Appointing top officials in a democratic indonesia: the corruption eradication commission

Abstract

Democratisation has brought checks and balances, and new state agencies, to Indonesian politics. Checks and balances and greater responsiveness to the public have also been sought in the appointment processes for the senior management of these new bodies. This paper examines the merits of the new appointment processes, in particular sequential selection, through a case study of the leadership selection process for the Corruption Eradication Commission. It reviews the process stipulated by law and its implementation in 2003, 2007 and 2010. The study argues that, while the short-listing of candidates by the selection committee aims at unprecedented openness and meritocracy, the process used has been tedious and has given insufficient weight to candidates’ track records. Despite criticism that the final selection was pre-determined, the paper concludes that the overall selection process has upheld the principle of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature and ensured diversity of political support.

Keywords:

• appointment systems
• anti-corruption commission
• governance
• democratisation
• corruption
• law enforcement

Acknowledgements

Interviews with Indonesian government officials and parliamentarians cited in this paper are part of the author 's doctoral research on ‘Triggering Institutional Change: The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission’, supervised by Howard Dick and Tim Lindsey and supported by an Australian government International Postgraduate Research Scholarship and a Melbourne International Research Scholarship. Special thanks go to Simon Butt, Melissa Crouch, Kevin Evans, Ross McLeod, Marcus Mietzner and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Complete references to newspaper articles can be obtained upon request from [email protected]

Notes

¹There are other ways of reducing the effectiveness of the KPK, of course, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.

²Appointments for the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong – both widely considered successful – are conducted by the respective heads of the executive alone. Although the organisational blueprint of these two agencies could easily be copied, their political context – in particular, the strong political will accumulated mainly in the hands of the head of the executive – cannot.

³Law 3/2004 on the Amendment of Law 23/1999 on Bank Indonesia, art. 41 (3, 4).

⁴Law 22/2004 on the Judicial Commission, art. 28.

⁵CommissionLaw 22/2007 on Elections, arts 12–15. This was the process used for appointments to the Elections Commission for the 2004 and 2009 elections (Law 12/2003 and Law 22/2007 on Elections, respectively). In 1999, appointments followed the simultaneous process: each of the 48 political parties that had registered for the elections appointed one representative, and the president appointed five government representatives; the two groups (the 48 party representatives and the five presidential appointees) had an equal number of votes (Law 3/1999).

⁶Law 37/2008 on the National Ombudsman, arts 15–16.

⁷Law 13/2006 on the Protection of Victims and Witnesses, art. 20.

⁸Legal scholar Romli Atmasasmita maintains that the president has the right to make changes to the short-list (Hanni 2007d). This, to the author 's knowledge, has not yet happened. Given the public attention that the short-listing processes receive, the president would need very convincing reasons to reject a candidate.

⁹Although not mandatory, ad hoc selection committees with the task of screening candidates have become common. This was the case, for example, with the appointment of Constitutional Court judges by the government in 2008 (‘Pemerintah umumkan 15 calon hakim konstitusi yang terseleksi [Government announces 15 chosen candidates for appointment as Constitutional Court judges]’, Kompas, 2/8/2008, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/08/02/00272545/pemerintah.umumkan.15.calon.hakim.konstitusi.yang.terseleksi; interview with senior government official, 10/12/2009).

¹⁰In 2007, the required supporting documents included an application letter; a curriculum vitae; a photocopy of the applicant's identity card; three passport photos; legalised photocopies of a mental health certificate from a government psychiatrist, a physical health certificate from a government general practitioner, and a police clearance certificate; evidence of a recent ‘clean’ drug test; a signed declaration of experience in the area of law, economy, finance or banking for at least 15 years; and signed declarations that the applicant does not hold a position in a political party, is willing to leave all other offices and not to undertake his or her profession if selected as a KPK commissioner, and is prepared to declare his or her assets if selected as a KPK commissioner (PGRI 2007: 12–13).

