Servants of liquidation: The clerical staff at the First Debt Office in Sweden, c. 1719–1730

Abstract

The extensive use of white collar workers, such as bookkeepers and clerks, played a crucial role in the formation of modern states during the early modern period. This article focuses on the formation of a Debt Office in Sweden, which was opened in 1719 in order to administer the liquidation of the debt accrued during the previous royal regime. By utilizing the available expertise that had been working on the debt market, it was relatively easy for the new parliamentary rule to found the office. The office became part of the credit system when it interacted with various creditors. The clerical staff helped the market to function by providing intermediation, but their role became increasingly contentious. By examining the clerical staff, we learn how the authorities tried to build a trustworthy institution. The case thereby offers another perspective on credible commitment than research which concentrates on formal political institutions.

Keywords:

• Sweden
• white collar work
• intermediation
• government debt
• credible commitment

During the early modern period in Europe, different government agencies grew in importance and size when they were assigned the tasks of collecting and measuring a growing number of taxes and other revenues. Government agencies also had to oversee the spending of the state as well as organising the increasing need to borrow huge sums from different creditors. To manage these tasks, the state needed to employ and supervise relatively large numbers of staff who had administrative skills and experience (Ågren, 2014; Baugh, 1965; Brandon, 2015, pp. 57–66, 141–148; Brewer, 1988, pp. 64–134; Dickson, 1967; Glete, 2002, pp. 10–66; Godsey, 2018, pp. 67–187; González Enciso, 2017, pp. 53–258; Neal, 1990; Torres-Sánchez, 2018, pp. 5–6, 9–11). It could therefore be argued that the extensive use of white collar workers, such as bookkeepers and clerks, played a crucial role in the formation of modern states.

Although we know a great deal about how early modern states organised their tax and borrowing systems, scholars have, as Anne Murphy has pointed out, often paid very little attention to the actual working practices and the working conditions of the clerks who toiled in the state apparatuses or organisations that operated on the financial markets. Furthermore, our knowledge is limited with regards to how the authorities actually recruited lower-ranking personnel as well as how they in practice ensured proper conduct within the organisations and how they monitored the behaviour of staff members (Murphy, 2010, 2015, 2017).

This lacuna in previous research will be addressed in this article by examining a period at the beginning of the eighteenth century when several European governments introduced new monetary and borrowing measures to finance the increasing cost of warfare, and to deal with the accumulated debts. These measures included the use of paper money, the sale of long-term bonds and the transfer of government debt to equity in long-distance trading companies. As a consequence, more people than before got in contact with monetary instruments and various forms of government debt. At the same time, the political stakes and tensions within existing polities increased when growing number of creditors demanded to be accommodated while traditional elites feared the political and social fallout of sharing power with different commercial interests (Wennerlind, 2011, pp. 161–234; Yamamoto, 2011). Many also questioned the public morality of leading officials when the state was dependent on credit and various financiers (Dubet & Félix, 2018, pp. 1–16). These financial and political processes came to a head during and after the well-known South Sea Bubble in England and the concurrent activities of John Law in France when the two states tried to deal with growing public debt levels. There were also similar developments in other European states, such as Denmark and Sweden (Bonney, 2001; Félix, 2018; Graham, 2019; Kleer, 2012; Neal, 2000, pp. 123–136; Paul, 2011; Velde, 2007).

In Sweden, an absolute king, Charles XII, had implemented a new system of finance during the final years of his reign in order to finance Sweden’s participation in the ongoing Great Northern War (1700–1721). The system was based on credit and the introduction of fiat coins (mynttecken), and the regime worked hard to establish itself as a credible debtor that treated all creditors and tax payers fairly and without giving preference to privileged groups (Ericsson, 2002, pp. 172–257; Karlsson, 1994, pp. 99–133; Lindegren, 2018, pp. 316–323). After the death of the king in November 1718, the successors decided to abolish the system of royal absolutism and the financial system that supported the king’s rule. A new parliamentary rule was established, which put political power in the hands of the four estates (nobility, clergy, burghers and peasantry), while the power of the king was reduced to a mainly symbolic role. Concurrently, several contested measures, including a partial default, were taken to remove the fiat coins from circulation and to start liquidating the remaining debt (Ericsson & Winton, 2019, 2020).

In the literature on credible commitment, it is normally representative assemblies that protect the interests of creditors from the predatory tendencies of monarchs and that secure property rights, while absolute monarchs tend to solve their fiscal problems by defaulting on their debts and subsequently have difficulties in establishing themselves as trustworthy debtors. Developments in England and France in the early eighteenth century have frequently been used by scholars to prove, and disprove, the credible commitment thesis (Coffman et al., 2013; Cox, 2016; Dincecco, 2011, pp. 24–63; North & Weingast, 1989; Stasavage, 2003; 2011, ch. 3–4). The Swedish case during the same period, where an absolute monarch tried to become a reputable actor on the credit markets, and a parliamentary regime initiated a debt liquidation process, is relatively unknown. It offers another perspective on the issue of credible commitment. Moreover, by concentrating on the white collar workers involved in the daily handling of the debt, we shift focus from the preoccupation with the distribution of power between the sovereign and the elected assembly to how the administrative capacity of the state affected the relationship between the political regime and the credit market.

In this article, we will thus examine how the administration of the liquidation of the government debt in Sweden was organised in the period 1719–1730. The liquidation was administered by a new government agency (Riksens ständers kontor), which opened in 1719. The agency’s office was located in the capital Stockholm and its task was to administer the liquidation of the debt accrued during the previous royal regime of Charles XII. The agency, which can be characterised as a Debt Office, was under the direct control of the Diet, and the Diet provided the agency with specific taxes and fees, which were used to liquidate the debt.¹

Although the Debt Office did not issue new debt, it became part of the credit system when it interacted on a daily basis with creditors and intermediaries. It needed to be viewed as a reliable actor in order for the creditors not to distrust the whole liquidation process. This meant that it had to monitor and to react to market sentiments and to adapt to actions taken by creditors. If the office failed in these areas, it could lead to political tensions threatening the new political order created in 1719. By examining the clerical staff that were in charge of the daily transactions and how they interacted within the organisation and with creditors, we can gain a better understanding of how the authorities tried to handle the contentious debt repudiation. Thus, an analysis of the detailed minutes in which the governors of the office discussed the daily operations, as well as different ledgers detailing payments, makes it possible to present a new picture of how a government agency in the Swedish state operated in the financial markets during the eighteenth century and how it dealt in practice with the issue of credible commitment.

