Negotiating inclusion by exclusion, or how to secure “eating” from farmland investments in Tanzania

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges previous institutional analyses of conflict patterns, showing that land conflicts are more complex and unpredictable than generally assumed. It documents how the arrival of investors in a Tanzanian village has fostered local land conflicts, and explains why local leaders defended their fellow villagers in one land conflict, but discriminated against them in another. Using a local political settlement approach, I argue that studying how formal and informal institutions are structuring the distribution of power is key to explaining why local leaders have used different conflict management strategies. This paper contributes to an emerging scholarship that links the global land rush and land conflicts, insisting on the role played by Tanzanian investors. It also nuances the dominant narrative of Tanzania as a harmonious country in which ethnicity is not politically salient by showing that local actors may instrumentalize identity to produce political discrimination.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article remet en question les précédentes analyses institutionnelles des modèles de conflit, en montrant que les conflits fonciers sont plus complexes et imprévisibles qu’on ne l’envisage généralement. Il montre comment l’arrivée des investisseurs dans un village tanzanien a favorisé les conflits fonciers locaux, et explique pourquoi les dirigeants locaux ont défendu leurs concitoyens dans un conflit foncier, mais aussi exercé une discrimination à leur endroit dans un autre. En exploitant une approche de règlement politique local, je soutiens qu’examiner comment les institutions formelles et informelles structurent la distribution du pouvoir est essentiel pour expliquer pourquoi les dirigeants locaux ont employé différentes stratégies de gestion des conflits. Cet article contribue à une littérature émergente qui établit un lien entre la ruée générale vers les terres et les conflits fonciers, en insistant sur le rôle joué par les investisseurs tanzaniens. Il nuance également le récit dominant de la Tanzanie en tant que pays harmonieux dans lequel l’ethnicité n’est pas politiquement saillante en montrant que les acteurs locaux peuvent instrumentaliser l’identité afin de produire de la discrimination politique.

KEYWORDS:

• Land conflicts
• land investments
• Tanzania
• autochthony
• political settlement

MOTS-CLÉS:

• Conflits fonciers
• investissements fonciers
• Tanzanie
• autochtonie
• règlement politique

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Cédric Jourde, Lars Buur, Marie Gagné, Philippe Martin, and Stéphanie Bacher for their insightful comments. An initial draft of this paper was presented at the Conference of the African Studies Association (ASA), held in Chicago, USA from November 15^th to 18^th 2017.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The only exception in this regard would be the persistence and prominence of land conflicts between farmers and pastoralists everywhere in the country. But even in these conflicts, autochthony is rarely invoked. Most commonly, they are seen as resulting from competing livelihood visions, and illustrating divergent ways to relate to the land (e.g. Walwa 2017; Benjaminsen, Maganga, and Abdallah 2009; Mwamfupe 2015; Greco 2016).

2. The ujamaa policy resulted from the Arusha Declaration (1967) – the Tanzanian Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance – that presented Tanzania’s vision for African Socialism and was implemented after Independence.

3. Other scholars have observed and documented instances in which ethnic identity becomes politically salient in Tanzania (Kelsall 2000; Gibbon 2001; Must 2018; Becker 2020).

4. In addition, the mukama (the King) also had exclusive prerogatives regarding land, which were instated through what was known as the nyarubanja system. Nyarubanja is the category of land that was under the King’s control. Because he became the owner of land without heirs, and could transfer individual/clan land to nyarubanja, the king used land allocation to enforce client–patron relationships and ensure political stability. As Reining explains: “[The king could single] out a block of bibanja and their occupants […] designating them tenants of his appointee” (Reining 1962, 66). In this way, Haya landowners became tenants of the King’s political appointee, and political appointees, clients of the King. Land attribution through this nyarubanja system was significant: estimates are that about 20% of Haya land was allocated in form of royal gifts. The remaining land (about 10%) was subject to the market system, sold and bought by interested buyers and sellers (Reining 1962).

5. In Tanzania, legally, all land belongs to the president. There are three legal categories of land: general land, reserved land and village land.

6. The proliferation of investors is not the only factor having contributed to this pressure to formalize and title land. Indeed, formalization programmes of land rights are also resulting from collaborative international and national initiatives to secure small-scale farmers’ land rights.

7. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the party that has been in power in Tanzania since Independence.

8. As noted by Kelsall (2000), the phenomenon of districtization in Tanzania is associated with competitive politics that have created incentives for local politicians to secure strong local support. Indeed, under Tanzania’s multi-party constitution, to sit in the cabinet, an MP must secure election in a constituency. Thus, “the tendency is for a closer linking of the national and local levels, and the increasing relevance of local concerns to national policy” (Kelsall 2000, 552).

9. Politically, Tanzania is divided into constituencies. During national elections, each constituency elects an MP.

10. Struggles between political factions within the ruling elite are an important feature of Tanzanian politics (see Tsubura 2018; Gray 2015; Cooksey and Kelsall 2011; Eriksen 2018).

11. The conflict had not been resolved as of 2017, and the land transfer was still in the administrative process.

12. Similar dynamics in other villages in Missenyi District have been documented by scholars: village land is sold without the consent of affected villagers (see Theodory 2017, 277).

13. Through a historical analysis, Ringquist (2012, 6) argues that since Independence, the Tanzanian state and the military have constituted a collaborative relationship because the military has been incorporated into the state’s political structure through benefit-sharing processes.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the University of Ottawa, Canada.

Notes on contributors

Joanny Bélair

Joanny Bélair is a postdoctoral fellow in the Faculty of Geoscience at Utrecht University. She completed her PhD in political science at the University of Ottawa, Canada. She works on issues associated with land governance, inclusive development, farmland investments and African politics. Her current research project looks at how investors’ profiles and levels of integration within host countries’ political economy (with a focus on SSA) influence their capacity to operationalize their agricultural investment projects.