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ABSTRACT
This article addresses the question of why some non-democratic governments are more successful than others at reforming their welfare institutions. Using the example of the Russian and Kazakhstani social benefits reform, the author will illustrate that in modern non-democratic regimes the importance of framing and effective communication with the public for the purpose of effective policymaking and regime legitimization is equal to, if not greater than, in established democracies. The successful implementation of the Kazakhstani social benefits reform, as opposed to Russia’s protracted experience with reforming its social benefits system, was determined not only by the configuration of various institutional and political factors, but also the skilful actions of the Kazakhstani authorities, who used effective communication strategies and framing techniques that resonated with the public and generated broad support for reform. Based on extensive research conducted in Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006–2010 as part of the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Toronto, this paper enhances our understanding of political and public policy processes in transitional and non-democratic contexts and adds important details to our understanding of how post-Soviet autocrats run their countries and what methods they use to stay in power, manage their state affairs, and avoid public dissatisfaction.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article aborde la question suivante : pourquoi certains gouvernements non-démocratiques ont plus de réussite à réformer leurs institutions d’assistance sociale. En employant l’exemple de la réforme des prestations sociales de la Russie et du Kazakhstan, l’auteur éclairera que l’importance, dans les régimes contemporains non-démocratiques, de bien formuler et de communiquer effectivement avec le public avec pour objectif les décisions politiques et la légitimation du régime efficaces, est à la hauteur de celle dans les démocraties établies, sinon plus grande. L’implémentation réussie de la réforme kazakhe de prestations sociales, par opposition à l’expérience prolongée russe concernant la réforme de son système de prestations sociales, a été déterminée non seulement par la configuration de plusieurs facteurs institutionnels et politiques, mais aussi par les actions habiles des autorités kazakhes, en employant les stratégies de communication efficaces et les techniques de formulation qui ont résonné avec le public et généré un large soutien en faveur de la réforme. Basé sur les recherches approfondies menées dans la Russie et au Kazakhstan du 2006 à 2010 dans le cadre de la thèse de doctorat de l’auteur à l’Universitè de Toronto, cet article améliore notre compréhension des processus politiques et de politique publique, dans les contextes de transition et non-démocratiques, et ajoute des détails importants à notre compréhension concernant la direction menée par les autocrates post-soviétiques de leur pays, et leurs méthodes pour rester au pouvoir, gérer leurs affaires d’état et éviter le mécontentement public.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Neuhouser, “Limits on Authoritarian Imposition of Policy.”
2. Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise?, 47. See also, Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States; Chandler, Shocking Mother Russia; Orenstein, Privatizing Pensions.
3. See, for example, Larin, “Kazakhstan: tsena reform?”; Ul'ianova, “Sotsial'nye l'goty”; “Khod sotsial'nykh reform v Kazakhstane”; “Pensii ne terpiat revoliutsii.”
4. Zakharova and Tuchkova, Pravo sotsial'nogo obespecheniia Rossii, 27, 53–54.
5. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States, 65.
6. Bulgakova, Kak rabotaiut rossiiskie deputaty?, 131. See also Maleva, Zubarevich, and Ibragimova, Obzor sotsial'noi politiki v Rossii, 341–342.
7. “Russian Federation: Social Expenditure,” 24.
8. Review, for example, Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State; Kornai, Haggard, and Kaufman, Reforming the State; Lane, The Legacy of State Socialism; Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States; Chandler, Shocking Mother Russia.
9. Teplova, “The Russian Welfare State.”
10. Boschmann et al., “A Generation at Risk.”
11. Zakonodatel'stvo: Pensii i posobiia.
12. Seitenova and Becker, “Kazakhstan’s Pension System,” 154.
13. Ibid., 154, 156.
14. Ibid., 94.
15. “Zadolzhennost' po pensiiam v Kazakhstane”; Murthi, Pradhan, and Scott, “Poverty and Economic Transition,” 162, 164; Sivriukova, “Iz pustogo basseina vody ne zacherpnesh'.”