Previous research on Swedish developments has paid very little attention to the clerical staff who were involved in administering different money matters in the early modern Swedish state. Thus, we know next to nothing about how bookkeepers and other administrators were trained or how the monitoring of conduct was organised in practice. Scholars interested in the state apparatus have primarily examined the different positions in organisations, who occupied them and the descriptions of the tasks in the formal instructions. It has been emphasised that the requirements regarding the administrators’ formal education became more pronounced in the seventeenth century and that a new group of non-noble administrators emerged who depended on their salaries for their sustenance. Many of them advanced in the organisations and were later ennobled. It has also been emphasised that the Swedish state was relatively efficient with limited corruption. The efficiency has been seen as a result of the close cooperation between the rulers and the elite, and the control mechanisms put in place when political authority was centralised (Asker, 1983, 2004; Gaunt, 1975; Glete, 2002, pp. 189–212; Kleberg, 1948; Norrhem, 1993). Some scholars have questioned these interpretations, especially pointing to developments during the eighteenth century when royal control became more limited and critique of corrupt practices within the government bureaucracy was spread in pamphlets and other printed texts (Cavallin, 2003; Thisner, 2007, pp. 119–163, 285–307).

The size and structure of Swedish government debt during the eighteenth century have attracted attention, in particular the financial innovations that were introduced during the 1710s and the role of paper money later in the century (Lindeberg, 1941; Lindegren, 2018; Ögren, 2016). Scholars have argued that the high debt level in 1719 can be attributed to the credit expansion by the previous royal regime, and that the new government in charge slowly reduced it. Thus, in 1722, the debt was 6.7 times higher than annual income, while in 1742 that ratio was only 2.7 (Fregert & Gustafsson, 2014, p. 212). Additionally, it has been shown how Swedish monetary policies were characterised by switches between specie and paper standards during the eighteenth century (Fregert & Jonung, 1996).

Another theme in the literature has focussed on attitudes towards commercial interests and the questions of virtue and morality in public life. Leif Runefelt, for instance, has argued that there existed a dual view on merchants. One view emphasised that merchants who were driven by a modest interest in profit that was compatible with the common good were to be encouraged, while a competing and more negative view saw merchants as self-centred individuals who only focussed on profit. If this latter type of merchant was allowed to reign freely, it would have an adverse affect on public morality and on the balance of trade (Runefelt, 2005, pp. 87–97). In a similar fashion, Mats Hallenberg and Magnus Linnarsson have shown that custom leases were viewed in divergent ways. Supporters of such arrangements argued that leases reduced the risk of corruption and mismanagement when there was a company in charge, whereas critics accused shareholders in lease companies of enriching themselves at the taxpayers’ expense (Linnarsson & Hallenberg, 2020).

Since the officials at the Debt Office interacted with various economic agents, they had to contend with these divergent views on commercial activity. These views had consequences for the administration of the government’s debt, especially by pointing out moral boundaries for the actions of the Debt Office. This study, therefore, not only concerns itself primarily with financial and administrative practices, but also analyses of discourses, which are useful because languages of the common good and appropriateness constrained and shaped those practices.

Establishing and dismantling a new system of credit

The regime of Charles XII had implemented a new system of government finance in 1715–1716, which was based on the expansion of credit. A key component of the system was to issue government bonds, which were guaranteed by allocated extraordinary taxes. However, the bond sales were slow. In order to expand the market and to ensure that bonds circulated, the authorities also gave bonds as payment to military contractors and to creditors holding old debts. The government also issued so-called salary bills to civil servants and military officers in 1715 as a substitute for regular salary payments. The salary bills yielded 6 percent interest and, like the bonds, they could be traded on a secondary market (Ericsson & Winton, 2019, pp. 32–34).

As it turned out, bonds and salary bills were insufficient to fund the war effort. Instead, fiat coins made of copper would make up the bulk of the new available resources. They had a nominal value of 1 silver daler (dsm) and they were to be accepted in all transactions. They spread to all social groups and to all parts of Sweden and they quickly became the dominating currency of exchange. Even foreign merchants, who traded with Sweden, owned large amounts of coins. The coins were not backed by any specie assets. Instead, their value ultimately depended on people’s confidence in them and in the regime’s promises (Ericsson & Winton, 2020, pp. 276–279). In order to keep its support from the propertied peasantry as well as different commercial interests, the regime emphasised in its communication that creditors were given priority when allocating government resources, and that all subjects, including different privileged groups, contributed equally to the war effort according to their available means. Moreover, various malpractices of civil servants and military commanders would be clamped down upon with severity (Ericsson, 2002, pp. 172–257).

After the death of the king in November 1718, the Diet convened to establish a new constitution and to discuss how to handle the existing debts. Traditional elites among the nobility and the clergy argued that the overall debt level was untenable and that it was necessary to default on the fiat coins in order to regain fiscal and monetary stability. Other groups, such as nobles and burghers with commercial interests, as well as peasants, argued that the fiat coins were the only currency that was available and that a default would create serious problems for the economy and for the ongoing war effort. They therefore suggested alternative solutions, such as transforming the fiat coins to long-term bonds, but the members who supported a default got the upper hand in the deliberations.² Hence, a majority at the Diet decided to dismantle the system of credit by partially defaulting on the fiat coins and by liquidating the other parts of the debt. Holders of the coins were ordered to hand them in to the authorities in exchange for non-interest bearing insurance notes valued at 43.75 percent of the fiat coins handed in. In June 1719, around 20 million coins were handed in and insurance notes valued at 8.7 million dsm issued. Although everyone owned fiat coins, it could be argued that peasants and merchants were the biggest losers from this process since their assets were mainly in coins. The authorities decided that the insurance notes would only be redeemable when paying a duty on foreign trade. By purchasing insurance notes on the secondary market at a discount, it was possible for merchants to profit from the trade with notes (Ericsson & Winton, 2019, pp. 37–42).

