Warlord undone? Strongman politics and post-conflict state-building in Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2013)

Abstract

This article examines the role played by strongmen in Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict reconstruction. While many acknowledge the unhindered or even the enhanced political influence these actors often enjoy as a result of their relationship to the state in post-conflict contexts, existing debates in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as elsewhere, often remain couched in terms of the implications of these kinds of relationships. Does working with rural strongmen tied to former insurgencies enhance the authority of the central state? Or do such alliances wither state institutions capable of providing long-term political order in peripheral areas? This article downplays these questions. Instead, it examines the alliances which form between strongmen and other actors amidst conflicts over local authority during post-conflict reconstruction. It suggests that the specific configuration of these alliances matter in determining the utility of allying with local strongmen during war to peace transitions. This article examines these struggles through the case of Morou Ouattara and the local Forces Nouvelles (FN) administration in Bouna, Northeastern Côte d'Ivoire.

Cet article examine le rôle joué par les hommes forts de la reconstruction post-conflit de la Côte d'Ivoire. Bien que de nombreuses personnes reconnaissent l'influence sans entrave, voire renforcée, dont jouissent souvent ces acteurs grâce à leur relation avec l'État dans les contextes post-conflit, les débats existants en Côte d'Ivoire, ainsi qu'ailleurs, continuent souvent d'être formulés en termes des implications des relations de ce type. Le fait de travailler avec des hommes forts ruraux associés à des insurrections antérieures renforce-t-il l'autorité de l'État central ? Ou bien les alliances de ce type amoindrissent-elles les institutions publiques capables d'introduire un ordre politique à long terme dans les zones périphériques ? Cet article minimise ces questions. Au lieu de cela, il examine les alliances qui se forment entre les hommes forts et d'autres acteurs en situations de conflit concernant l'autorité durant la reconstruction post-conflit. Il suggère que la configuration précise de ces alliances a une importance au moment de déterminer l'utilité de s'allier à des hommes forts locaux durant les transitions guerre-paix. Cet article examine ces luttes à travers le cas de Morou Ouattara et de l'administration des Forces Nouvelles (FN) à Bouna, nord-est de la Côte d'Ivoire.

Keywords::

• Côte d'Ivoire
• warlordism
• civil war
• post-conflict
• authority

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association and the 2012 annual meeting of the African Studies Association. The author would like to thank Amy Poteete, Shane Barter, Elizabeth Bloodgood, Catherine Boone, Kathrin Heitz, Maja Bovcon, Daniel Douek, Kenneth Martin, Stephanie Ferrara and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback on earlier versions of this article. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

^1. While there is little agreement over a precise definition of warlordism, there are a handful of general characteristics used by observers. Generally, most studies of contemporary warlords agree that these actors: control a small piece of territory within the boundaries of existing “weak” states, rely heavily on the use of force as a means of social control, are embedded in (sometimes illicit) transnational markets, and do little to institutionalise or legitimise their political positions vis-à-vis the populations they control (Giustozzi 2003, 1–5; Jackson 2003, 137–139; Marten 2006/07; Beswick 2009, 338; Utas 2012, 14–18). Marten adds that warlords in the contemporary international system are unique, compared to historical cases of warlordism, because they are commonly sustained “through the complicity of state leaders” (2012, 3). I do not use the term “warlord” in any intended “derogatory sense” (Hills 1997, 36). I use the terms “strongman” and “warlord” interchangeably throughout this article.

^2. In terms of levels of contestation, it is difficult to determine exactly how unique Bouna is as a case. Descriptions of other areas that fell under the control of the rebels suggest that the level of discontent with the rebellion in Bouna was particularly high. On Korhogo during the rebellion, see Förster (2010). See also Heitz (2009, 2013) on Man while under FN control.

^3. For more on the organization of the rebellion in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, see Fofana (2011, 168–171) and Balint-Kurti (2007, 22–24). For the organisation of the rebellion in Bouna, see Speight (2013).

^4. As part of a strategy for defeating Laurent Gbagbo, the main opposition parties had formed a pre-electoral coalition in 2005 called the Rassemblement des houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP). The RHDP included the RDR, the PDCI, the UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire) and the MFA (Mouvement des Forces de L'Avenir).

^5. For Bouna-Téhini, Georges Savonnet (1986, 23) estimated that in 1975 there were 10 times more Lobi living in the region than Koulongo, putting the numbers at 75,000 to 80,000 for the Lobi compared to 7500 for the Koulongo.

^6. Although much of the PDCI would ultimately side with the Ouattara and the RDR after the first round of the presidential elections in 2010, it is important to remember that Bedié was one of the principal political architects of the policy of ivoirité during the 1990s. It was only after the formation of the RHDP in 2005 that it was fairly certain on which side of the conflict Bedié and the rest of the PDCI would position themselves. Leading up to the 2010 elections, Bedié embarked on a tour of the north in an effort to distance himself from the nationalist agenda now advanced by Gbagbo.

^7. All of the interviews included in this article were conducted in French. They were transcribed in English by the author.

^8. Kalyvas (2006, 383) refers to similar processes as “alliances”, or the “convergence of interests via a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive advantage over local rivals; in exchange, supralocal actors are able to tap into local networks and generate mobilization”. Building on Manchester School anthropology, McGovern (2011, 191) looks at what he refers to as “intercalaries”, who are actors that “do the work necessary to align the interests and strangers of high-level state actors and those of local actors, down to the level of farmers in the village”.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jeremy Speight

Jeremy Speight is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Concordia University and a visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Memorial University. His research explains variations in the coalition building strategies employed by armed movements at local levels and how these variations impact post-conflict state-building. His work has been published in the Canadian Journal of African Studies and Civil Wars.