16. Falkingham, “Welfare in Transition,” 16.
17. Peck, Economic Development in Kazakhstan, 65; “V Kazakhstane 60% naseleniia.”
18. Falkingham, “Welfare in Transition,” iv; Falkingham, “From Security to Uncertainty”; Falkingham, “The End of the Rollercoaster?,” 346.
19. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 115; Nazarbaev, “Ideinaia konsolidatsiia obshchestva.”
20. Jaura, “Kazakhstan”; “Donors Pledge $1.22 Billion in Aid”; “IMF to Help Cover Kazakhstan's Budget Deficit”; “Kazakhstan to Receive Economic Aid”; “World Bank May Grant.” All articles are available from Factiva, accessed 12 September 2015.
21. Sadykov, “L'goty kak shchepetil'nii vopros”; “Zakonoproekt o l'gotakh.”
22. “Kazakhstan: Living Standards.”
23. “O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii.”
24. Sivriukova, “Iz pustogo basseina vody ne zacherpnesh'.”
25. “Nazarbaev obeshchaet zavershit' sotsial'nye reformy.”
26. “Kazakhstan: Dimensions of Poverty.”
27. “The Republic of Kazakhstan: Assessment,” 17.
28. “Kazakhstan: Dimensions of Poverty.”
29. “Glavnaia zadacha glav mestnoi ispolnitel'noi vlasti.”
30. “The Republic of Kazakhstan. Inception Report,” 5.
31. “The Republic of Kazakhstan: Assessment,” 20.
32. Bhuiyan, “E-Government in Kazakhstan,” 35; Agrawal, “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction.”
33. Ufer and Troschke, “Fiskalische Dezentralisierung,” 27–28.
34. “Kazakhstan Regional Disparities.”
35. “Pensionery Alma-Aty protestuiut”; Sivriukova, “Iz pustogo basseina vody ne zacherpnesh'”; Clark, “No Bread, no Money.”
36. Craig, Norregaard, and Tsibouris, “Russian Federation,” 685; Treisman, “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers.”
37. Gaidar, “The Most Correct Policy,” 10.
38. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States, 50.
39. Ibid., 49.
40. Rosefielde, “Premature Deaths”; Theroux, Death of a Nation.
41. Verbin, “Millions of Russians under Poverty Line”; “Russia: Social Protection during Transition.”
42. Hedlund, Russia’s “Market” Economy, 357–361.
43. Schleifer and Treisman, Without a Map, 23–24 and 41–42.
44. Review Presidential Decree No. 466, 20 April 1993; Letters from the Ministry of Finance No. 51 and Ministry of Social Protection No.1-2359-18, dated 29 June 1992; Presidential Decree No. 382; Resolution No. 203, dated 19 June 1992; Presidential Decree No. 409, 20 June 1992; Presidential Decree No. 509, 13 May 1992; Presidential Decree No. 508, 13 May 1992; Presidential Decree No. 1511. All documents are available at Zakony Rossii, http://www.lawrussia.ru. See also Khudyakova, “Yeltsin Raises Child Welfare Benefits.”
45. “Russian Government Discusses Science.”
46. McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution, 285.
47. Hoffman, The Oligarchs, 325–364.
48. Review Government Resolution No. 133, 20 February 1994. Also, Zakharova and Tuchkova, Pravo sotsial'nogo obespecheniia Rossii, 27, 53–54; “Sotsial'naia podderzhka semei.” On the problem of international financial assistance to Russia see Flickner, “The Russian Aid Mess”; Satter, “Yeltsin: Modified Victory,” 26.
49. Treisman, “Why Yeltsin Won,” 68.
50. Bourdreaux, “Yeltsin to Voters”; Treisman, “Why Yeltsin Won,” 74–77.
51. Schleifer and Treisman, Without a Map, 48.
52. Manning, Shkaratan, and Tikhonova, Work and Welfare in the New Russia, 59–60.
53. Sinitsina, “Experience in Implementing Social Benefits,” 9.
54. Maleva, Zubarevich, and Ibragimova, Obzor sotsial'noi politiki v Rossii, 18; see also Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States, 146; “Russia Needs Pension Reform”; “Putin Aide Says”; Alikina, “Social Aid”; Tompson, “Putin’s Challenge”; Bekker and Germanovich, “The Sacred Text.”