At the same time as the insurance notes were circulating, the authorities also started to liquidate the other claims, which had not been targeted in the default, such as the bonds and claims from officers and civil servants for unpaid salaries. These claims were recognised after they had been scrutinised by different government bodies. The Debt Office divided the recognised claims into 11 categories, which indicated the order they were going to be paid: first claims from children and other dependents, then churches, then bonds, then crown suppliers and then unpaid salaries. Once the claims were signed and recognised, holders could trade the claims on a secondary market. Consequently, there were many different government debt instruments circulating with different terms and conditions.³ This process of categorising the claimants and investigating the various claims was similar to the procedure chosen in France following the collapse of John Law’s system. One big difference between the two parallel processes was the political decision in France to try and protect the interests of small holders of debt, while larger creditors had to accept discounts. In Sweden, discounts also occurred, but the small holders mostly held fiat coins which were especially targeted in the decisions in 1719.⁴

The structure of the Debt Office

The Debt Office that was established in 1719 to administer the liquidation of the debt was under the direct control of the Diet. The three governors were appointed by the Diet with one representative from each of the three leading estates. In other words, one representative from the nobility, one from the clergy and one from the burghers took part in the deliberations. In 1738, the secretary at the peasant estate was also granted access to the meetings. The governors received detailed instructions from the Diet which guided the actions taken. The governors knew that their actions would be audited at the next meeting of the Diet by a special subcommittee. If the subcommittee found irregularities the governors could be dismissed. This meant that the office had to record their activities in detail.⁵

The Debt Office was given specific taxes to handle the liquidation. The most important revenue was an extraordinary tax (lön- och betalningsavgiften) that every household in the realm paid. The collection of the tax was administered by the regional tax authorities, which separated the tax from other revenues in a special ledger. The regional tax authorities then sent regular reports to the Debt Office on how much revenue had been collected. Part of the Debt Office’s activities was, therefore, focussed on monitoring the collection of revenue and planning how the revenue should be utilised.⁶

The officials at the Debt Office were in daily contact with claimants, intermediaries who represented claimants and other actors who were trading with the different financial instruments that were circulating. In particular merchants who used insurance notes and salary bills to pay the licent – the special customs duty – were important counterparties. In all the discussions in 1719 and 1720 the office made it clear that it was important to facilitate the merchants’ transactions and it was not acceptable for the office to hinder trade. The office was, therefore, open at least two hours each day to accept deposits of notes and bills.⁷ It was also suggested that the office should have a representative at the customs house in Stockholm to expedite transactions since the office was located outside the city centre. The governors were sceptical about such an arrangement since it was difficult to assign a bookkeeper or a clerk to be there on a daily basis.⁸ They were simply needed at the office to manage the many tasks there. It could also be seen as a control issue: that it was necessary for the officials to check in the ledgers, which were located at the office, before they accepted the bills and the notes. That the control aspect was important became clear when a customs official signed and accepted bills and notes when the clerk employed by the Debt office was absent. Concerns were then raised that it was problematic that a person not employed by the Debt Office and who had not signed the oath as administrator, acted on behalf of the office. Thus, it was important that if a clerk was not present, someone else in the organisation acted as a signatory.⁹ The problem of geographic distance between the Debt Office and the commercial centre was solved in 1724 when the office moved to Järntorget in the heart of the city and adjacent to the Bank of the Estates, the customs house and all the merchant houses in the capital.¹⁰

However, since international trade did not only take place in Stockholm and the Debt Office did not have branches, it became necessary for other government officials to be involved in handling bills and notes in order not to hinder trade. In the town of Norrköping, for instance, merchants expressed concern that it would be too costly and cumbersome for them to send their bills and notes to Stockholm. The Debt Office responded to this fear by arranging for the merchants to give the bills and notes to the local customs official, who collected them and sent them to Stockholm when a significant volume of instruments had been amassed. When the instruments were sent to the office, the customs official would specify the ownership of each bill and note in order to ensure that the liquidation was properly conducted and that each merchant received certificates of deposits for the bills and notes.¹¹ The customs officials thereby became intermediaries between the merchants in other towns and the Debt Office in Stockholm. Instead of the merchants having to accept the transaction costs, it became the responsibility of the custom houses to pay for the shipment of bills and notes to the capital and to distribute the certificates of deposits to the merchants. This arrangement also meant that the Debt Office received administrative assistance from customs officials, especially in locations outside Stockholm.

If we take a look at the clerical staff who administered the operations of the Debt Office in 1720, there were eight paid positions in total from the top-ranking commissioner to the lowest ranking official, the porter.¹²

Table

	Yearly salary
Samuel Hedengran – Commissioner (Kommissarie)	1000 dsm
Anders Iggström – Accountant (Bokhållare)	750 dsm
Lars Aschlin – Treasurer (Räntmästare and kassör)	600 dsm
Jacob Giese/Abraham Dahlén – Clerk (Notarie)	400 dsm
Jacob Giese/Harald Schening – Assistant clerk (Kanslist)	300 dsm
Jacob Westman – Clerk (Kammarskrivare)	300 dsm
Carl Magnus Aurell – Clerk (Ränteri- och kammarskrivare)	300 dsm
Anders Beck – Porter (Vaktmästare)	175 dsm

The Commissioner, Samuel Hedengran, was appointed by the Diet. His responsibility was to oversee the work at the office and control the conduct of the other officials. He was also signing bills and notes and was in charge of executing orders and decisions, such as sending letters to other government bodies. He received assistance, especially with expediting decisions, from the assistant clerk, first Jacob Giese and then Harald Schening.¹³ Second in rank was the accountant, Anders Iggström, who handled the general ledger and the ledger detailing the liquidation of salary notes and insurance bills. He had an assistant, a clerk, Jacob Westman, who helped him with the ledgers, but who also worked with expediting claims.¹⁴

Third in rank was the treasurer, Lars Aschlin, who was administering the revenue that the office received from the local tax districts. But he was also involved in checking and liquidating claims. Aschlin had an assistant, Carl Magnus Aurell, who helped with bookkeeping and with checking and liquidating claims.¹⁵ Then there was a clerk, first Jacob Giese and then Abraham Dahlén, who wrote the minutes at the meetings of the governors and dealt with other similar penman tasks. Additionally, he could sign and accept claims.¹⁶

The last position was held by a porter, Anders Beck, who dealt with more practical things like maintaining the rooms, buying firewood and locking and unlocking the rooms. He was also used as a messenger to both collect information from and to send information to people in Stockholm. In January 1720, Beck complained that he had to be at the office early in the morning and late evenings every weekday, which indicates that he was there basically all the time. He also complained about the task of cutting firewood. It was therefore agreed that the office should contract someone to do that work.¹⁷

Although a clear hierarchy existed within the organisation and the staff were given specific tasks, the division of labour in the organisation was not so developed that one official could not, at least temporarily, take on someone else’s tasks. For example, when the commissioner Hedengran went on vacation to improve his health in 1721, it was the clerk Abraham Dahlén and the assistant clerk Harald Schening who had to step in to approve and sign bills and notes as well as expediting decisions.¹⁸ In another instance, when Anders Iggström was sick, his assistant Jacob Westman had to take on some of his superior’s responsibilities.¹⁹ Given the small size of the clerical workforce, it was not practical to maintain a clear division of labour, or to make some tasks a reserve for just one official. However, there were limits to the flexibility of duties. When the treasurer Lars Aschlin had assigned the work on a ledger to his assistant Carl Aurell, the governors of the Debt Office reacted. They wondered why Aschlin did not personally write in the ledger. He replied that there was not enough time and that he had prioritised providing assistance to the merchants. The governors did not agree with his allocation of time and said that he could face legal action if he did not do the work himself. Delegating work on the main ledgers was consequently not allowed for the treasurer.²⁰

