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Abstract
This article investigates the adaptations of Italian silk technologies to the environment of Bengal. The case is particularly interesting as the English East India Company (EEIC) invested considerable effort into making the technologies operational in the new climatic and socio-economic context. The article highlights the unequal focus on technical adaptations, although it points out that commercial and economic, and social adaptations were not completely neglected. It concludes that the key obstacle for the commercial success of the transferred technologies was the lack of attention to institutional adaptations. Institutional problems that arose were the result of lack of leadership and managerial innovations on the part of the company rather than the technology itself.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Giorgio Riello for invaluable advice and guidance and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
Notes
1. Rosenberg, “Economic Development and the Transfer of Technology,” 550–575; Hilaire-Pèrez and Verna, “Dissemination of Technological Knowledge,” 535–559; Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 372–376.
2. Mansfield has pointed to the fact that in order for a technology to achieve economic success in a new environment, ‘it is very important that a proper mating occurs between the technological considerations, on the one hand, and the more purely economic considerations, on the other’. Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 373.
3. Bhattacharya, “Cultural and Social Constraints,” 243–246; Ray, “Silk Industry,” 349 –373.
4. See for instance: Hayami and Rutan, “Factor Prices and Technical Change in Agricultural Development,” 1, 135–136; Broadberry and Gupta, “Lancashire, India,” 282–302.
5. Sericulture consists of mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing.
6. Goldsmiths’ Library, 1796, fol. 16,654, Considerations, 21 and 1795, fol. 16,280, Reports of the Committee of Warehouses, 13; Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia, 346.
7. Silk reeling is the process of making silk thread from silk cocoons.
8. IOR/E/4/625, 9 April 1777, 219.
9. IOR/E/1/65 ff. 440–441v: “Letter 270 James Wiss in London to the Court Recommending, 20 December 1779,” 440–441; Goldsmiths’ Library, 1795 fol. 16,280, Reports of the Committee of Warehouses, 1; IOR/E/1/61 ff. 486–487v: “Letter 240 James Wiss in London to the Court, 18 November 1777’, 487.
10. Bhadra, “Role of Pykars,” 17–18, 34–35 and “Silk Filature,” 75–77, 82.
11. Ray, “Silk Industry,” 349.
12. Ibid., 371–373.
13. Bhattacharya, “Cultural and Social Constraints,” 243–246.
14. Davini, “Bengali Raw Silk,” 62.
15. Davini, “History of Bengali Raw Silk,” 9–10.
16. There is wealth of studies focusing on the transfer of technologies to the US explaining the success or failure of these transfers by differences in factor endowments. Other studies look at the role of the changes in output markets. See for instance: Jeremy, “British Textile Technology and Transmission to the United States,” 46–52; Temin, “A New Look at Hunter’s Hypothesis about the Antebellum Iron Industry,” 345–351; Coleman, “An Innovation and its Diffusion: The ‘New Draperies’,” 420–29; Hayami and Rutan, “Factor Prices and Technical Change in Agricultural Development,” 1, 135–136.
17. Considering factor prices in Bengal silk industry, these were favourable for adoption of the Piedmontese silk technologies. The returns on investment into silk filatures were positive and the investment was profitable. Moreover, the study of transfer of dairy technology from Sweden to Uruguay shows that technology can adapt to the local factor endowment. After being adopted in Uruguay the technology became more labour intensive than it was in Sweden. Sterner and Tansini, “Transfer and Adaptation of Technology,” 116–119.
18. Brown, “Cakes and Oil: Technology Transfer and Chinese Soybean Processing,” 449–450.
19. Rosenberg mentions that technologies need to be adapted not only to economic but also to environmental conditions – to climate, geography and geology. Rosenberg, “Economic Development,” 571–573. See also, Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 373.
20. Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 373.
21. Mansfield and Wagner, “Organizational and Strategic Factors Associated with Probabilities of Success in Industrial R&D,” 187. Edwin Mansfield is among the pioneers of the study of technology transfer and diffusion of innovations. Teece, “Technology and Technology Transfer: Mansfieldian Inspirations,” 17–33. Writing with various co-authors, Mansfield focused on several aspects of technology transfers, especially on the firm level. See for instance, Mansfield and Romeo, “Technology Transfer to Overseas Subsidiaries by U.S.-based Firms,” 737–750; Mansfield, “Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer” and “The Speed and Cost of Industrial Innovation in Japan and the United States,” 1157–1168.