¹¹In practice, the selection committee has requested the asset declarations in the final stages of the short-listing process, allowing the financial situation of the candidates to be known before the interviews take place.

¹²The Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (PGRI, known as ‘Partnership’ or ‘Kemitraan’) was founded in 2000 as a multi-donor initiative, under Indonesian management (see http://www.kemitraan.or.id/). Formally a UNDP project at first, it has since become an independent organisation. The Partnership supported two NGOs involved in the 2003 KPK leadership selection process: the Indonesian Society for Transparency (MTI), with a grant of $184,000 (Rp 1.563 million), and Demos, with a grant of $92,000 (Rp 782 million) (PGRI 2004: 73).

¹³Justice Minister Hamid Awaluddin had only narrowly escaped being designated a suspect in an Election Commission corruption scandal; his predecessor and later Minister of State, Yusril Izha Mahendra, had become involved in a public row with KPK chair Taufiqurrahman Ruki. Further, when Yusril and Hamid were in office the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights had assisted the repatriation of assets to Tommy Soeharto (the son of former President Soeharto, who was in prison at the time for ordering the murder of a judge who had convicted him of corruption in 2000; see footnote 16) from Bank Paribas in London. Both ministers would be dismissed during a cabinet reshuffle in May 2007 (Manggut, Suditomo and Wijaya 2007).

¹⁴In 2007 the PGRI provided Rp 3 billion in support of the selection process (correspond-ence with PGRI staff, 5/7/2010).

¹⁵In both years the consultancy firm Dunamis <(http://www.dunamis.co.id/home)> won the bidding. In 2003 it was supported by Daya Dimensi Indonesia <(http://www.dayadimensi.co.id/)>.

¹⁶The coalition (<http://koalisipemantauperadilan.blogspot.com/>) consisted of several reputable NGOs: Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia – Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Indonesia (the Society for Indonesian Court Monitoring – Law Faculty of the University of Indonesia, Mappi FHUI); Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW); Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (the National Law Reform Consortium, KRHN); Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan (the Institute for Research and Advocacy for Judicial Independence, LeIP); Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia (the Indonesian Centre for the Study of Law and Policy, PSHK); and Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, YLBHI)

¹⁷Antasari Azhar was in charge of effecting Tommy Soeharto's detention in 2000, after the latter had been found guilty of an $11 million land scam. Tommy escaped and evaded capture for over a year (<http://www.tempo.co.id/harian/profil/prof-antasari.html>; BBC, 30/7/2002, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1881066.stm>).

¹⁸Besides Antasari's affiliation with the public prosecutor 's office, the NGO coalition objected to his track record. He was the candidate about whom it had received the largest body of controversial information from the public. He was suspected of involvement in the escape of Tommy Soeharto (footnote 17) and in the cover-up of a 1999 scandal involving Bank Bali, of having received bribes in relation to corruption cases in Central Sulawesi, and of having offered money to a journalist in relation to reporting on KPK leadership candidates (Kompas, 4/12/2007).

¹⁹On PDI–P discontent, see, for example, Kompas, 6/12/2007, where the Secretary General of the PDI–P, Pramono Anung, is quoted as saying that he ‘hoped the new KPK leadership would be more professional and not conduct character assassination’. ‘The old KPK was more political’, he continued, ‘and its impact was felt by the PDI–P. Suwarna (PDI–P cadre and non-active governor of East Kalimantan) was investigated as a witness in the morning, at noon he was a suspect and in the evening he was arrested. Why is such a thing not done to other people?’ (‘KPK bukan badan super; wakil presiden akui koruptor di Indonesia bernyali besar [The KPK is not a super-body: vice president highlights the audacity of Indonesia's corruptors]’, <http://m.antikorupsi.org/?q=node/11819>).

²⁰Hanni (2007e) reports on a meeting of Golkar, PKS, the Crescent Star Party, the National Awakening Party, the National Mandate Party and the Democratic Party in a hotel opposite the KPK office on 27 November 2007, but there were also reports of meetings in other hotels (Susanto, Sutarto and Wibowo 2007).