One consequence of the small workforce was the relatively heavy workload for the clerical staff. This in turn put pressure on the organisation, especially if one or two officials were absent. When Lars Aschlin’s father-in-law died for example, the governors did not initially want to grant him leave because of the workload, but after Aschlin’s pleas they eventually relented. During his absence, Aschlin’s tasks were handled by Anders Iggström and Carl Aurell.²¹ However, during his time away from Stockholm the tensions seem to have increased between the remaining clerical staff. For instance, Commissioner Hedengran got into a heated argument with the accountant Iggström over Iggström’s correspondence with Aschlin in which Iggström discussed some official business. Schening also questioned orders he had received from Hedengran about keeping track of payments in a separate ledger. He claimed that such a task belonged to an accountant or a treasurer and not a clerk. The governors sided with Commissioner Hedengran in this latter case. In other words, they argued that security was improved if records were kept in two separate ledgers.²²

Some of the tensions within the organisation emerged into the open when the injured parties turned to the governors to seek support for their grievances. Especially Hedengran used that strategy as a way to highlight what he saw as problematic practices or errors in the office, but also the other clerical staff could turn to the governors to seek support. This meant that the governors became mediators between the different staff members in order to prevent tensions from escalating, especially between senior officials such as the commissioner and the treasurer. Since the governors only met a few times per month and they all had other assignments, they relied on the organisation to function without their constant intervention or monitoring. Mediation between different interests within the organisation, as well as highlighting the formal instructions from the Diet became important tools for the governors in controlling the organisation. If that did not work they could always threaten with legal action, but that could further hurt the operations, in particular when considering that it was not always easy to find people with the right knowledge and experience in financial matters.

The background of the clerical staff

When examining the background of the clerical staff in the Debt Office, it is clear that most of them had been involved with the administration of the new financial system that had been developed in the 1710s by the previous regime. More specifically, they had been working with the agency Kontributionsränteriet, which had been assigned with collecting special extraordinary taxes that were used as collateral for the bonds issued. The agency was also involved in issuing and redeeming bonds as well as issuing non-interest bearing bills in low denominations.²³ Thus, Samuel Hedengran, Anders Iggström, Lars Aschlin, Jacob Giese and Anders Beck had all held similar positions at Kontributionsränteriet as they held at the newly formed Debt Office.²⁴ This meant that they were very familiar with the various issues concerning the debt.

In 1719, when the new office was formed there was no uncertainty about where the staff should come from. Many of them were simply moved over from one organisation to another.²⁵ The fact that the first organisation was deeply involved in the policies of the absolute monarchy, while the second organisation was given the task of dismantling that system was not seen as a problem. No one casted doubt about the appropriateness of such a transfer. This lack of discussion was probably a result of a shortage of experienced clerical staff, and that it was deemed important that the new office got started right away. In order to do so it had to be staffed with people who had the right knowledge. There was simply no time to build an organisation from scratch, or to train new staff.²⁶ This organisational aspect was deemed more important than any fears of political disloyalty. The totally dominating view was, therefore, to examine the clerical staffs’ experience, competence and how well they had conducted themselves rather than examining the tasks of the previous organisation.

However, before the clerical staff from the Kontributionsränteriet could move to the new Debt Office, they had to swear a new oath where they committed themselves to the new political regime. In Anders Iggström’s oath he swore in the name of God to obey the queen and the new constitution. In particular, he promised not to openly or secretly promote or support royal absolutism. He should obey the governors of the office and execute his duties with diligence and loyalty. Moreover, he promised to follow the written instructions that the Diet provided the Debt Office, and to keep all ledgers and books in good order. It was also important that he promoted the interests of the Diet and the Debt Office rather than his own gain.²⁷ The structure of the oath was similar to the ones all civil servants had to swear in 1719. In other words, this was not a special arrangement for the Debt Office.²⁸

In June 1719, after five of the clerical staff was moved from Kontributionsränteriet to the Debt Office, Anders Iggström was ordered to find a skillful clerk who could function as his assistant since the clerk at Kontributionsränteriet, Peter Hedengran, was moving to a position at the Board of Public Lands and Funds (Kammarkollegium). This process lasted until September 1719 when Jacob Westman was hired as a clerk. He had been involved in military procurement during the campaign in Norway in 1718. This can be seen as a process whereby military administrative resources were shifted to civilian use when the authorities reduced military activity. During the time a clerk was found, Peter Hedengran continued to work at the office.²⁹

In another case of recruitment, the office received an application from Harald Schening who was in Stockholm. Schening had heard that Jacob Giese was moving to a new position so he sent in a résumé in which he stressed that he had been studying for seven years at Uppsala University, and that he had specialised in law. He also stressed that he had been visiting and observing how various courts in Stockholm were functioning for two years in order to gain experience. The governors decided to hire Schening as an assistant clerk.³⁰

In 1720, the governors received an application from the clerk Abraham Dahlén at the Board of Public Lands and Funds after he had heard that there was an opening at the Debt Office. The application was sent by the leadership of the board to the Debt Office. The board emphasised his experience and his diligent work as a clerk. In the discussion at the Debt Office, it became clear that Dahlén had heard about the opening from Jacob Giese and that they had discussed a switch of positions between them. Thus, that Giese was moving to the Board of Public Lands and Funds and that Dahlén was moving the other way.³¹ This case highlights that the civil servants in Stockholm knew each other and that they interacted in both formal and informal arenas. It was also possible to make arrangements before discussing it with their superiors, and to influence the hiring process at the Debt Office.

In 1723, Dahlén showed further initiative when he became involved in politics. At the meeting of the Diet he provided vital assistance to members of the peasant estate on key constitutional issues. Although he did not hold a formal position in the political system, he had helped the peasants to draft replies to the other estates, and more crucially, drafted a proposal demanding the strengthening of royal power. When the powerful Secret Committee of the Diet discovered that Dahlén was involved in such activities, he was arrested and later sentenced to death for treason. He was also removed from his position at the Debt Office. The punishment was subsequently commuted into a prison sentence at the fortress Marstrand.³² Evidently, Dahlen’s actions were not just seen as a violation of his oath as a public servant, but also as an explicit threat to the newly established political order. The notion of a coalition between the monarchy and the peasantry, assisted by lower-ranking civil servants, plotting to overthrow parliamentary rule scared the political oligarchy. Dahlén could, therefore, not go unpunished.

