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Abstract
This introduction to the special issue on business responses to European competition policy considers the development of research in the field of European competition policy. It is argued that existing analyses have concentrated on the development of policy over time and that we know surprisingly little about the response of business to the demands of competition policy. This is important because it is apparent that ever stricter legal provision has not removed the problem and where there appears to be a considerable degree of recidivism. The aim of the special issue is to begin to address these issues by examining the response of different companies and sectors to the existence of EEC/EU competition policy.
Notes
1. Vives, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.
2. Amato, Antitrust; Damro and Guay, ‘Transatlantic Merger Relations’; Gifford and Kudrle, Atlantic Divide; Kovacic, ‘Competition Policy’; and Poli, ‘Antitrust Institutions’.
3. See Aydin and Thomas, eds, Globalization; Damro and Guay, European Competition Policy. On particular cases see Gavil and First, Microsoft; Renda, ‘Searching’; Morgan and McGuire, ‘Transatlantic Divergence’; and Lyons, ed., Cases.
4. Such as the GE-Honeywell merger, authorised by US antitrust authorities but banned by the EU Commission in 2001.
5. For an overview see Freyer, Antitrust; and Kovacic and Shapiro, ‘Century’.
6. Legislation was introduced in Sweden in 1953, Netherlands in 1953, Denmark in 1949 and 1955, France in 1953, Norway in 1953 and Switzerland in 1947, but all were weak.
7. This special issue covers EEC competition policy, that is, prior to the creation of the European Union in 1992. When ‘EEC/EU’ is used it is to denote competition policy in both the EEC and EU.
8. Cini and McGowan, Competition Policy, 29–35; Harding and Joshua, Regulating, 116; and Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 21.
9. Buch-Hansen and Levallois, ‘Scale’, 737; and Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality.
10. On a turning point in the early 2000s see McGowan, Antitrust, 14; and Simonsson, Legitimacy, 1. On policy after the financial crisis see McGowan and Morgan, ‘”Today’s Softness”’.
11. Neven et al., Trawling for Minnows, 15; on the debate since 1948 see Warlouzet, ‘La Contribution’.
12. McGowan and Wilks, ‘First Supranational Policy’.
13. Warlouzet, ‘Centralization’.
14. Germany enacted its law in July 1957, whereas the Treaty of Rome was signed in March 1957. There were provisions on cartels in French and Dutch law but they were rather weak. Although technically part of what we call now ’competition policy’, they were considered in those days only as part of other economic policies (such as price policy in France). The UK had provisions regarding monopolies (1948) and restrictive practices (1956) but it was not part of the EEC until 1973. See: Hesse and Roelevink, ‘Cartel’, 198–203; Petit, Van Sinderen and Van Bergeijk, ‘Tortoise’, 71–9; Warlouzet, ‘Competition’, 49; Warlouzet, Choix, 271–3 and 292–4.
15. McGowan, Antitrust, vii; and Aydin and Thomas, ‘Challenges’, 532.
16. Buch-Hansen and Wigger, Politics, 4.
17. For an overview of this very rich literature see Kaiser and Varsori, European Union History.
18. Hambloch, Europäische, Leucht, Transatlantic; Pitzer, Interessen ; Ramirez, Public Policies ; Seidel, The Process of Politics; Warlouzet, Le Choix ; Witschke, Gefahr ;.
19. Bussière and Warlouzet, eds, La Politique; Jullien and Smith, eds, Le Gouvernement; Patel and Schweitzer, eds, Historical Foundations.
20. An exception being Bertilorenzi, The International Aluminium Cartel.
21. Buch-Hansen and Levallois, ‘Scale’, 738.
22. Brusse and Griffiths, ‘Incidence’.
23. Bouwens and Dankers, ‘The Invisible Handshake’; Petit, ‘The Dutch’; Sandberg, ‘Cartel Registration’; Shanahan, ‘The Secret Register’.
24. For an example of peak level associations’ consideration of EEC competition policy see Bührer and Warlouzet, ‘Regulating Markets’; and Rollings, British Business, 193–217.
25. On the embedding of competition policy into the project of social, neomercantilist, market-oriented and neoliberal Europe, see: Warlouzet, Governing Europe; On the linkage between competition policy and industrial policy considered by a lawyer, see: Sauter, Competition.
26. For example, Cini and McGowan, Competition Policy. On Monti see Levy, ‘Mario Monti’.
27. Kovacic and Shapiro, ‘Antitrust’.
28. Buch-Hansen and Wigger, Politics, 5; and Buch-Hansen and Wigger, ‘Revisting’. For a typical and widely cited work of the genre criticised here see Motta, Competition Policy.