22. Mansfield and Wagner, “Organizational and Strategic Factors,” 188.
23. Evenson, “International Diffusion of Agrarian Technology,” 51.
24. Rosenberg, “Economic Development,” 569.
25. Evenson, “International Diffusion,” 55.
26. Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 373.
27. Rosenberg, “Economic Development,” 552–554.
28. This shows that even if a technology is not necessarily labelled as a ‘macro-invention’, it cannot be successfully adopted without large-scale alterations.
29. Mokyr, Lever of Riches, 10.
30. Joel Mokyr defines macro-inventions as ‘inventions in which a radical new idea, without clear precedent emerges more or less ab nihilo’. The distinction between macro- and micro-inventions was first made by Mokyr. He defined micro-inventions as ‘small, incremental steps that improve, adapt, and streamline existing techniques already in use, reducing energy and raw material requirements’. Such a definition of micro-inventions fits well the definition of changes that accompanied successful technology transfers. Mokyr argued that micro-inventions occur more frequently than macro-inventions and that they account for most of the gains in productivity. Moreover, macro-inventions are not feasible without micro-inventions. Although Mokyr did not dispute the vital contribution of the key ‘macro-inventions’ of the industrial revolution such as Arkwright’s water-frame, or in the instance of steam engine, he decisively shifted the attention to micro-inventions. What he emphasised was the fact that it took time for these macro-inventions to find wide usage and that adaptations were often indispensable. Mokyr, Lever of Riches, 13.
31. Rosenberg, “Economic Development,” 552–573.
32. Hilaire-Perèz and Verna, “Dissemination of Technological Knowledge,” 535–59. His research focused particularly on the whaling and lime industries. Pearson, “Technology of Whaling in Australian Waters,” 40–54; Pearson, “Lime Industry in Australia,” 28–35.
33. Warwick Pearson argues that in colonial context ‘sociocultural values of tradition will quickly give way to those of innovation, and even long-established traditional technologies will not survive transfer’. Pearson, “Water Power in a Dry Continent,” 58–59.
34. The gender division of labour in Japan was not dissimilar to Western industrial economies. Yet, adaptations were necessary if the new technologies were to comply with Japanese social norms. Hunter, “Technology Transfer and the Gendering of Communications Work,” 1, 5 and 9–18.
35. Brown, “Cakes and Oil,” 454–461, 463.
36. For silk industry, see Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 369–394; Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System and Adaptations in Japan,” 27–39.
37. See for instance: Cordeiro, “Technology Transfer in Portugal’s Late Eighteenth Century,” 177–188; Endrei, “Italian Contribution to the Development of Sericulture in Hungary,” 301–313; Chicco, La Seta in Piemonte, 247–294.
38. Transfer of Piedmontese technologies is briefly mentioned by Chicco, La Seta in Piemonte, 288–294.
39. Piedmontese silk reeling technologies were very advanced in terms of organisation and technology – they relied on centralisation, factory discipline and advanced machinery – the system of production relied on constant innovations of both technology and organisation. Zanier, “Pre-modern European Silk Technology and East Asia,” 131–139;.
40. See for instance, Itoh and Tanimoto, “Rural Entrepreneurs,” 61–63; Choi, “Entrepreneurial Leadership,” 930–932; Kawagoe, “Technical and Institutional Innovations in Rice Marketing in Japan,” 37–43, Yonekawa, “University Graduates and Large Japanese Enterprises,” 193–218.
41. Itoh and Tanimoto, “Rural Entrepreneurs,” 61–63.
42. Choi, “Entrepreneurial Leadership,” 930–932.
43. Hashino, “Institutionalising Technical Education,” 25–27.
44. Hashino and Otsuka, “Expansion and Transformation of the Export-oriented Silk Weaving District,” 24–26.
45. Hashino and Otsuka, “Hand Looms, Power Looms and Changing Production Organizations,” 801–802.
46. Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System,” 27–39; Furuta, “Silk-reeling in Modern East Asia,” 191–221.
47. Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System,” 27.
48. It has been argued by Kiyokawa that the modern factory system and social conditions in the filature were too ‘idealistic for the pre-industrial society of Japan’. Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System,” 27–28, 30.
49. Ibid., 31–34.
50. Steam was substituted for water, Ibid., 34.
51. For instance, the government and entrepreneurs made efforts to remove prejudice against Western culture as part of their efforts to promote Western technology and create a favourable environment for the development of silk reeling. Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System,” 34; Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 375–376.
52. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 374–376, 383. The efforts to develop social and physical infrastructure falls in the category of ‘capacity building’. Capacity building has been mentioned by the opponents of pure laissez-faire approach to technology development in developing countries as essential for successful technology borrowing. See, for instance: Lall, “Technology Capabilities and Industrialization,” 181.
53. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 374–376, 383.
54. Zanier, “Pre-modern European Silk Technology,” 133.
55. IOR/E/1/63 ff. 158–160v: “Letter 70 and James Wiss in London to the Court, 28 October 1778”; IOR/E/4/625, 14 July 1779, 484–486.
56. IOR/E/1/66 ff. 422–424v: “Letters 212–213 James Wiss in London to Peter Michell, 10 May 1780,” 424; IOR/E/4/638, 30 May 1792, 624.
57. The skein was to be 40 inches in length and 80 inches in circumference, IOR/E/1/66 ff. 422–424v, 424.
58. IOR/E/1/63 ff. 19–20v: “Letter 8 Report of James Wiss to the Committee of Correspondence, London 14 July 1778,” p. 21; IOR/E/1/65 ff. 440–441v : “Letter 270 James Wiss in London to the Court, 20 Dec 1779,” 441.
59. Also buildings had to be adapted to the weather conditions. Resilient materials such as bricks and wood had to be used in the building of the filatures. Moreover, filatures had to be closed rather than semi-open because of the rainy weather. However, this created the problem of how to dispose of the fumes created by the furnaces. Davini, “Una Conquista Incerta,” 230–232.
60. IOR/E/4/625, 14 July 1779, 484–486.
61. Ibid., 484.
62. IOR/E/4/625, 14 July 1779, 485; IOR/E/4/626, 12 May 1780, 107.
63. IOR/E/4/625, 14 July 1779, 486.
64. IOR/E/4/628, 11 April 1785, 560–61.
65. IOR/E/4/627, 12 July 1782, 350.
66. IOR/E/4/628, 11 April 1785, 561.
67. IOR/E/4/629, 8 July 1785, 90.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Mansfield, “International Technology Transfer,” 373.
71. It is not clear how many cocoons were used in the reeling of the sorts A, B and C respectively. The filatures were simply ordered to use the samples sent from London without any further specification. It can only be said that A was the finest sort of these three but it was hardly the finest sort that could possibly be made.
72. The differentiation of silk according to fineness into sorts A, B, and C first appeared in the letters to Bengal in 1785 and rapidly became prevalent. IOR/E/4/640, 25 June 1793, 517; IOR/E/4/628, 11 April 1785, 552.
73. IOR/E/4/645A, 27 July 1796, 340.
74. IOR/E/4/628, 16 March 1784, 261.
75. The coarser sorts of silk could not be spun in the rainy season as the silk would be impossible to dry the silk and it would grow mouldy. ‘If it be made of 5 or 6 Cocoons, it will occasion a prodigious waste in winding off at the Mill, owing to the Bars of the Reel being too hard for so slender a thread, which cannot be loosened therefrom without breaking; and should it be made of 18 to 20 Cocoons the Silk will be black and musty, for want of time to dry it on the Reel, and occasion a Considerable difference in the price in England’. IOR/E/4/625, 9 April 1777, 201–3.
76. IOR/E/4/628, 11 April 1785, 552.
77. IOR/E/4/640, 25 June 1793, 517.
78. Chicco, La Seta in Piemonte, 213.
79. Only in Calabria reeling was done by men. Cinzia Capalbo, “Mercato Esterno e Tradizione di Mestiere,” 73–96; Zanier, “Pre-modern European Silk Technology and East Asia,” 131; Chicco, La Seta in Piemonte, 212–213.
80. Goldsmiths’ Library, 1775, fol.: Williamson, Proposals, 17–18.
81. The issue of employing female reelers was never discussed by the company. Other sources reveal that all the reelers employed by the EEIC in Bengal were men.
82. The role of the movement of journeymen and other skilled artisans in the transfer in the transfer of technologies has been underlined, for instance, by Hilaire-Pérez and Verna. Hilaire-Perez and Verna, “Dissemination of Technological Knowledge,” 544–548, 554–557, 562. The fact that the transfer of the Piedmontese reeling technologies to Bengal was driven by the EEIC, made it more coordinated and controlled than most early-modern technology transfers. For instance, the silk specialists were employed directly by the company rather than being given privileges. Also, it was the EEIC who retained ownership of the technology, not the specialists. For this reason, it is helpful to compare the silk specialists sent to Bengal with the skilled personnel employed in transfer of technologies in nineteenth century. For the discussion of the role of skilled individuals in diffusion of steam power in Europe and North America see: Robinson, “The Early Diffusion of Steam Power,” 91–107.