Among the clerical staff only three had been at a university. Lars Aschlin, Abraham Dahlén and Harald Schening had studied at Uppsala before starting their careers as civil servants (Odén, 1902, p. 114 and p. 125; Thimon, 1996, p. 95). However, the university did not teach them bookkeeping or other similar tasks. Instead, the university focussed primarily on how to structure arguments and how to present them in a convincing manner. Linguistic skills, especially in Latin, rather than maths and numbers, were prioritised. As in London, learning the practical side of accounting was not done at secondary schools or universities. Such skills had to be acquired somewhere else.³³

When examining the clerical staff at the Debt Office, it seems that all of them had a civil service background. For instance, Lars Aschlin’s father was a principal at a local school in Eksjö. There is no evidence that they, or any one in their immediate families, had been working in merchant houses or in other type of commercial organisation. All of this indicates that the bookkeepers and clerks learnt about the theory and practice of bookkeeping in the administrative organisations of the state. First they observed and practiced before they got lower positions. Slowly they could then advance in the government hierarchy. The treasurer Lars Aschlin, for example, started his career as an observer at a local court in Stockholm before he advanced to auditor (auditör) at a regiment and then to a position as cashier and secretary in the military before moving on to becoming a registrar at the royal court. From there he moved on to become treasurer at Kontributionsränteriet (Odén, 1902, p. 114). In a similar fashion, Samuel Hedengran started his career as an extraordinary clerk at the Board of Public Lands and Funds before he moved up to an ordinary clerk position in the same organisation. Three years later he transferred to the newly formed Kontributionsränteriet to work as an accountant. After four years as an accountant there he was promoted to the position of commissioner (Kleberg, 1957, p. 167).

The experiences and careers of the civil servants employed in the Debt Office indicate that much of their training in accounting took place on the job with supervision from more experienced colleagues. The training included technical skills, but also the social skills necessary to navigate the administrative structure in Stockholm must have been part of the training. Thus, it was necessary for the young clerk to show his abilities to deal with ledgers and accounts in a comprehensive and diligent way, but also to manifest his trustworthy and honourable behaviour in general to his superiors. By passing these informal tests, the young clerk gained both training and experience, which in turn created opportunities for upward mobility within the state apparatus at the same time as it helped to create a professional identity. The arrangement can be characterised as a system of apprenticeship that was common among merchants and guilds in early modern Europe. By becoming an apprentice, the young clerk became part of an organisation that provided both material and immaterial resources, but also a clear career path that could last his whole life if he played his cards right. Since internal recruitment was common, it was very possible that the apprenticeship was the beginning of a lifelong connection between the individual servant and the state organisation.³⁴

The connections between the Debt Office and the financial market

As mentioned above, one of the main tasks of the Debt Office in the early part of its operations was to oversee the liquidation of the insurance notes and salary bills through the payment of the licent, the special toll. This arrangement meant that merchants had a demand for the instruments and they had to acquire them on the secondary market either themselves or through their business associates. However, many merchants did not have the time or the interest necessary to operate on this market on a regular basis. Instead, they could turn to intermediaries to provide the required bills and notes.³⁵ Some merchants decided to approach the clerical staff at the Debt Office to request assistance with the transactions, which the administrators also provided. Presumably, it was believed that the clerical staff had a good overview of the market and that they knew how to obtain the necessary bills and notes. In particular, three staff members, Carl Aurell, Jacob Westman and Lars Aschlin, had accounts in their own name at the Debt Office, which they used to make transactions. In Table 1, the transactions of Aurell from September to December 1720 are shown.

Table 1. Transactions in Carl Magnus Aurell’s account at the Debt Office, September–December 1720.

Payments from Aurell’s account	Value in silver dalers
12 toll payments	143 on average
Total payments from account	8,315
Payments into Aurell’s account
16 deposits of insurance notes and salary bills	282 on average
22 salary bills
11 insurance notes
Total deposits into account	9,436

Source: SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Licentmemorialböcker, vol. 454, 1720.

Table 1 show that relatively large amounts as well as volumes were deposited into and paid from the account. Thus, Aurell both made toll payments and deposited salary bills and insurance notes in an extent that was greater than the biggest merchant houses in Gothenburg and Stockholm. In comparison, the merchant Catharina Tham in Gothenburg deposited seven insurance notes and four salary bills totalling 2,902 dsm in the same period.³⁶ Moreover, the total deposits of close to 9,500 dsm was much greater than Aurell’s annual salary of 300 dsm from the Debt Office. There is no indication that he engaged in international trade. The only answer behind these large numbers is that he functioned as an intermediary for the merchant community. In other words, he used the account on behalf of other actors who actually owned the different instruments. Aurell was probably paid a small commission for the service he provided.

Commissioner Samuel Hedengran questioned how appropriate this and other similar arrangements were. He said that it created rumours among the population, which could hurt the Debt Office. He also pointed out that staff members would become market leaders and crowd out other actors in the market when it would be the easiest solution to turn to the centrally located staff members. Hedengran was also worried that staff members would be so preoccupied with trading the bills and notes that they would neglect their other tasks. There was also a risk that officials would misuse their position for personal gain. In other words, that they would become like self-interested merchants who would not seek the common good. Despite these concerns, the governors did not stop this practice in 1721.³⁷ One explanation for this reluctance is that the officials provided a service that was necessary for the liquidation system to function properly. Without these services, the merchants and other actors would probably have complained about the system, which would have undermined its legitimacy. Ultimately, convenient and fast transactions were more important than maintaining a sharp dividing line between the clerical staff and various trading activities.