²¹‘DPR pilih 5 pimpinan KPK – Taufiequrachman Ruki menjadi ketua [Parliament chooses five Corruption Eradication Commission leaders – Taufiequrahman becomes chair]’, Kompas, 17/12/2003: 1. The names in the second package were Mohammad Yamin; Taufiqurrahman Ruki; Tumpak Panggabean; Sjahruddin Rasul; and Amien Sunaryadi.

²²The Indonesian word is titipan-titipan, which in this context refers to messages of support for candidates from people interested in their nomination. This can go beyond mere lobbying and may include political or personal pressure.

²³Komisi Antikorupsi: keraguan publik jadi pemicu KPK lebih baik [Anti-corruption Commission: public doubt a trigger for KPK improvement]’, Kompas, 7/12/2007, <http://m.antikorupsi.org/?q=node/11821>.

²⁴In the 2005 and 2007 polls, the police force scored well in regard to action taken against corruption, but at the same time was itself considered corrupt by respondents.

²⁵In this case, the Bank Indonesia (BI) governor and deputies embezzled Rp 100 billion from central bank funds. Rp 68.5 billion of this was used to support five former top BI officials who were involved in the Indonesian Banking Liquidity Assistance (BLBI) corruption case. The remaining Rp 31.5 billion was used to bribe members of DPR Commission IX on Finance and Banking to cover up the BLBI corruption and pass an amendment to the banking law (Jakarta Post, 27/11/2008).

²⁶Article 21 (5) of the KPK Law states that: ‘The leadership of the KPK as defined in paragraph (2) works collectively (bekerja secara kolektif)’. In the Elucidation ‘works collectively’ is defined as all decisions having to ‘be made together (disetuji dan diputuskan bersama-sama)’.

²⁷It is not clear how the scenario of a tied vote in an even-numbered commission should be handled. At the time of Antasari's arrest, the focus was on whether the vice-chairs were allowed to make a decision at all.

²⁸On the struggle between the KPK and other law enforcement agencies and the president's reluctance to intervene, see Von Luebke (2010); Patunru and Von Luebke (2010).

²⁹The two commissioners remaining in office had so far been in charge of prevention, data and information processing and internal oversight. There was concern about their capacity to keep the KPK's enforcement operations running on their own (interview with senior government official, 10/12/2009).

³⁰The members of the DPR were about to be replaced by those elected in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

³¹As a reviewer of this paper noted, the appointment of qualified replacement commissioners also set a precedent, and ‘the more often elected officials act in this way, the more likely a convention will emerge around the appointment of qualified leaders to state institutions rather than the cronies that would have been selected under Soeharto.’

³²Bibit and Chandra had filed an application for constitutional review of the KPK Law's prescription of immediate and irreversible dismissal the moment a commissioner becomes a defendant in a criminal case. They argued that this discriminated against KPK commissioners, because state officials are normally suspended, but not permanently dismissed, on becoming defendants in a criminal case. The Constitutional Court ruled that the commissioners could not be dismissed permanently from office unless found guilty by a court (Jakarta Post, 25/11/2009; Constitutional Court Decision 133/PUU-VII/2009). Temporary commissioners Waluyo and Mas Ahmad Santosa returned to their former positions when Bibit and Chandra rejoined the KPK.

³³A similar fracture of the government's coalition parties emerged in the parliamentary vote on the bail-out of Bank Century (Von Luebke 2010: 83).

³⁴The Court acknowledged that the appointment of the replacement chair was almost as costly as appointing five commissioners. According to media reports, the selection process for the five commissioners cost Rp 4.7 billion in 2003 and Rp 2.9 billion in 2007 (Kompas, 22/10/2007, 17/11/2007), while Rp 2.5 billion was allocated to selection of the replacement chair in 2010 (Widjaya and Darmawan 2010).