83. David J. Jeremy called practitioners ‘the most efficient agent(s) of international diffusion’. Jeremy, Transatlantic Industrial Revolution, 162.
84. Kiyokawa, “Transplantation of the European Factory System,” 33.
85. ‘We are concerned to observe, that in our last Sale there was some deficiency in this respect. There were complaints of inferiority and particularly of its being generally too coarse. In some case the Sorts, denominated A were not finer than the B should have been, and the same of the B and C. There were also some instances of frauds in package, which ought particularly to be attended to, for preserving the reputation of our Sales. What We allude to, is the making the Coating on outside a Skain of the Letter A when the inside is only B, or perhaps C. The Silk of Collinsons was faulty in this respect, as was also some from Rungpore, a specimen of which is forwarded for your inspection.’ IOR/E/4/645A, 27 July 1796, 355. It should be observed that this problem with the labelling of silk continued from the period before 1770s.
86. Bhadra, “Role of Pykars,” 25–27; Bhattacharya, “Cultural and Social Constraints,” 243–244; Davini, “Una Conquista Incerta,” 129–135.
87. IOR/E/4/630, 21 July, 1786, 548.
88. Davini, “Una Conquista Incerta,” 47.
89. Chaudhuri, Trading World, 208–213, 298–300, 325; Hejeebu, “Contract Enforcement,” 498–500; Davies, Royal African Company, 163–165; Wilson, England´s Apprenticeship 174–176; MacKay, Honourable Company, 66–67; Willan, Early History, 258–267.
90. Hejeebu, “Contract Enforcement,” 498–500.
91. Kranton and Swamy, “Contracts, Hold-up, and Exports,” 977.
92. Ibid., 981–983.
93. Zanier, “Pre-modern European Silk Technology and East Asia,” 139.
94. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 370.
95. LSE Archives, W7204, East India Company, Reports and Documents, xxxiv. ‘That mulberry plantations can be established on account of the company, so as in time to render the public investment in a considerable degree independent of the other sources of supply of cocoons, is not, we conceive, to be expected, considering that, for the accomplishment of such an ends, lands to so great an extent must be cultivated, and servants so numerous must be employed, as well as buildings be erected for rearing of cocoons comprehending altogether such a field of care and superintendence, as no Resident could be competent to, in addition to the minute and constant attention requisite to the peculiar and important duty of manufacturing silk. Such a plan, even if it were found to be practicable, should, in all probability, from the greatness of the expense attending it, prove decidedly objectionable.’ LSE Archives, W7204, East India Company, Reports and Documents, 63.
96. In Bengal peasants owned their product throughout the production process which was a significant difference to the putting-out system practiced in Europe and it gave the artisans more freedom. For the company it meant that many silk producers did not abide to the contracts. Riello, Cotton, 62–64; Gupta, “Competition and Control,” 292–297.
97. In many regions sericulture remained a household activity even in the twentieth century and entrepreneurs gained control over the production process by creating dependence. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 381. Federico, Economic History of Silk Industry, 16. In Japan the problems with quality of cocoons were overcome under the household system of production thanks to institutional innovations. A new system of contracts called ‘sub-contractual long direct purchase system’ emerged and institutionalised a long-term system of purchase contracts between farmers and filatures. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 379.
98. Ma, “Why Japan, Not China,” 379.
99. IOR, Bombay (Misc. Public Documents, etc.), 1793. m.17: “Letter from Giuseppe Mutti to John Bell Esquire on 20 October 1838,” India Office Records and Private Papers.
100. IOR/E/4/625, 9 April 1777, 225–26; IOR/E/4/626, 5 July 1780, 219.
101. Ibid., 182–184.
102. Ibid., 172–174.
103. IOR/E/4/625, 9 April 1777, 176–184.
104. IOR/E/4/627, 12 July 1782, 351; IOR/E/4/625, 9 April 1777, 175.
105. IOR/E/1/66 ff. 422–424v: “Letters 212–213,” 10 May 1780, 422.
106. IOR/E/4/623, 24 December 1776, 281.
107. Carlos and Nicholas, “Agency Problems,” 856; Hejeebu, “Contract Enforcement,” 497.
108. IOR/E/4/630, 21 July 1786, 538–542.
109. IOR/E/4/630, 12 April 1786, 390; IOR/E/4/630, 21 July, 1786, 538–542.