However, when a new governor from the nobility arrived at the Debt Office following the meeting of the Diet in 1723, the concern regarding officials having active trading accounts and formally trading in their own name re-emerged as a contentious issue. When the governor Anders Falcker examined one of the ledgers dealing with insurance notes and salary bills in 1724, he found that several officials had accounts and that the balances on those accounts were very substantial. His conclusion from this examination was that such practices should not be allowed since it could reflect badly on the Debt Office. By banning these activities, the suspicion that the officials wrongfully profited from the transactions would also disappear. It was primarily the potential risk to the reputation of the Debt Office rather than all market participation that Falcker wanted to target by these measures, since he did not want to prohibit the officials from assisting merchants or from profiting from such assistance. The crucial point was that all transactions should only be done in the name of the merchants or other actors who actually owned the financial assets, and if the clerks and accountants acted as intermediaries they should be able to present the orders they had received to act on someone else’s behalf. The other governors agreed with Falcker’s arguments and it was therefore decided that the officials’ existing accounts should be discontinued.³⁸

The effect of this decision can be seen in the ledger for 1724. Carl Aurell, for instance, made nine deposits of insurances notes and salary bills into his account in February and March totalling 427 dsm, but after the decision no further deposits were made. Concurrently, payments were made during the year in order to reduce the assets in the account. At the end of 1724, only five dsm remained in Aurell’s account. A similar pattern can be seen in Lars Aschlin’s account. In March he made two deposits of insurance notes and a salary bill into his account valued at 340 dsm in total, but after the decision by the governors Aschlin did not deposit any further assets. He proceeded to sell off all of the assets in the first half of the year and the account was effectively closed in May.³⁹

Interestingly, when the accountant Anders Iggström left the Debt Office in 1729 to take up a position as the head accountant at the regional tax authority in Östergötland, he immediately opened up an account at the Debt Office in order to trade with bills and notes. Thus, from March to December 1729 a total of 37 different deposits valued at 9,337 dsm were made into his account. During the same period, 14 withdrawals valued at 6,697 dsm were recorded in his account.⁴⁰ All of this shows that Iggström was a sought after intermediary who could provide an important service to different market participants. When he left the Debt Office, the previous contentious clashes of loyalties ended and he could operate more freely on the market.

The dwindling down of the officials’ direct ownership of insurance notes and salary bills did not mean that they suspended their activities in the market. On the contrary, it seems that they continued to receive offers from various actors to assist with different financial tasks, and often chose to allocate significant parts of their time to these activities despite the fact that the workload at the Debt Office was heavy. The opportunity to earn commissions was probably one reason guiding such priorities. The governors were aware of the situation, and they also knew that the assistance helped the market to function, but there were limits to what they could accept. For instance in 1724, Harald Schening asked Carl Aurell and Jacob Westman to assist him with a detailed public proclamation informing all subjects about the regulations concerning the liquidation of the debt. Although both Aurell and Westman had been hesistant, Westman had outright opposed giving such assistance to Schening. The governors realised that the reason Westman declined was due to his many private commissions, which made it difficult for him to fulfil his duties at the office. They therefore decided to summon Aurell and Westman and to order them to assist Schening. However, Westman was nowhere to be seen. When asked where he could be, Aurell replied that Westman was dealing with some issues at the offices of the royal court. The reply angered the governors, and they told Aurell to inform Westman that if he did not do his work properly at the Debt Office he would be removed from his position so that he could work full time with his many private commissions.⁴¹ Clearly, the governors doubted Westman’s loyalty to the Debt Office as well as his priorities.

The problems with Westman continued for several years, and despite receiving several warnings from the governors, his behaviour did not improve. In 1728, the governors’ tolerance reached a definite limit when it became clear that Anders Iggström did not have sufficient time to work on the general ledger detailing the overall operations of the Debt Office. One reason Iggström could not allocate time to work on the ledger was the lack of assistance from Westman who had a poor attendance record and who was deemed to do substandard work. Iggström had tried to cover for him, but when the completion of the general ledger was delayed, it became impossible to continue such a practice. For the governors, it was politically important to show this ledger to the members of the Diet since the members used the ledger to audit the Debt Office’s operations. The governors, therefore, decided to relieve Westman from his duties at the Debt Office and to replace him with a more competent and diligent clerk. However, after Westman requested a redress of the decision, the governors granted him another chance to show his clerical abilities to Hedengran and Iggström. When Westman again failed to attend to his duties at the office it was finally decided to hire a replacement.⁴²

The reluctance of the governors to deal with Westman’s lack of loyalty and inability to do his work properly show how strong the staff members’ positions were at the Debt Office and how their professional identity gave them a sense of entitlement that was in force even when they were absent from their work. Once a clerk was accepted into the organisation and they became part of the inner circle of staff members, their tenure was deemed so secure that their superiors had a hard time removing them from the office. It was only when a crucial task of bookkeeping could not be performed that the governors and the leading clerical staff decided to take action and to cut the ties between the individual and the organisation. In other words, unlike the Bank of England, where rules and procedures were enforced through close supervision and by punishing errors, the governors had to accept some level of neglect by lower-ranking officials and it was only if the problems became severe that the governors acted (Murphy, 2010, pp. 159–162).

Later in 1724, the governors would return to the issue of the officials’ activities on the market for government debt. In September, when they examined a liquidation of a number of bonds that a merchant handed in, they found that the treasurer Aschlin was the owner of several interest notes worth 2,709 dsm. These notes were issued to the bondholders for unpaid interest on the bonds. This was evidence that Aschlin had bought bonds from the original owners at a discount. According to the governors, such practices went against the intentions of the Diet since many members of the Diet had argued that it was the Swedish Crown’s original creditors that should benefit from payments rather than actors who had bought discounted financial instruments on the secondary market. This first group of creditors was seen as morally superior to the second group whose actions were viewed as being driven by a narrow and harmful self-interest. The governors thought it was especially problematic that the Debt Office’s own staff members were involved in various trading activities since they had access to insider information, such as the office’s cash flow, which was not public knowledge. The governors feared that the officials, in the interactions with creditors, could argue that it would take a long time before their debts would be repaid and the only way for creditors to receive payment was to sell the bonds swiftly to the officials at a discount. The creditors would thereby lose out, while the officials would benefit from their position in the administrative system of the state. Such practices went against the oath the officials had sworn, but they also threatened the legitimacy of the Debt Office and the idea that all original holders of government debt should be treated equally by the state. Thus, the reputational repercussions for the office, in particular the potentially perilous sentiment that the office only benefitted a small clique of actors in Stockholm who were well-connected to its clerks and bookkeepers, meant that the governors felt that they needed to take action against the officials’ trading activities. In order to reduce the risk, the governors proposed a new oath where the officials would swear to abstain from direct or indirect trading with government bonds. If they refused to swear such an oath, they would be removed from their positions.⁴³

After the governors had made their suggestion, Commissioner Hedengran stood up and pointed out that he had never owned bonds nor had he been involved in trading. Instead it was the accountant Anders Iggström, the treasurer Lars Aschlin and the clerk Jacob Westman who in particular interacted improperly with other creditors. He also stressed that he had warned about the trading practices several times in the past, but that no actions had been taken. Evidently, the old tensions between Hedengran on one side and Iggström and Aschlin on the other surfaced when these issues were discussed. During the meeting, the clerk Harald Schening also swore that he had never traded with bonds, insurance notes or salary bills.⁴⁴

