The resilience of the past: government and opposition in Kenya

Abstract

The article discusses government and opposition in Kenya over the last 100 years. Major democratic changes have occurred, but legacies from the colonial period and Kenya's one-party state endure. Pushback efforts to perpetuate the status quo continue. Subverting formal legal changes, using violence, and polarizing ethnicity are among the means used to consolidate the past. The focus is on the interplay between stasis and change, using comparative political economy theories and similar examples from other times and places. The analysis highlights the resilience of the past and historic barriers to change, thereby raising broader questions and issues that are not well understood.

Cet article traite du gouvernement et de l'opposition au Kenya au cours des 100 dernières années. De grands changements démocratiques ont eu lieu, mais l'héritage de la période coloniale et le système à parti unique de l'État kenyan perdurent. Les efforts de refoulement visant à perpétuer le statu quo continuent. La subversion des changements juridiques formels, l'utilisation de la violence et la polarisation de l'ethnicité figurent parmi les moyens mis en œuvre pour consolider le passé. L'axe central tourne autour de l'interaction entre stase et changement, en ayant recours à des théories comparatives d'économie politique et à des exemples similaires d'autres époques et lieux. L'analyse met en relief la résilience du passé et les barrières historiques entravant les changements, ce qui soulève des questions et problématiques°plus larges qui ne sont pas bien comprises.

Keywords::

• democratization
• government
• opposition
• repression
• stasis
• change
• comparative political economy
• ethnicity
• violence
• political parties
• elections
• colonialism
• post-independence
• Kenya
• Africa
• transition political economies

Acknowledgements

I thank the following individuals for useful comments concerning several points in the paper: Phil Keefer, John Lonsdale, and Daniel Ziblatt.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was written for a conference on “Kenya at 50”, Johns Hopkins, School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), September 26–27, 2013.

^1. Marx particularly bemoaned the resilience of pre-capitalist modes of production as a fetter on the development of capitalism.

^2. As North (1994, 366) correctly notes, “economies [and political systems] that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of very different informal norms and enforcement”.

^3. In 2010, George Saitoti named a number of MPs who were alleged to be involved in drug trafficking, one of whom had been named as a drug “kingpin” by United States (US) President Obama. With the exception of one alleged drug baron who lost in the 2013 election, the others went on to win political positions as governors and senators; see Wabanisi (2010).

^4. Kenya National Archives (KNA), PC/CP8/5/1, Kikuyu Association, letter of 16 May 1930, 16.

^5. KNA, PC/CP3/5/1, Kikuyu Association, 1921–31, letter from Senior Commissioner to Hon. Chief Native Commissioner, 28 January 1928, 10.

^6. See Adar and Munyae (2001). By 2002, the constitution had been amended thirty-eight times; see Njogu (2005).

^7. Some argue that another Kikuyu coup was also in the works.

^8. Old friends such as Archbishop Muge lost their lives in an alleged car accident, while others such as Foreign Minister Robert Ouko were murdered in 1990.

^9. Interviews by the author with ex-KPU M.P.s after they were released from detention, Kenya, 1971/2.

^10. Under a new law, winning the election required that the president win a seat, get a simple majority of votes and receive at least 25% of the vote in five out of Kenya's eight provinces.

^11. Even though the post did not yet exist. The MOU agreement was later contested.

^12. For an analysis that challenges the Luo's own view of marginalization, see Morrison (2007).

^13. Based on the account of an attendee.

^14. However, Hornsby (2012, 698) notes that “the cabinet was far better balanced ethnically and regionally than Moi's”.

^15. Kagwanja's (2001) study Warlord Politics is the most comprehensive study of gangs in Kenya. Numerous other articles about Mungiki in African Affairs followed this pioneer research. Mungiki initially began as a Kikuyu cultural-cum-religious group representing the dispossessed before it was displaced by the violent clashes of the 1990s in the Rift Valley. However, Mungiki quickly morphed into a hierarchical Mafioso-like criminal gang in Nairobi and Central Province, where it shook down businesses, hired itself out to politicians to use violence against their competitors, and often attacked innocent citizens who refused to join, or opposed them. To some it conjured up a revival of Mau Mau, even though it had little in common with it.

^16. Hence, in 2014 when Odinga began holding anti-government rallies, many Luos from the North and Central Rift Valley decamped to Nyanza, as they feared they might become the targets of violent attacks. Also the opinion polls by Ipsos Synovate show an increasing ethnic polarization around the ICC; see (Mueller 2008, 12).

^17. The fact that Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and Ruto, a Kalenjin were on the same ticket; the stress on peace at all costs; the police being deployed to hot spots before, during, and after the election; a belief in the neutrality of a reformed judiciary; the willingness of Odinga and the ODM to accept the results even if they did not believe them; and a population which was still fatigued by the violence of 2007/8 and wanted peace at all costs. For a discussion of some of these factors, see Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2014).

^18. For the TJRC report (Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Vols 1–4 2013), see http://nipate.com/full-tjrc-report-for-those-interested-t28162.html (last accessed August 7, 2013) or http://www.scribd.com/doc/142790254/TJRC-Report-Volume-1-4 (last accessed on November 12, 2014).

^19. For instance, see Boix, (2011). For a general discussion of the contending theories see, Wucherpfennig and Deutsch (2009). For the role of the middle class see Cheeseman (2014).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Susanne D. Mueller

Susanne D. Mueller has a research appointment at Boston University's African Studies Center. She received her Ph.D from Princeton University, previously taught there, at the University of Nairobi, and resided in Kenya for 20 years while working in most of the countries of East and Southern Africa. She has written articles about politics in Kenya and Tanzania and also worked for years for international development institutions including the World Bank and various UN agencies. Her 2008 article “The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis” won the African Politics Conference Group's best article of the year award. Her most recent article is on Kenya and the International Criminal Court.