29. Dell, Trade Blocs, 72.
30. Leucht, ‘Transatlantic’; Witschke, Gefahr.
31. Barthel, ‘European Steel Cartel’; Warlouzet and Witschke, ‘Difficult Path’; Witschke, Gefahr.
32. Schweitzer, ‘Parallels’.
33. Warlouzet, ‘Centralization’, 730; on the negotiation of Regulation 17/62, see also: Hambloch, Europäische,; Montalban, Ramírez Pérez and Smith, ‘Competition’; Pace and Seidel, ‘Drafting’; Pitzer, Interessen; Warlouzet, Choix.
34. Gerber, Law; Hambloch, Europäische; idem, ‘EEC Competition Policy’; Pace and Seidel, ‘The Drafting’; Pitzer, Interessen; Seidel, The Process, 155–8 .On von der Groeben, see also Elvert, ‘Hans von der Groeben’. On ordoliberalism in EEC/EU competition policy, see also Mestmäcker, ‘Developments’.
35. Berghahn, Americanisation; Hesse and Roelevink, ‘Cartel Law’.
36. Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism, 27.
37. Akman, ‘Searching’; Akman and Kassim, ‘Myths’; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, ‘Revisiting’, 9; Ramírez Pérez and Van de Scheur, ‘The Evolution’.
38. Warlouzet, ‘Centralization’, 731–3; more details in Warlouzet, Le choix, 269–338.
39. On the German opposition to Grundig-Consten see Warlouzet, Governing Europe, 158.
40. Ham, ‘Rules’, 41.
41. Cini and McGowan, Competition Policy, 21; McGowan, Antitrust, 15; Büthe, ‘Politics of Competition’, 182; and Wilks and McGowan, ‘Competition Policy’, 225.
42. Gerber, Law and Competition, 353.
43. Harding and Joshua, Regulating, 109–10; Buch-Hansen and Wigger, Politics, 62.
44. Forrester and Norall, ‘Laicization’, 14.
45. Cini and McGowan, Competition Policy, 31; Montalban, Ramírez Pérez, and Smith, ‘Competition Policy’; Warlouzet, ‘Centralization’, 734–5 and Warlouzet, Governing Europe.
46. Montalban, Ramírez Pérez, and Smith, ‘Competition Policy’; Warlouzet, ‘Competition Policy’, 61; and Warlouzet, Governing Europe, 161–3.
47. McGowan, Antitrust, 10; Wigger, ‘Competition’, 183.
48. For a review on the literature on the 1989 merger regulation see Warlouzet, ‘Centralization’, 727 and 734.
49. This began with Buch-Hansen, ‘Rethinking’; and Wigger, ‘Competition’, before their joint work. See also: Montalban, Ramírez Pérez, and Smith, ‘Competition Policy’; Warlouzet, ‘Rise’.
50. Djelic, Exporting; and idem ‘Does Europe?’.
51. See Witschke, Gefahr für den Wettbewerb?; and Leucht, ‘Transatlantic Policy Networks’.
52. Martin, Goals; Leucht and Marquis, ‘American’, 147–9.
53. McGuire Woods, Competition.
54. For example, Pitzer, Interessen.
55. Bührer and Warlouzet, ‘Regulating Markets’; Montalban et al., ‘Competition Policy’; Ramírez Pérez, ‘La Politique’.
56. See Dinan, ‘Historiography’; Loth, ed, Experiencing; and Kaiser and Varsori, eds, European Union History.
57. Milward, European Rescue; idem, Politics; and Milward et al., Frontier. See also Guirao et al., Alan S. Milward. For a critique see Kaiser, ‘From State to Society’. One factor explaining this was that Milward mainly studied the years before 1962 when EEC competition policy really took off.
58. Kaiser and Starie, Transnational; Kaiser et al., History; Kaiser et al., Transnational; and Kaiser and Meyer, eds, Societal actors. A second strand focussing on technology, networks and experts has also developed since Misa and Schot, ‘Inventing Europe’, for example Lagendijk, Electrifying, van der Vleuten and Kaijser, eds, Networking, and Badenoch and Fickers, eds, Materializing.
59. Badel and Michel, eds, Patronat; Bussière, Dumoulin and Schirmann, eds, Europe; Kipping, La France; Rhenisch, Europaeische Integration; McKinlay et al., ‘Reluctant Europeans’; Rollings, British Business; Geven, Transnational Networks; Morival, ‘Passage’; idem, ‘Les Europes du Patronat’; Moguen-Toursel, L’Ouverture; Moguen-Toursel, ed, Stratégies d'Éntreprise; Ramírez Pérez, ‘Public Policies’; idem, ‘Role’; idem, ‘French Automobile Industry’.
60. One exception is Jones and Miskell, ‘European Integration’. A number of case-studies have also been explored in collective volumes edited by Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin and Sylvain Schirman (see a summary in Bussière, Dumoulin and Schirmann, ‘Le développement’), but none of the contributions based on archives deal with competition policy except those of Sigfrido Ramírez Pérez and of Laurent Warlouzet published in Bussière, Dumoulin and Schirmann, eds, Europe.