When the accused officials were confronted with the suggestion that they should swear an oath, they hesitated. Aschlin, for instance, wondered where the proposal emanated from, suggesting that he would swear the oath if the government had passed legislation banning the purchase and sale of financial instruments, or if he was accused of a crime. On the issue of the existing trade with government bonds, Aschlin argued that the secondary market was so large that the officials of the Debt Office, with their modest participation, could not influence the market conditions. He also argued that most original creditors had already sold their bonds, which made the proposition that the state should only reward people who had provided credit to the Crown an impossible task. Moreover, Aschlin stressed that it was wrong to characterise an open market system with willing participants as an unlawful practice. It was natural for a bondholder who wanted to liquidate his assets quickly to sell the bonds to anyone without regard for the buyer’s social position or character. Such a bondholder would also be contented with a lower price if he received a swift payment than to wait for full payment at a later date. Aschlin also thought that removing the officials from the market would rather reduce the Debt Office’s credit than improve it since many bondholders with limited means would have fewer options available to them.⁴⁵

Iggström thought that it was unnecessary for him to swear a new oath since he was already bound by his previous oath and its ban on seeking personal gain from his employment at the Debt Office. He also stressed that he provided an essential service to many bondholders who lived outside Stockholm and who did not know any reputable persons in the capital that could represent them. He admitted that he had bought some bonds from people living in the northern parts of the realm, but that it was the owners who had pleaded with him to buy the bonds. He had then resold the bonds to a merchant, but without making a profit from the transactions. Instead, he had sought to serve both the bondholders and the merchant in Stockholm. Moreover, he stressed that he had provided the same information to all market actors and that he had tried to serve their interest to the best of his ability.⁴⁶

Since both Aschlin and Iggström refused to swear the proposed oath, the governors did not proceed any further with their plan in 1724. They could have demanded an oath, but that would have meant that they very likely had had to accept the resignation of two of the most experienced senior officials at the office. When faced with the potential of such an outcome, they backed down. In other words, keeping the expertise within the organisation became more important than implementing a total ban on financial trading by the clerical staff.

The tension between the governors and the two officials highlights different perspectives on how the credit market functioned and the role the Debt Office should play in it. The governors stressed the need to protect the reputation of the office and the impartiality of its officials. Thus, credible commitment could only be established if the officials oversaw the market, but without actively engaging in exchanges or making trades in their own name. Moreover, it was important that the office promoted the political will of the Diet to foremost cater for the ‘true’ and ‘legitimate’ interests of the people who had originally provided credit to the state. The perceived fairness of the liquidation process was therefore at the forefront of their priorities rather than the promotion of a secondary market that threatened to create politically problematic profits. The accountant and the treasurer on the other hand approached the issue by concentrating on how the market actually functioned and what was possible and not possible to do on that market. It was more important to take into account established financial practices and market forces than formal rules and moral boundaries when creating a well-functioning and credible system of government debt. Both officials had been heavily involved for more than ten years in the attempts to promote and support a government bond market. They therefore knew the importance of the secondary market and they were knowledgeable about the forces that structured it. They knew that peripheral actors in particular had information asymmetries as well as geographic distances to overcome, and that there existed a demand for financial services in the capital that the officials could provide. Aschlin and Iggström, thereby, stressed the need to continue financial practices, which had been supported by the previous royal regime, in order for the liquidation process to function properly. Without a secondary market with its intermediaries, the bondholders would have greater difficulty in selling their assets which in turn could lead to discontent and a loss of credit. Hence, Aschlin and Iggström portrayed themselves as servants of credit.

Conclusion

The establishment of the Debt Office in 1719 shows that it was relatively easy to set up the organisation since the new organisation basically used the available clerical expertise that had been established in another organisation and by the former political regime. The clerical staff maintained their positions and many of their tasks. Thus, when looking at the transition from absolute monarchy to parliamentary rule from the perspective of the clerical staff in the Debt Office, the change was not great. However, the partial default that had preceded the establishment of the office and the political tensions between the different social groups who were trying to influence the future public debt of the Swedish realm affected the operations of the office. Many wanted to liquidate their claims and many more had views on which claims should be prioritised in the liquidation process. These tensions created pressures, such as a heavy work load, but it also led to moral questions about the relationship between the state and the financial market. The Swedish case, therefore, offers another perspective on regime change and credible commitment than what is usually emphasised in research that focuses on the role of formal political institutions. Instead of only examining the distribution of power between the sovereign and the elected assembly, and the ability of the assembly to control the sovereign’s actions, we should focus more on how the administrative capacity of the state affected the implementation of key decisions, such as how the existing public debt should be handled (Cf. Cox, 2016; Dincecco, 2011, pp. 24–63; North & Weingast, 1989; Stasavage, 2003, pp. 72–75; 2011, ch. 3–4). Like in England in the 1690s when the Bank of England was established, it was the actions of the clerical staff that facilitated the transfer from one system of public debt to another in Sweden (Murphy, 2010).

The knowledge and expertise that the administrators provided ensured that the Debt Office functioned, even though the workload was heavy. The experience and clerical skill that the administrators provided gave them a relatively strong bargaining position within the organisation. Unlike when the Bank of England was set up, the governors and leading administrators at the Debt Office did not have to establish new strict rules and procedures in order to make the organisation function (Murphy, 2010, pp. 151–154, 162–163). Instead, they essentially relied on administrative practices that were instituted by the previous organisation and the previous royal regime. Thus, the supervisory safeguards against fraudulent and improper behaviour were primarily based on well-known rules and norms that the clerks and bookkeepers had learnt on the job when they were working in other government agencies.

However, the existing secondary market for government debt and the profits that could be made by trading with discounted financial instruments created strains between different goals of the Debt Office. On the one hand, it was deemed important that the office should facilitate transactions and not create hurdles for actors to participate in the market. Thus, the smooth running of the market strengthened the reputation of the Debt Office and in extension the Swedish state’s credit. The officials’ actions could support this goal by quickly expediting claims, but also by accepting private commissions. On the other hand, it was stressed that the officials should not become so involved in the market that they spent more time earning commissions and assisting other actors than working with the ledgers at the Debt Office. If they became too integrated in the market as intermediaries or traders, the officials’ motives could be questioned, which risked to undermine the Debt Office’s position as an unbiased overseer of the market. The governors feared that narratives focussing on how the office’s officials earned ‘unjust’ profits from utilising insider information and the desperate situation of creditors would seriously hurt the Debt Office and the Swedish state’s credit.

