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Abstract
In mid-2021, the Delta strain of the Covid-19 virus caused a second wave of transmissions and deaths in Indonesia at a scale much greater than what was seen in 2020. In this paper, I examine what the Indonesian government’s handling of the Covid crisis in 2021 reveals about the priorities of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), as well as his political agenda and attitude towards the country’s democracy, as he strives to cement his legacy. I argue that, while devastating, the Covid-19 pandemic has given Jokowi the opportunity to push through long-planned economic and political reforms. Furthermore, I contend that, under the guise of promoting social and political stability in the time of Covid, Jokowi has also allowed for further democratic regression in Indonesia through laws that restrict freedom of speech and through the further empowerment of the military and intelligence agencies in civilian life. This paper ends with an examination of Jokowi’s persistently high popularity rating and the discourse surrounding the rumoured push for a constitutional reform that would allow for a third-term Jokowi presidency.
Pada pertengahan 2021, varian Delta dari virus Covid-19 membawa gelombang kedua transmisi serta kematian di Indonesia pada skala jauh lebih besar ketimbang yang terjadi di tahun 2020. Dalam artikel ini, penulis mengulas bagaimana penanganan pemerintah atas krisis Covid di tahun 2021 menunjukkan prioritas Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi), sebagaimana juga agenda politik dan pendekatannya terhadap demokrasi di Indonesia, sembari ia berusaha membangun legasinya. Penulis berargumen bahwa pandemi Covid-19, walau merugikan semua pihak, telah memberikan kesempatan kepada Jokowi untuk menggolkan reformasi ekonomi dan politik yang telah lama ia rencanakan. Lebih jauh, di balik alasan menciptakan stabilitas sosial dan politik dalam suasana Covid, Jokowi juga memberi jalan bagi kemunduran demokrasi di Indonesia lewat undang-undang yang membatasi kebebasan berbicara dan lewat pemberian ruang yang lebih besar bagi agen militer dan intelijen dalam kehidupan sipil. Tulisan ini diakhiri dengan analisis mengapa popularitas Jokowi tetap tinggi serta diskursus mengenai isu adanya upaya mengubah konstitusi demi membuka jalan bagi periode ketiga Jokowi.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Marcus Mietzner for his invaluable guidance, feedback and edits during the preparation of this paper. I would also like to express my gratitude to colleagues who generously shared information and gave me feedback for both this paper and its presentation at the Indonesia Update Conference in September 2021. Particular thanks are due to Edward Aspinall, Greg Fealy, Eve Warburton, Nava Nuraniyah, Ross McLeod, Sebastian Dettman and Stephen Sherlock. Special thanks also go to my two research assistants, Sabrina binte Hardy and Nathaniel Hong.
Notes
1 Owing to reasons discussed later in the paper, the actual numbers of new Covid cases and deaths were likely much higher than what was reflected in official government figures.
2 Similarly, in his 2020 State of the Union speech, Jokowi likened Covid-19 to a computer crash that would require Indonesia to reboot its economy but said this would present an opportunity to make great leaps (Fealy Citation2020).
3 Translated by the author from Indonesian. The full transcript of Jokowi’s 2021 State of the Union address can be found here: https://preview-kly.akamaized.net/liputan6/PIDATO%20KENEGARAAN%20PRESIDEN.pdf
4 Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar (PSBB) translates to large-scale social restrictions, though the restrictions were less extensive and less strict than some later measures.
5 Data gathered from community reports and published by organisations such as LaporCovid-19 showed that, as of 7 August 2021 (around the height of the Delta wave), at least 3,013 Covid patients had died while self-isolating at home. For a data breakdown, see https://laporcovid19.org/data/kematian-isoman
6 For instance, data from research collective Our World in Data (Hasell et al. Citation2020) suggest that, as of 27 August 2021, Indonesia had conducted 113,891 Covid-19 tests per million people. This is the third-lowest rate of testing in Southeast Asia, after Laos (49,931 per million) and Myanmar (63,313 per million). However, Laos and Myanmar lack official data for certain periods. For a data breakdown, see https://www.reportingasean.net/covid-19-testing-southeast-asia/
7 For its part, the government admitted that it had failed to report timely and accurate data, owing to the absence of a centralised nationwide data system. Various Covid data management systems were used at the district, provincial and national levels, creating overall confusion, and there were problems with misreporting and data leaks. Furthermore, data collection was also concentrated in Java, resulting in gross under-reporting from the outer provinces.
8 In early August 2021, the government removed the death toll count from all official Covid-handling indicators. The mortality rate was not included again in daily data reporting until the end of August. Explaining the removal of mortality data, coordinating minister Pandjaitan claimed that the decision had been made because problematic data input had allegedly distorted the reported numbers from across the archipelago (Oktara Citation2021). This led to more accusations that the government was deliberately manipulating and omitting data in order to hide its incompetence and to protect the economy.
9 Jokowi’s predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, at several junctures of his presidency, tried to change the existing labour laws. However, workers’ protests that blocked toll roads and paralysed Jakarta’s economic life convinced him to abandon the initiative.
10 Note that this special exam was jointly developed by the National Civil Service Agency (BKN), the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), the BIN and the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT). The test was supposedly designed to identify KPK officers who were ‘radical’ and lacked neutrality, and were therefore presumably unfit for future civil service. The case of the KPK exam is thus another example of the growing involvement of the military and security agencies in civilian matters.
11 Gunawan was one of the key players involved in the tension between the KPK and the national police in 2015 that was triggered when Jokowi nominated him as the sole candidate for the chief of police position. The KPK then investigated Gunawan as part of a larger investigation into corruption among the senior ranks of police leadership. This led to a string of (very public) mutual corruption accusations between the KPK and the police that ended only when a Jakarta court declared Gunawan’s status as a suspect to be unlawful. Gunawan went on to be appointed as the deputy chief of police in 2016.
12 This targeting was also a direct response to the growing trend among Islamist followers to reject the Covid-19 vaccine and the government’s health protocols (Yuniar Citation2021).
13 The government claimed that the internet blackout had been caused by a broken underwater cable, but rights groups were sceptical of this explanation and pointed out how this latest internet blackout was part of a pattern that had been more frequent since 2019. A major instance of internet blackout during weeks of protest in 2019 was declared illegal by a Jakarta court.
14 Surveys conducted by agencies such as the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and Charta Politika showed similar results.
15 Most recent polls show Prabowo Subianto and PDIP Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo as two possible frontrunners, placing their electability at over 20%. Other potential candidates that usually score well in polls include Baswedan, West Java governor Ridwan Kamil, tourism minister Sandiaga Uno and Democrats party leader Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono.