The progress in establishing the rule of law in Côte d’Ivoire under Ouattara’s presidency

Abstract

Creating an autonomous and efficient judiciary represents an important and necessary step for the consolidation of democracy and the reconciliation of a nation divided by almost two decades of conflict over the contentious issue of Ivoirité. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the progress that has been made in the establishment of the rule of law in Côte d’Ivoire under the current president, Alassane Ouattara, by comparing the period of his presidency to those of his predecessors, Henri Konan Bédié, General Robert Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo. I argue that the judiciary is still struggling to establish its autonomy and that one of its main problems is its lack of impartiality. I examine possible reasons for the courts’ persistent weak accountability performance and discuss possible remedies.

La création d'un système judiciaire autonome et efficace constitue une étape importante et nécessaire pour la consolidation de la démocratie et la réconciliation d'une nation divisée par presque vingt ans de conflit autour de la question sujette à controverse de l'ivoirité. Cet article a pour objectif d'évaluer les progrès effectués dans l'établissement de l'autorité de la loi en Côte d'Ivoire sous le président actuel, Alassane Ouattara, en comparant la période de sa présidence à celles de ses prédécesseurs, Henri Konan Bédié, le général Robert Gueï et Laurent Gbagbo. Je soutiens que le système judiciaire éprouve encore des difficultés à établir son autonomie et qu'un de ses principaux problèmes est son manque d'impartialité. J'examine des raisons possibles pouvant expliquer les performances toujours faibles des tribunaux en matière de reddition de comptes et discute de remèdes possibles.

Keywords::

• Côte d’Ivoire
• rule of law
• judicial reforms
• courts
• Ouattara
• Gbagbo

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Catherine Boone, Scott Straus and Jeremy Speight, as well as the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this article.

Notes

^1. According to Kipré (2002, 87) it was a pro-FPI journalist, Raphaël Lakpé, who first expressed doubt in Ouattara’s nationality in 1992. See Akindès (2004, 36–42) for a detailed explanation of the problematic construction of Ouattara’s identity, which also includes Ouattara’s defence of his nationality.

^2. Before that, the Ivorian state did not develop a concise juridical framework for land ownership, yet neither did it recognise customary, communal or hereditary land rights (Boone 2003, 218–221). State agents (prefects, sous-préfets and forestry agents) simply allocated to immigrants the rights to use the land, not to properly own it, meaning that the land could not be automatically transmitted to an heir. The land disputes were treated in an informal, ad hoc manner. This institutional (juridical) void and the fact that most of the land was cultivated by immigrants explain why land rights became such an explosive issue over time.

^3. Extracts from General Gueï’s speech are included in the propaganda movie made by Gbagbo’s supporter Sidiki Bakaba (2005).

^4. However, on the same occasion he also insisted that the ultimate authority for determining Ouattara’s nationality was the Constitutional Council. The latter delivered Ouattara his national certificate as late as 28 June 2002, only after his RDR supporters gave an ultimatum to Seydou Diarra, the convener of the Forum (Bouquet 2005, 98).

^5. Apart from these three prominent figures, the Supreme Court also invalidated candidatures of Lamine Fadiga and other PDCI candidates (Le Pape 2002, 47).

^6. “Crises de 2002 et 2011: Le rôle joué par Tia Koné et Yao N’Dré”, Le Democrate, 12 September 2012.

^7. “Opposition wants international court to try human rights violations”, Integrational Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 8 April 2004.

^8. “26 octobre 2000 – 26 octobre 2011: il y a 11 ans, charnier de Yopougon”, Le Patriote, 26 October 2011.

^9. “Côte d'Ivoire: le parquet ouvre une enquête sur la mort du général Gueï en 2002 (procureur)”, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 11 September 2012.

^10. “Côte d’Ivoire: Seka Yapo et trois autres officiers inculpés pour l’assassinat du général Gueï”, Jeune Afrique, 1 October 2012.

^11. Ouattara won the following percentages of the vote: Boundiali (82%), Ferkessedougou (91.7%), Korhogo (84.4%), Dabakala (84.5%), Seguela (87.9%). The exceptions were Bouaké and Katiola, where he nevertheless still won 50.6% and 65.7% of the vote respectively.