The governors tried to balance between administering a well-functioning market and preventing the office’s officials becoming too involved in the market. The profits that could be made from buying and selling government debt instruments, and the involvement of the office’s officials in these activities, raised moral and political concerns and moved the governors into a position where they wanted to regulate and limit the market participation of the officials. Thus, rather than being intimately connected to the existing networks of credit in Stockholm the officials should be detached and unbiased servants of credit in the realm. The officials tried to resist this attempt to redefine their role by arguing that they could combine their different tasks without any conflicts of interest.

All of this shows how important the ties between the financial market and the Swedish state had become at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but also how challenging it was for the state to define what role the administrative staff, who interacted on a daily basis with other participants on the credit market, should play on that market. These tensions were obviously connected to broader questions about the morality of commercial society and the role of mercantile interests in public life, and also demonstrate that the issues were far from only an abstract theoretical discussion in learned society or an object of discussion at the Diet. They became central issues in administrative practices of the state (Cf. Linnarsson & Hallenberg, 2020; Runefelt, 2005, ch. 4; Wennerlind, 2011). It was not possible to simply utilise the rules and norms that were associated with government tax collection since the relationship between government creditors and the state differed from the more hierarchical bond between tax payers and tax collectors. Instead of portraying the creditors as loyal subjects who always obeyed their lawful authorities, the bookkeepers, clerks and accountants in the Debt Office had to adapt to different market demands, while at the same time trying to maintain the image of impartial administrators who helped all creditors. Such a balancing act was difficult to maintain, especially when there were profits to be made and when many people relied on the swift payment of claims. Ultimately, the clerical staff maintained their identity as government officials, and when given a choice, they saw their future as administrators rather than market traders. But the market was always there, and different market participants continued to demand their services. Thus, strict rules, norms and procedures could not remove the allure of the market sirens.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by Handelsbanken’s Research Foundations under grant P18-0160.

Notes on contributors

Patrik Winton

Patrik Winton is a senior lecturer in history at Örebro University with a particular interest in global history, state formation, political economy and financial development in Europe during the early modern period. Winton’s research has primarily focussed on politics and on how the ties between the Scandinavian states and the growing credit markets affected society during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Winton finished his doctoral thesis at Uppsala University in 2006. The thesis focussed on political organisation in Sweden during the Age of Liberty (1719–1772). Since then he has, among other things, edited an anthology on political culture in Scandinavia during the age of revolution together with Michael Bregnsbo, Pasi Ihalainen and Karin Sennefelt, and published a number of articles on war finance in the Danish and Swedish realms and on the relationships between the Swedish state and the international capital markets in the period 1760–1830. Other contributions have focussed on the expansion of credit markets in the Swedish realm during the eighteenth century.

Notes

1 For an overview of the Debt Office, see Åmark (1961, pp. 675–708).

2 E.g. Swedish National Archives, Stockholm (SNA), Sekreta utskottets protokoll 1719, vol. R2384, 5 Mar. and 8 Apr.

3 For an overview of this process, se Åmark (1961), pp. 675–708.

4 On the French system of liquidation, see Neal (2000, p. 132) and Velde (2008, pp. 151–164).

5 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Inkomna skrivelser från ständerna, sekreta utskottet och kontorsdeputationen 1719–1733, vol. 142.

6 E.g. SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Renskrivna huvudböcker, vol. 395, Huvudbok 1719–1722; Regional Archives in Uppsala, Länsstyrelsen i Västmanlands län, Landskansliet I, Huvudböcker över medel under Riksens ständers kontors disposition, vol. 1, 1719–1720.

7 E.g. SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 13 Jul., 26 Aug., 16 Dec. 1720.

8 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 19 Aug. 1719 and 26 Aug. 1720.

9 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 16 Dec. 1720.

10 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 6 and 11 Feb.

11 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 26 Aug. 1720.

12 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Renskrivna huvudböcker, vol. 395, Huvudbok 1719–1722.

13 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 22 Jun. 1719; SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 28 Feb., 10 Jun.

14 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 22 Jun. and 23 Sep. 1719, 16 Dec. 1720.

15 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 13 and 29 Jul. 1720; SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 19 Dec.

16 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719 – 1720, 26 Aug. and 14 Sep. 1720.

17 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 19 Jan. 1720; SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 3, 1722, 27 Feb.

18 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 10 Jun.

19 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 22 Dec.

20 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 19 Dec.

21 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 8 and 18 Feb.

22 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 28 Feb. and 11 Mar.

23 On Kontributionsränteriet, see Lindeberg (1941, pp. 76–94) and Karlsson (1994, pp. 125–130, 170–180).

24 SNA, 1714 och följande års Kontributionsränteri, Expensräkenskaper 1715–1718. See also SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 5 Jul. 1720.

25 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 22 Jun. 1719.

26 Murphy (2010, p. 152) shows how there was a shortage of experienced clerical staff in London in the 1690s.

27 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Tjänstemäns eder 1719–1762, vol. 248.

28 On oaths, see Nauman (2017).

29 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 22 Jun. and 23 Sep. 1719.

30 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 23 May 1720.

31 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 1, 1719–1720, 26 Aug. and 14 Sep. 1720.

32 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 4, 1723, 20 Jun., 24 Jul. and 18 Sep. See also Odén (1902, s. 125) and Stavenow (1922, p. 73).

33 Gaunt (1975, p. 31). See also Murphy (2010, p. 152) for a similar argument about the English situation.

34 On apprenticeship, see De Munck et al. (2007) and Prak and Wallis (2020).

35 On the role of intermediation in early financial markets, see Van Bochove (2013, pp. 252–271).

36 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Licentmemorialböcker, vol. 454, 1720.

37 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 2, 1721, 22 and 27 Sep. Cf. Runefelt (2005), pp. 86–97.

38 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 10 Mar.

39 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Licentmemorialböcker, vol. 458, 1724.

40 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 10, 1729, 26 Mar. SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, Licentmemorialböcker, vol. 464, 1729.

41 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 17 Mar.

42 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 9, 1728, 27 Feb., 5 Mar., 12 Mar., 19 Mar., 30 Apr., 21 May, 5 Sep., 22 Oct.

43 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 30 Sep. The division between morally superior creditors and self-interested speculators is similar to the division between useful and harmful merchants in Runefelt (2005, pp. 86–97).

44 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 30 Sep.

45 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 13 Oct and 20 Oct.

46 SNA, Riksens ständers kontor, Huvudarkivet, Renskrivna protokoll, vol. 5, 1724, 13 Oct.