Reasons and Causes: A Critical-Realist Phenomenological Analysis of Agency

ABSTRACT

Reason is the object of understanding. Cause is the object of explanation. The original aspect of this study, which argues that reasons are in some sense causes, is that it discusses the distinction between reason and cause in the context of agency. It first explains the logical arguments that reasons cannot be causes and that reasons must be causes, and then presents an ontological argument concerning the pre-linguistic and irreducible continuity of phenomenal existence, in which critical realism and phenomenology work together. In discussing the manifestation of reasons in the form of beliefs, memories, and dream interpretations, the focus is on the irreducible phenomenological-psychological level between humans as an organic set of molecules and humans as beings emerging from a social network of meanings. Finally, non-human agency is discussed and the thesis is made that the capacity for agency is not a social gift.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-reductionism
• intentional arc
• phenomenal body
• autobiographical memory
• inner conversation
• interanimality

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Davidson 685–700.

2 Bhaskar 94.

3 Bhaskar 96.

4 Bhaskar 100.

5 Wittgenstein 161.

6 Archer 132.

7 Archer, Being Human 7.

8 The term “lower level science” pertains to the concept of level stratification in critical realist ontology, which involves “the stratification of the world into emergent explanatory levels” [Elder-Vass 160]. ‘In this framework, a higher level entity is formed by a specific and stable organization of lower-level entities. The emergence of a higher-level entity is characterised by the presence of emergent properties that are not inherent in its constituent lower-level entities but arise solely from their particular combination. Critical realist ontology suggests that various branches of science are dedicated to comprehending and studying distinct emergent entities that are specific to their respective levels.

9 Benton and Craib 127–8.

10 Zahavi 82.

11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 103.

12 Merleau-Ponty 105.

13 Zahavi, Phenomenology 83.

14 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 501.

15 See Zahavi, Phenomenology 82.

16 See Archer, Being Human 127 ff.

17 Archer 127.

18 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior 3.

19 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 342.

20 See Archer, Being Human, 128.

21 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 385.

22 The question of whether Merleau-Ponty ultimately abandoned the naturalist stance in his later works, particularly in The Visible and The Invisible and Nature, is indeed a topic worth exploring and discussing. However, it is important to clarify that my current objective is to develop a critical realist phenomenological analysis. Therefore, within the scope of this analysis, I am drawing upon Archer's interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, which places significant emphasis on naturalistic considerations.

23 Archer, “Realism and the Problem of Agency,” 13.

24 Archer 14.

25 Archer 14.

26 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 157.

27 Merleau-Ponty 486.

28 Archer, “Realism and the Problem of Agency”, 15.

29 Archer 15.

30 See Archer, Being Human, 129–30.

31 Quoted by Archer, “Realism and the Problem of Agency”, 12.

32 Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, 90.

33 Bhaskar 104–6.

34 Bhaskar 105.

35 Bhaskar 106.

36 Tulving.

37 See Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, and Eustache 239–40.

38 Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, and Eustache, 252.

39 Revonsuo 235 ff.

40 See Revonsuo 209–10.

41 I use the term “open system” in the sense described by Roy Bhaskar: “As the world is open, and agency is real, and as society is only materially present in intentional human action, it follows that social phenomena only ever manifest themselves in open systems” (Bhaskar 125).

42 Sayer 191.

43 Archer, “Realism and the Problem of Agency”, 13.

44 Quoted from Kenneth Burke by Charles Tilly, Why? What Happens when People Give Reasons … and Why (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), x.

45 See Newen and Starzak.

46 See Clayton and Dickinson.

47 See Winson.

48 See Huizinga 1.

49 See Bulkeley 136–7.

50 See Bulkeley 137–8.

51 See Buchanan 115–50.

52 Quoted from Uexküll by Buchanan, Buchanan 124.

53 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 159.

54 Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies, 146.

55 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible 274.

56 Merleau-Ponty, Nature 271.

57 Merleau-Ponty 271.

58 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception xii.

59 Merleau-Ponty, Signs 167.