneity, Husserl states, we have a “double striving-system. Striving for knowledge and striving for the realization of objects for the sake of value” (Hua XLIII.3, ch. XII, §2). The crucial point, though, is that this striving is no longer a passive tendency, since it is spontaneously carried on by the ego. In the theoretical domain, the passive tendency toward fulfilment that characterizes doxa in sensation and sensible perception “take the form of a true act of will, a will to knowledge, with deliberate positing of goals, etc.” (Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, 92). For example, I do not just listen to the train whistle but rather I spontaneously perform a judgment that the whistle has such-and-such intensity, pitch, etc., for I actively aim to know what this sound is exactly. In the practical domain, the passive tendency toward enjoyment that characterizes inner tendencies, drive-movements, and non-voluntary doings, take the form of a voluntary action (see Hua XLIII.3, 69; 136).²⁴ For example, when crossing the street, instead of just following up my drive-movement of walking faster, and thus limiting myself to turn toward such a movement as a non-voluntary doing of mine, I turn it into my voluntary action, performing the fiat to walk even faster as the car gets closer.

Although Husserl talks of a spontaneous theoretical act as “a true act of will, a will to knowledge,” the fact remains that “cognitive acting” (erkennendes Handeln) and “practical acting” (praktisches Handeln) are not identical for him. Whereas the former strives toward the knowledge of the existing state of affairs being objectified, the latter strives toward the enjoyment of the valuable state of affairs being practically realized.²⁵ Furthemore, in the Studien Husserl maintains the foundational model of consciousness stemming from his static phenomenological analysis. Interestingly, though, he expresses this foundational idea not by employing the notion of “act” (Akt) of consciousness but by employing the more general notion of “striving” (Streben). A “practical striving” (praktisches Streben) is founded upon an “evaluative striving” (wertendes Streben), which, in turn, is founded upon an “objectifying striving” (objektivierendes Streben) (see Hua XLIII.3, 168; 170). Arguably, in the phenomenological genesis of an experience, this foundational relation is to be found within each level of constitution, since for Husserl consciousness remains a striving-intentionality from passivity, through receptivity, to spontaneity.²⁶

In the Studien one can clearly see, then, that Husserl’s genetic analysis does not challenge the foundational model of his static analysis but, as usually held by the scholars, it complements it.²⁷ This is possible precisely because volitional consciousness is not intended as any possible form of striving-intentionality but more specifically as the practical form of striving-intentionality. When Husserl claims that, from the genetic point of view, a theoretical act of the ego originates from drives, by “drives” he means “passive objectifying strivings”, and not “passive practical strivings”. It is not the case, then, that volition, strictly intended as a form of practical striving-intentionality, lies in the phenomenological genesis of every egoic act, thereby having no content peculiar to it and being, instead, a general mode of consciousness.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper I have highlighted the novelties of Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. I hope the analysis above will deepen our understanding of some issues that have been the subject of debate among Husserlian scholars in recent years, especially the issue of the full scope and correct demarcation of the domain of volition within consciousness. Furthermore, let me summarize the specific contribution of my investigation to this special issue “Shaping Actions and Intentions” of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. By introducing Husserl’s notion of “fiat”, I clarified in the first place the phenomenological relation between intentions and actions. Through the discussion of Husserl’s distinction between “attentiveness” (Achtsamkeit) and “attention” (Aufmerksamkeit), I investigated the particular phenomenological forms of self-experience implied in being aware of one’s own actions. By retracing the genesis of voluntary actions from involuntary doings and passive tendencies of the will, I gave a phenomenological account of how the agent assumes ownership of something that he or she was not aware of while doing it, of how intentions emerge and how they relate to what falls out of our attention.

Acknowledgments

This work is funded by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). I would like to thank the Husserl Archives in Leuven for giving me access to Husserl’s research manuscripts, which were still unpublished at the time of writing. I would also like to thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers, whose insightful comments and suggestions were crucial for improving the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek: [grant number 11B2818N].

Notes

1 Melle, “Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins”.

2 More specifically, I will take into account some of the most recent studies that focus specifically upon Husserl’s analysis of the essence of action and volition, leaving aside the more general studies that address the core ideas of Husserl’s ethics, such as those of “practical and evaluative reason”, “normativity”, “value”, “person”, “formal axiology”, “formal praxis”, etc. The first group of studies includes the work of Melle, “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Willing”, Mertens, “Husserl’s Phenomenology of Will in his Reflections on Ethics”, Mertens, “Phenomenology of Willing in Pfänder and Husserl”, Dreyfus, “A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl’s and Searle's Representationalist Account”, Lotz, “Action”, Rinofner-Kreidl, “Motive, Gründe und Entscheidungen”, Peucker, “Hat Husserl eine konsistente Theorie des Willens?”, Lohmar, “Human Freedom – A Husserlian Perspective”, Staiti, “Husserl’s Account of Action”, De Monticelli, “The Phenomenology of Rational Agency”, among others. The second group includes Hart, “The Person and the Common Life”, Spahn, “Phänomenologische Handlungstheorie”, Crowell, “Normativity and Phenomenology”, Moran, “Defending the Transcendental Attitude”, Ferrarello, “Husserl’s Ethics and Practical Intentionality”, Zahavi, “Self and Other”, Heinämaa, “Two ways of understanding persons”, Loidolt, “Experience and Normativity”, Staiti, “Etica Naturalistica e Fenomenologia”, to mention a few.

3 Hereafter, where possible, all references to Husserl’s works will be to the German pagination of the Husserliana edition (abbreviated “Hua”) including volume and page number. All translations are mine.

4 By “empirical causality” Husserl means the relation of temporal succession between two independent physical processes α and β, such that “if α occurs, then β “must” occur” (Hua XLIII.3, 61; see also Hua XLIII.3, 8).

5 The phenomenological notion of “ego” or “I” may sound unfamiliar to non-Husserlian scholars. For Husserl, “‘I’ is an unclear concept; it can mean: (1) I, the human, and hence it can be taken [to mean; NS] body and soul [united; NS] in one. (2) On the side of the soul, [it; NS] can be taken [to mean; NS] the entire extraphysical inwardness of the human. I can be sick, [I; NS] can fall in a hole, I can have an idea, [I; NS] can feel colors and tones, etc. But also: (3) I can be freely active as the I of the actio” (Hua XLIII.3, 99; note 2). Importantly, Husserl argues that, for the understanding of his phenomenological analysis, the “I” should not be taken to mean the human being in either sense (1) or sense (2), but rather it should be taken to mean the “original I” (Ur-Ich) (see Hua XLIII.3, 95), namely the I in sense (3) as the subjective pole of free intentional acts (Akte) in general and practical actions in particular.

6 This passage belongs to the chapter of the Studien entitled “The Essence of Straightforward Action”.

7 Fiat and action can be described from both the phansic (i.e., noetic) and the ontic (i.e., noematic) point of view, that is, from the perspective of the act of consciousness and the perspective of the intentional object as intended through such an act. In order to emphasise the phansic perspective, Husserl sometimes denotes fiat and action by using the verbal nouns “willing” (Wollen) and “acting” (Handeln). Instead, in order to emphasize the ontic perspective he calls the fiat “ontic it shall be” (ontisches Soll), or simply “it shall be” (Soll), and points out that the “action” (Handlung) is characterized by an “ontic character of positing of the will” (ontischer Charakter der Willenssetzung).

8 Importantly, Husserl’s account of voluntary action does not simply entail that the spontaneous performance of the fiat by the ego, although motivated by preceding experiences such as drives, desires, beliefs, evaluations, etc., is not caused by them. More radically, Husserl claims that the spontaneous performance of the fiat by the ego is not the empirical effect of any natural process. Unfortunately, I cannot discuss here the details of this complex motivational and non-causal theory of action. For a discussion of it, see Rinofner-Kreidl,“Motive, Gründe und Entscheidungen”, Lohmar, “Human Freedom”, Staiti, “Husserl’s Account of Action”, and Spano “Volitional Causality vs Natural Causality”, among others.

