The Lapindo mudflow disaster: environmental, infrastructure and economic impact

Abstract

This note examines the environmental, infrastructure and economic impact of the Lapindo mudflow disaster in East Java province. It outlines unsuccessful attempts to staunch the mud volcano, concerns for human health and plans for long-term management of the mudflow. It considers the impact on transport and logistics networks and the additional costs to the East Java economy. The heaviest economic impact has occurred in the region surrounding the mud volcano in Sidoarjo district, but areas to the east and west are also affected. Individual firms in East Java have found means of accommodating their business operations to the mudflow with some provincial government assistance. PT Lapindo Brantas, the company considered responsible for the drilling that led to the mud volcano, has been slow in compensating victims as required by presidential decrees. Delays in finalising compensation appear to be holding back implementation by the national government of critical infrastructure reconstruction work.

Notes

¹The eruption site is also called the ‘Lusi’ mud volcano, from the initial syllables of lumpur (‘mud’) and ‘Sidoarjo’ (the main location of the mudflow). There are numerous scientific overviews of the site and discussions of the eruption, including those by Cyranowski (2007); Mazzini et al. (2007); and Davies et al. (2007).

²Interview with Mr Soedarman, former Chair, East Java Investment Board, Surabaya, 6 June 2007.

³The maximum residue limit as here defined refers to the maximum concentration of chemical residue allowable by regulation to occur in a particular substance (in this case, the Lapindo mud).

⁴Interview with Mr Joseph Chan, PT Eratex Jaya, Surabaya, 7 June 2007.

⁵Interview with Mr Sam Santoso, PT Kuda Laut, Surabaya, 13 August 2008.

⁶Interview with Dr Candra Fajri Ananda, Brawijaya University, Malang, 16 August 2008.

⁷Interview with Dr Kacung Marijan, Airlangga University, Surabaya, 14 August 2008.

⁸Interview with Mr Olivier Bernard, PT Tripper Nature, Jakarta, 11 September 2008.

⁹Interview with Dr Bambang-Heru Santosa, Central Statistics Agency, Jakarta, 9 August 2008.

¹⁰Interview with Mr Eugene Lim, PT Eastern Logistics, Lamongan, 3 June 2007.

¹¹Interview with Mr Johan Suryadarma, Indonesian Frozen Seafood Association, East Java branch, Surabaya, 12 August 2008.

¹²Interview with Mr Adig Suwandi, PT Perkebunan Nusantara XI (Persero), Surabaya, 2 September 2008.

¹³Interview with Mr Erlangga Satriagung, East Java Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Surabaya, 11 August 2008.

¹⁴Interview with Mr Kresnayana Yahya, Surabaya Institute of Technology, Surabaya, 15 August 2008.

¹⁵Interview with Mr Djoni Irianto, East Java Investment Board, Surabaya, 12 August 2008.

¹⁶Interview with Mr Erlangga Satriagung, East Java Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Surabaya, 11 August 2008.

¹⁷‘Geologists blame gas drilling for Indonesia mud disaster’, source: Durham University, <http://www.physorg.com/news144596883.html>, posted 30 October 2008.

¹⁸Interview with Mr Suprayoga Hadi, Directorate for Disadvantaged Regions, Bappenas, Jakarta, 4 August 2008.

¹⁹For a discussion of the national government's powers of eminent domain, see McLeod (2005: 146–7).

²⁰Interview with Mr Hadi Prasetyo, East Java Development Planning Agency, Surabaya, 2 September 2008.

²¹See Friends of the Earth International (2007): 8–9) for an outline of PT Lapindo's relationship to the Bakrie Group.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Heath McMichael∗

∗ The views expressed in this note are the author's alone and have no official status or endorsement. They are based on material from public sources and fieldwork conducted during private visits to Surabaya in June 2007 and to Jakarta and East Java in August–September 2008