Abstract
Rail privatisation was a controversial, widely unpopular policy whose implementation was not inevitable. This article employs counterfactual history methodology to examine whether the move to rail privatisation in Britain might have failed. It places the privatisation proposals in context by examining opposition within the Conservative Party and British Rail. The paper then focuses on three key counterfactual questions, including the significance of New Labour's reversal of its commitment to renationalise rail under its ‘third way’ policy and the possible consequences had the move to privatise rail failed. Based on the historical evidence available, it concludes that the move to rail privatisation could have failed, and that performance would have been better had rail remained an integrated, nationalised industry.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Warwick Funnell, Brian Rutherford and the editor for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Notes
1. Bob Reid II was Chairman of British Rail from 1990 to 1995. He succeeded Bob Reid I, who was Chairman from 1983 to 1990.
2. BR Press Release 14 July 1992, 44/92, The National Archive (henceforth TNA), AN 192/1070/2.
3. Department of Transport: Track Access & Charging Study Final Report, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett Ltd, 1991, TNA, AN 192/1040.
4. Comments on the PHB Paper – Professor Bradshaw, 23 May 1991, TNA, AN 192/1040.
5. Ibid., pp. 1, 3, 5.
6. Briefing Pack for Chairman on White Paper: Dinner with Secretary of State, 24 June 1992, TNA AN 192/1070/2, note 2.
7. Ibid., note 4.
8. John Welsby was Chief Executive of British Rail from 1990 until 1995, when he succeeded Bob Reid II as Chairman.
9. Letter from Bob Reid, BR Chairman, to Brian Mawhinney, Transport Secretary, 15 November 1994, TNA AN 192/1087.
10. John Smith, 9 June 1993, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 226, Hansard, col. 292.
11. Ibid., col. 294.
12. John Prescott, 12 January 1993, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 216, Hansard, col. 771.
13. Ibid., col. 782.