9 Crowell, Normativity and Phenomenology, 267.

10 As Husserl also says, mechanised actions are “secondary spontaneity” (sekundäre Spontaneität), due to the fact that they are “[…] spontaneity which has become receptivity” (Hua XLIII.3, 79). For a clarification of the difference between the constitutive levels of spontaneity and receptivity within the practical domain of consciousness, see endnote (n 19) below.

11 Objectification takes place through a “representation” (Vorstellung), namely a doxic act of consciousness that presents an object as being such and such to the experiencing ego. Importantly, the represented object is not contained, as a part, in this “objectifying act”. Intentional objects are not in consciousness. For Husserl’s phenomenological disambiguation of the notion of “representation”, see Hua XIX, ch. V, §37. For Husserl’s discussion of reflection as an objectifying act, see Hua IV, §6.

12 Mertens, “Husserl's Phenomenology of Will”, 131–132. ‌‌‌

13 In light of the phenomenological analysis of mechanized actions, the view of Husserl as committed to an overly intellectualistic account of agency, according to which the performance of any action must be governed by the ego’s representation (Vorstellung) of the action itself, might turn out to be not fully accurate. The main advocate of this wide-spread view is Dreyfus, “A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl’s and Searle's Representationalist Account”.

14 It is difficult to capture this conceptual distinction in English. When used as a noun, “attentiveness” is just a synonym for “attention”, and hence indicate “one’s taking notice of something or someone”. In its adverbial use, though, “attentiveness” assumes a meaning that is somewhat close to that which, in this context, Husserl confers to the German term “Achtsamkeit”. In expressions of the form “attentively doing x” the meaning being conveyed is indeed that of actions with a high manner of active performance.

15 In other passages, Husserl argues more carefully that the consciousness of the “I can” is a necessary presupposition for every rational will of an action, although there might be irrational volitions which are not based upon it. As he remarks: “I cannot will what I hold as unrealisable, something that I am certain I cannot do, something whose failure is certain to me. This probably means: such a willing is unreasonable; and not: it is psychologically impossible” (Hua XLIII.3, 406). After all, “we will not be able to say whether a madman may not manage to bring about an act of the will referred to something past or ideal” (Hua XXVIII, 106), namely something that is not within his power to realise. Moreover, it must be noted that the consciousness of the “I can” is not the only presupposition of rational willing. Another necessary presupposition is valuing consciousness, since a will is rational only if it is directed at something valuable (see Hua XLIII.3, 84; Hua XXVIII, 127).

16 As an anonymous reviewer noted, Husserl’s claim that the consciousness of the “I can” is based on a representation (Vorstellung) of the action as similar to past real deeds seems to be in conflict with the claim he makes in Ideas II that “we must not fail to note that the transfer of an actually experienced “I can and I effect” to a new case is not simply an inductive ontological belief, related to my ability as a fact, but that I experience in practical consciousness itself a possible ability” (Hua IV, 330). However, it is my opinion that, under closer examination, there is no actual conflict between these two claims. Let me explain why. In the Studien, Husserl stresses that the consciousness of the “I can” is a “practical consciousness” whose objective correlate are “practical possibilities” (see Hua XLIII.3, ch. VII-VIII). Such a consciousness should not be conflated, then, with any theoretical consciousness of possible states of affairs. Accordingly, the consciousness of the “I can” does not consist in the representation (Vorstellung) of the action as similar to past real deeds and, hence, as something practically realizable. That is to say, it does not consist in an inductively justified belief of the ego. Yet, the fact remains that the consciousness of the “I can” includes such a belief. The crucial point, though, is that this inclusion does not turn the practical attitude of the consciousness of the “I can” into a theoretical attitude, since, as Husserl remarks in Ideas II, the theoretical attitude “is not determined merely through the conscious lived experiences we designate as doxic (Objectifying) […], for “doxic lived experiences also occur in the valuing and practical attitude” (Hua IV, 3). The type of attitude is in fact determined by the manner in which lived experiences are performed by the ego. In the specific case of the consciousness of the “I can”, the representation of an action as similar to past real deeds is not “performed or carried out in the function of knowledge” (Hua IV, 3), but precisely in function of the performance of action. Therefore, this consciousness remains a practical consciousness whose objective correlates are practical possibilities, not doxic ones.