^12. According to UNOCI, at least 500 civilians were killed in Duékoué at the end of March. The first wave of violence was perpetrated against the northerners by Liberian mercenaries and pro-Gbagbo militia groups. This was followed by an FRCI offensive targeting the Guéré ethnic group. See “Crise en Côte d’Ivoire: l’ONU réagit aux accusations d’Amnesty International” Radio France Internationale (RFI), 26 May 2011.

^13. In the Gbagbo camp: former president Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé (head of Young Patriots), General Philippe Mangou (head of the armed forces under Gbagbo), General Guiai Bi Poin (head of the security force unit Centre de commandement des opérations de sécurité; CECOS), General Bruno Dogbo Blé (head of the Republican guard), “Bob Marley” (a Liberian mercenary commander who fought for Gbagbo in the west), Pierre Brou Amessan (Director General of the state-controlled Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne; RTI) and Denis Maho Glofiéhi (head of pro-Gbagbo militia groups in the west). In the Ouattara camp: Captain Eddie Médi (the commander of the Republican Forces March offensive from Toulepleu to Guiglio), Commander Fofana Losséni (Médi’s boss and overall commander of the Republican Forces March offensive in the west), Commander Chérif Ousmane (long-time commander of rebel Forces Nouvelles in Bouaké and the head of the Republican Forces operations in Yopougon during the final battle for Abidjan), Commander Ousmane Coulibaly also known as “Ben Laden” or “Ben le sage” (long-time New Forces zone commander in Odienné, he oversaw Republican Forces soldiers implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings in Yopougon) (HRW 2011, 103–107).

^14. Adou Richard Christophe, a former prosecutor of the tribunal of first instance in Bouaké and a former deputy of the prosecutor Tchimou Raymond under Gbagbo, replaced Simplice Kouadio Koffi, appointed by President Ouattara on 15 January 2013. See “Justice/Tribunal de première instance d’Abdijan Plateau: les nouveaux procureurs Adou et Yéo officiellement aux affairs”, L’Intelligent d’Abidjan, 16 January 2013.

^15. “Quinze ans de prison ferme pour le Général Dogbo Blé”, Jeune Afrique, 12 October 2012.

^16. “Côte d’Ivoire: Seka Yapo et trois autres officiers inculpés pour l’assassinat du général Gueï”, Jeune Afrique, 1 October 2012.

^17. “Situation militaire post-crise électorale, Ange-Kessi: voice pourquoi les Frci ne sont pas poursuivies”, Soir Info, 7 July 2011.

^18. “Simone Gbagbo entendue par la justice à Odienné”, Jeune Afrique, 14 November 2012.

^19. Dozos are traditional hunters of northern origin who fought against Gbagbo and his supporters during the conflict. They acquired considerable power since Ouattara’s accession, although links between them and the current Ivorian government are not clearly established.

^20. Dioula is the name of a language similar to Bambara and spoken by people from the north (Dozon 2000b, 57).

^21. “Ivory Coast violence: Abidjan army attack kills seven”, BBC News, 6 August 2012.

^22. “Ivory Coast closes Ghana border after deadly attack”, BBC News, 21 September 2012; “Update 2 – I. Coast closes frontier with Ghana over border attack”, Reuters, 21 September 2012.

^23. “A la Une: un rapport qui fait grand bruit en Côte d’Ivoire”, RFI, 8 October 2012; “Ivory Coast exiles set up strategic command in Ghana: U.N. panel”, Reuters, 9 October 2012.

^24. See articles 116 and 89 of the constitutions of Benin and Gabon respectively (ALP 2013; UNHCR 2013).

^25. “Rejet des candidatures de Bédié et Ouattara en 2000: les révélations de l’ex président de la Cour suprême, Tia Koné”, L’expression, 19 October 2011.

^26. “Côte d’Ivoire des chefs de l’ex-rébellion affectés dans la nouvelle armée”, AFP, 4 August 2011.

^27. “La hiérarchie des FRCI se réorganise”, Jeune Afrique, 8 November 2012.

^28. “Plusieurs magistrats suspendus de leurs fonctions”, RFI, 24 October 2012.

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Maja Bovcon

Maja Bovcon has completed a PhD in Franco-Ivorian relations at the University of Oxford and is currently an Africa Senior Analyst at the UK-based political risk consultancy company Maplecroft.