Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline

Abstract

This article examines the decline of Indonesia’s democratic institutions under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) ahead of his 2019 re-election bid. It argues that the latter part of Jokowi’s first term has seen a downturn in the quality of Indonesian democracy, associated with the continued mainstreaming and legitimation of a conservative and anti-pluralistic brand of political Islam; the partisan manipulation of key institutions of state; and the increasingly open repression and disempowerment of political opposition. These trends have served to unbalance the democratic playing field, limit democratic choice, and reduce government accountability. This article first discusses the medium-term ramifications of the polarised 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and their implications for 2018’s marquee political events: a major round of sub-national elections and the presidential nomination process. It then argues that the Jokowi government has taken an ‘authoritarian turn’ ahead of the 2019 elections, highlighting its manipulation of powerful law enforcement and security institutions for narrow, partisan purposes, as well as the administration’s concerted efforts to undermine and repress democratic opposition. Finally, it frames the 2019 election as a contest between two candidates—Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto–who display little regard for the democratic status quo. The declining quality of Indonesian democracy is particularly troubling in a global context of democratic recession.

Tulisan ini menelaah menurunnya kualitas institusi-institusi demokratis di bawah pemerintahan Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi) menjelang upayanya mencalonkan diri kembali sebagai presiden dalam Pemilu 2019. Penulis berpendapat bahwa pada masa-masa terakhir pemerintahan Jokowi tahap pertama ini, terdapat penurunan kualitas demokrasi Indonesia, yang berhubungan dengan berlanjutnya penerimaan dan legitimasi atas aliran tertentu dari Islam politik, yaitu konservatisme dan anti-pluralisme; manipulasi partisan terhadap beberapa institusi negara yang utama; serta represi atas oposisi, yang semakin bertambah dan terang-terangan.

Kecenderungan-kecenderungan ini telah membuat area demokrasi menjadi tidak seimbang, membatasi pilihan-pilihan demokratis, dan mengurangi akuntabilitas pemerintah. Tulisan ini diawali dengan mendiskusikan ramifikasi jangka menengah dari pemilihan gubernur 2017 yang terpolarisasi dan dampaknya bagi perhelatan politik besar di 2018: pilkada regional serentak dan proses nominasi presiden. Kemudian, penulis mengajukan argumen bahwa pemerintahan Jokowi telah memilih ‘belokan otoriter’ menjelang pemilihan umum 2019, dengan membahas berbagai manipulasi atas lembaga-lembaga penegakan hukum dan keamanan demi tujuan-tujuan yang sempit dan partisan, serta usaha-usaha terkoordinir untuk menekan dan mengurangi oposisi demokratik. Akhirnya, tulisan ini juga membingkai pemilihan umum 2019 sebagai kontes antara dua kandidat—Jokowi dan Prabowo Subianto—yang cenderung tidak memperhatikan status quo demokrasi. Kualitas yang menurun pada demokrasi Indonesia menjadi lebih bermasalah lagi dalam konteks global dari resesi demokrasi.

Keywords:

• democratic regression
• authoritarianism
• elections
• political Islam
• corruption
• presidentialism

JEL classification:

• D72
• D73
• K42

Notes

1 Interview with Mardani Ali Sera, 6 August 2018, Bekasi.

2 Interview, 9 August 2018.

3 Interview, 9 August 2018.

4 Interview, 17 January 2018.

5 Interview with Ganjar Pranowo, 8 January 2018, Jakarta.

6 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, 7 August 2018, Jakarta.

7 Interview, 11 August 2018.

8 Interview with Mardani Ali Sera, 6 August 2018, Bekasi.

9 Interview with Hasto Kristiyanto, 11 August 2018, Jakarta.

10 On social media, Jokowi’s supporters and opponents have adopted satirical nicknames for one another: ‘tadpoles’ (Jokowi keeps frogs in the palace grounds), and ‘bats’ (Prabowo supporters ‘see things upside-down’).

11 Interview with Mardani Ali Sera, 6 August 2018, Bekasi.

12 Interview with Mahfuz Siddiq, 7 August 2018, Jakarta.

13 Interview with Jazuli Juwaini, 17 January 2018, Jakarta.

14 Interview, 10 January 2018, Jakarta.

15 Kalla served two terms non-consecutively.

16 They included public commentators, intellectuals, researchers, and media editors.

17 Interview, 11 August 2018.

18 Interview, 11 August 2018.

19 According to a senior source in the Anies-Sandiaga campaign team, Prabowo was not even able to cough up Rp 4 billion ($300,000) during the Jakarta election. He would have considered this a pittance five years earlier.

20 Indonesia’s attorney general has the power to conduct investigations, make arrests, and conduct prosecutions in relation to ‘extraordinary crimes’, which include graft crimes.

21 Interview, 6 August 2018.

22 Interview, 5 August 2018.

23 Interview, 7 August 2018.

24 A sizeable number of regional heads joined Nasdem in 2017–18. For instance, during a brief trip by Nasdem chairman Surya Paloh to Southeast Sulawesi in March, three local regents shifted allegiance to his party.

25 As of October 2018.

26 Note that the General Elections Commission (KPU), the General Elections Oversight Board, and a number of independent legal experts have deemed 2019GP a legitimate constitutional movement.

27 Interview with Mardani Ali Sera, 6 August 2018, Bekasi.

28 Interview with Arief Poyuono, 8 August 2018, Jakarta.