17 Furthermore, it must be noted that not all practical stimuli (praktische Reize) are empirical. For Husserl, non-voluntary doings can also be triggered by stimuli coming from phantasy (see Hua XLIII.3, 113), such as when the wishful desire of kissing the beloved person triggers the non-voluntary movement of doing so. Arguably, practical stimuli can also come from sedimented actions and decisions that, although “unconscious”, still affect the ego. A famous example is that given by Velleman (“What Happens When Someone Acts?”, 464): “Suppose that I have a long-anticipated meeting with an old friend for the purpose of resolving some minor difference; but that as we talk, his offhand comments provoke me to raise my voice in progressively sharper replies, until we part in anger. Later reflection leads me to realize that accumulated grievances had crystallized in my mind, during the weeks before our meeting, into a resolution to sever our friendship over the matter at hand, and that this resolution is what gave the hurtful edge to my remarks.”

18 In my view, the ideal possibility for the ego of turning its non-voluntary doings into voluntary actions represents the core of Husserl’s solution to what Erhard, (“Unifying Agency”, 1) calls “the unity problem of activity” in Reiner’s phenomenology of action. Non-voluntary doings and voluntary actions can be unified as activities precisely because the ego has the ideal possibility of turning the former into the latter. Erhard himself (see “Unifying Agency”, 22–23) critically discusses this proposal.

19 For Husserl, a “striving” (Streben) belongs to the whole temporal stream of consciousness, since any lived experience whatsoever strives toward the fulfilment of what is emptily anticipated in protention (see Hua XLIII.3, 118–119). Accordingly, consciousness is a striving-intentionality from passivity, through receptivity, to spontaneity. Husserl distinguishes and names these three levels of constitution of experience on the basis of the degree of ego’s activity involved. He specifically calls “tendency” (Tendenz) any striving that occurs in passivity and receptivity, levels in which there is not yet any spontaneous participation of the ego in the constitutive synthesis. In the practical domain of consciousness, passivity is the level of drive-movements and inner tendencies that I discuss in the present section of the paper, while receptivity and spontaneity are the levels of non-voluntary doings and voluntary actions discussed in the two previous sections, respectively. For a phenomenological analysis of passivity, receptivity, and spontaneity in the theoretical domain of consciousness, see Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil.

20 The ego’s “turning toward” (Zuwendung) occurs when something pre-constituted in the passive field of consciousness becomes, as a result of its affective force, the intentional object of an ego’s act (Akt), be it a doxic act or a practical act founded on it. I exemplify the ego’s doxic and practical turning toward in what follows in the main text.

21 More specifically, Husserl calls “drive” (Trieb) any tendency that specifically belongs to the lived body (Leib) of the ego.

22 See Melle, “Husserl's Phenomenology of Willing”, 188–192; Peucker, “Hat Husserl eine konsistente Theorie des Willens?”, 36–39.‌‌

23 “Outer” [äußere] volitional processes are volitional processes that take place in the external world. On the contrary, “inner” [innere] volitional processes take place inside the psyche, such as when the ego voluntarily remembers or imagines something for the sake of enjoying what is re-presented therein. For Husserl’s description of the distinction between outer and inner actions, see Hua XLIII.3, 126.

24 It is not always the case, though, that a voluntary action is performed because of a tendency in the sphere of passivity of the will. As Husserl notes: “it can also be, however, that I will for reasons that do not lie in this tendency itself” (Hua XLIII.3, 80). A classic example is when the ego performs a voluntary action just to prove its free will (see Hua XLIII.3, 80).

25 For a thorough analysis of the analogy, and the difference between cognitive and practical actions, see Hua XLIII.3, ch. XI; Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §48.

26 See endnote (n 19) above.

27 However, it must be noted that the static foundational analysis of consciousness has been challenged not only because of Husserl’s later genetic analysis. For a defense of the static foundational model from this further criticism, see Staiti, Etica Naturalistica e Fenomenologia, ch. III.