61. Wells, Antitrust. For examples see Stocking and Watkins, Cartels in Action; idem, Cartels or Competition?; and Hexner, International Cartels. For a recent summary see Connor, Global Price Fixing. One who continued to publish in this area was Corwin Edwards, Cartelization; and idem, Control of Cartels.
62. Barjot, Introduction’, 39. Relevant works include Teichova, ‘Internationale Kartelle’, Pohl, Kartelle und Kartellgesetzgebung, Wurm, Internationale Kartelle. See also Pohl (ed.), Competition and Cooperation.
63. See Barjot, ed., International Cartels; Kudō and Hara, eds, International Cartels; Wurm, Business; Barbezat, ‘Price’; Phimister, ‘Chrome Trust’; Levenstein, ‘Do Price Wars?’.
64. Levenstein and Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, 54.
65. Barjot and Schröter, ‘Why?’, 963.
66. Barjot and Schröter, ‘Why?’, 957; Schröter, ‘Cartelization and Decartelization’; and idem, ‘Cartels Revisited’.
67. Schröter, Foreword’, xviii. See also Fear, ‘Cartels’.
68. Fear, ‘Cartels’, 276.
69. Bertilorenzi, ‘Legitimizing Cartels’.
70. Kaiser and Schot, Writing the Rules, 195–96. On Loucheur see Bussière, ‘La SDN’ and Barjot, ‘Les Cartels’.
71. Kipping, La France; Rollings and Kipping, ‘Private Transnational Governance’.
72. Kaiser and Schot, Writing the Rules, 293.
73. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, xiv.
74. For a textbook analysis see Motta, Competition Policy.
75. McGowan, Anti-trust Revolution, 19.
76. Motta, ‘Cartels’.
77. McGowan, Antitrust Revolution, 23.
78. Levenstein and Suslow, ‘Breaking Up’, 463–64.
79. Connor and Helmers, ‘Statistics’. See also Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 199–203.
80. For an empirical example of firms using some form of cost-benefit analysis see Feinberg, ‘Enforcement’.
81. Stucke, ‘Am I a Price Fixer?’.
82. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 11; and Levenstein and Suslow, ‘Breaking Up’, 456.
83. Schröter, ‘Risk and Control’.
84. Levenstein and Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, 54.
85. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 20.
86. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 102; Levenstein and Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, 45; and idem, ‘Studies of Cartel Stability’.
87. Harding and Joshua, Regulating Cartels, 33.
88. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 24.
89. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 21. In many ways this is similar to the approach used by Connor, Global Price Fixing.
90. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 20–21.
91. Harding and Edwards, Cartel Criminality, 99.
92. Levenstein and Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’.
93. This is not to argue that there are no selection biases.
94. Connor, Global Price Fixing, 3;.
95. McGowan, Antitrust Revolution, 24. There have been some legal international cartels, usually relating to commodities, for example the International Coffee Agreement and OPEC.
96. One potential contributor to the special issue who knew from previous research that relevant material existed in a company’s archive was refused access to study the topic while another contributor found that some records, which had previously been consulted, had been recalled by the company and were no longer available.
97. Akman, ‘Searching’; Schweitzer, ‘Parallels’; see also: Mestmäcker, ‘Developments’.
98. Cini, ‘Soft Law’; Ehlermann, ‘State Aids’; Spector, ‘State Aids’.
99. Notably Bertilorenzi, International Aluminium Cartel; Jensen-Eriksen, ‘Industrial Diplomacy’; Rollings, British Business; Warlouzet, Le Choix; Ramírez Pérez, ‘Public Policies’; Van Laer, ‘European Community’.
100. Defraigne, ‘From National Champions’.
101. This cartel was examined in particular in Schröter, ‘Kartelle’ and in Marx, ‘European’. On Davignon and Vouel’s opposition about this cartel see Warlouzet, ‘Difficult Quest’, 58–59 and Governing Europe, 113–4.
102. This relationship has been particularly examined in Buch-Hansen and Wigger, ‘Revisiting’ and Jullien and Smith, The EU.
103. On the role of EEC/EU competition policy to break the network of bilateral agreement in the air transport sector see Kassim and Stevens, Air transport.
104. On this focus on vertical agreements and its subsequent alteration see Amato, Antitrust, 51.
105. Spar, Cooperative Edge; LeClair, International Commodity Markets.
106. Levenstein and Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’.
107. Michel Waelbroeck delivered a paper in one of the first conference organized on EEC competition policy in 1967 entitled ’Coopérations, Concentrations, Fusions d’Entreprises dans la CEE”. It was published in the Revue du Marché Commun in 1967.
108. Vauchez, ‘Making’; and idem, Brokering Europe.
109. On the growing role of lawyers’ firms in competition policy see Wigger, ‘Towards A Market-Based Approach’.