Oil, violence and international actors: the case of Libya

Abstract

The survival of authoritarian regimes has for a long time been associated with the availability of rents derived from oil and gas. In particular, military oil regimes have been able to withstand the challenge of domestic opposition even at difficult times because these regimes could ultimately count on oil and gas revenues. As this article demonstrates, the Qadhafi regime had been particularly adept at surviving by using oil and gas rents. But there is a limit to what these rents can explain: in 2011 however the regime fell after a brief civil war, in which external forces played a central role. The role played by the European and NATO interventions points to the limits of the oil and gas rents. The changed distribution of international resources amongst domestic Libyan actors contributed to the rebels' victory, indicating that international factors should be better incorporated into studies of both authoritarian survival and democratisation.

La survie des régimes autoritaires est depuis longtemps associée à la disponibilité de rentes dérivées du pétrole et du gaz. Les régimes militaires étayés par le pétrole ont en particulier été en mesure de résister au défi de l’opposition intérieure, même durant des périodes difficiles, parce que ces régimes pouvaient compter, en fin de compte, sur les revenus dérivés du pétrole et du gaz. Comme le relate cet article, le régime de Khadafi s’est montré tout particulièrement doué pour survivre grâce aux rentes tirées du pétrole et du gaz. Mais ces rentes n’expliquent pas tout : en 2011, le régime est tombé après une brève guerre civile durant laquelle des forces externes ont joué un rôle de tout premier plan. Le rôle joué par les interventions de l’Europe et de l’OTAN indique les limites des rentes du pétrole et du gaz. La distribution modifiée des ressources internationales parmi les acteurs libyens nationaux a contribué à la victoire des rebelles, ce qui indique que les facteurs internationaux devraient être mieux incorporés dans les études de la survie des régimes autoritaires et de la démocratisation.

Keywords::

• oil
• Libya
• violence
• international actors
• rent seeking

Notes

^1. On 22 July 1996, a communiqué from the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform condemned the regime's repression in that month of the mutiny at Bou Salem prison in Tripoli, which was said to have claimed hundreds of victims (El Hayat, 28 July 1996).

^2. Mattes (2004, 28) points out: “Up until the present, the Revolutionary Leadership's deployment of the security organisations to protect the Revolution has been so efficient that any attempts to depose the regime or to change the political system by oppositional military or political groups have been doomed to failure”.

^3. El Kikhia (1997, 90) states: “Most prominent among them are Ahmad Qathaf al Damm, Masoud Abdul-Fatih, Misbah Abdul Hafith, Khalifa Ihneish, Omar Ishkal, Al Barani Ishkal, Omran Atiatallah al Qaddafi, Imhamad Mahmoud Al Qaddafi, Khamis Masoud Al Qaddafi, Saad Masoud Al Qathaf, Hassan al Kabir Qaddafi. Until April 1995 the central sector (Sirte) was under the command of Khalifa Ihneish, the southern sector (Sebha) under Colonel Masoud Abdul Hafith, the Benghazi sector under Misbah Abdul Hafith and the Tobrouk sector under Ahmad Qaddafi al Damm. A failed coup attempt in February 1995 prompted General Qaddafi to make changes that gave his cousins even more encompassing powers. Ahmad Qathaf al Damm's territory was expanded to include all of the Cyreanica. Khalifa Ihneish was appointed the commander of armaments and munitions, Masoud Abdoul Hafith was promoted to commanding officer of military security in Libya, and Al Barani Ishkal was assigned to command domestic military security”.

^4. “Call For Reform in Libya, ‘A Vision of Libya’s Future'”. Personal copy of this petition, which was circulated at the time of the visit of the American official.

^5. Only 25% of natural gas and oil reserves are exploited (interview with Tarek Hassan, director of planning at the Libyan NOC, New York Times, 23 July 2004)

^6. On 15 July 2008, Hannibal Qadhafi, Qadhafi's fourth son, and his wife were arrested in Geneva following complaints filed by two domestics who accused them of beating them. After paying bail, the couple was released. In retaliation, Libya cut off its supply of petroleum to Switzerland, curbed trade and took two Swiss citizens hostage. To wheedle out of a diplomatic crisis, the president of the Federal Council “apologised” and triggered a political crisis in Switzerland because Libya has still not forgiven [them] and one of the two Swiss citizens remains captive.

^7. The revolutionary committees were established on 2 November 1977: “In the mind of their creator”, writes François Burgat, “the revolutionary committees had no other purpose than to accelerate implementation of the new system, in other words weakening the state. Actually, they functioned as a sort of militia” (Burgat and Lalonde 1996, 74).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Luis Martinez

Luis Martinez is a Senior Research Fellow at CERI-SciencesPo, Paris, holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (IEP, 1996), and was a visiting professor at Columbia University, New York (2000/01) and at the University of Montréal (2007/8). A political scientist and a specialist of the Maghreb and the Middle East, he was temporarily affiliated with the Rabat School Of Governance and Economics as its scientific director (2010/11). He is the author of Violence de la rente pétrolière (Algérie, Libye et Irak), Presses de Sciences Po, 2010 (English version, Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2012); The Libyan Paradox, London: Hurst/Columbia University, 2007; The Enigma of Islamist Violence with A. Blom and L. Bucaille (eds), London: Hurst/Columbia University, 2007; and La guerre civile en Algérie, Paris: Karthala, 1998 (English version, Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2000).