55. “Russian President’s Address to Federal Assembly.”
56. Skvortsov, Sotsial'naia politika regiona, 204. Also review Federal Law No. 122, “O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii.”
57. Sinitsina, “Experience in Implementing Social Benefits,” 16.
58. Ovcharova and Pishniak, “Uroki monetizatsii l'got,” 134–157.
59. “Issledovanie protestnoi aktivnosti v 2005 godu.”
60. Sinitsina, “Experience in Implementing Social Benefits”; Alexandrova and Struyk, “Reform of In-Kind Benefits in Russia”; Maleva, Zubarevich, and Ibragimova, Obzor sotsial'noi politiki v Rossii, 336.
61. Skvortsov, Sotsial'naia politika regiona, 204; Maleva, Zubarevich, and Ibragimova, Obzor sotsial'noi politiki v Rossii, 224–226 and 342.
62. Alexandrova, Kuznetsova, and Grishina, “Reforming In-Kind Privileges,” 122.
63. Sinitsina, “Experience in Implementing Social Benefits,” 17–18; “Press-konferentsiia gruppy sotsiologov.”
64. Personal communication with the Chair of the Gatchina Social Protection Committee, Leningrad region, Russia, 8 August 2008.
65. Sinitsina, “Experience in Implementing Social Benefits.”
66. Hacker, “Political Linguistic Discourse Analysis”; Kenski, “From Agenda Setting to Priming”; Ross, “Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent Societies”; Cox, “The Social Construction”; Béland, “Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change”; Schatz and Maltseva, “Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian ‘Persuasion’.”
67. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism.”
68. Ross, “Framing Welfare Reform,” 170.
69. Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?, 11; Stone, Policy Paradox, 248.
70. Stone, Policy Paradox; Hajer, “Discourse Coalitions.”
71. Stone, Policy Paradox, 188.
72. Personal communication with four elderly welfare recipients, June 2008, Astana. According to their accounts, the first national TV channel ‘Қазақстан’ (http://kaztrk.kz/rus/) and commercial TV channel KTK (http://www.ktk.kz/ru/about/english/) delivered numerous news programs focusing on Kazakhstan’s economic crisis and the rebirth of Kazakhstani cultural and social traditions. Two respondents emphasized that they gathered most of information from newspapers, including Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (http://www.kazpravda.kz), Ekspress-K (http://www.express-k.kz/), and Komsomol'skaia Pravda (http://www.kp.kz/).
73. Schatz and Maltseva, “Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian ‘Persuasion’.”
74. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 115–116; personal communication with a Kazakhstani teacher, Astana, 18 June 2008.
75. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 115.
76. Kokovinets, “Kazakhstan, nasmotrevshis' na RF.”
77. Nazarbaev, “Nezavisimost' Kazakhstana,” 206.
78. Nazarbaev, “Kazakhstan-2030,” 21–22.
79. Ardaev, “Kazakhstan mozhet stat'.”
80. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 115.
81. Ibid., 116.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 189.
84. Ibid., 191.
85. Mishler and Willerton, “The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity,” 2.
86. Ibid., 3.
87. Klimov, “Den'gi vmesto l'got,” 9. See also Osadchaia, “L'goty v kontekste reformirovaniia sotsial’noi politiki,” 1–12.
88. Khakhulina, “Sotsial'nye reformy glazami rossiiskogo naseleniia,” 39–40.
89. Kosichkina, “Issues for Vladimir Putin’s Second Term.”
90. Ibid.
91. Khakhulina, “Sotsial'nye reformy glazami rossiiskogo naseleniia,” 39–40.
92. Ibid.
93. Kosichkina, “Issues for Vladimir Putin’s Second Term.”
94. Cox, “The Social Construction,” 475.
95. Stone, Policy Paradox, 11.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Elena Maltseva
Elena Maltseva is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Windsor. She holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. Her research interests focus on post-Soviet politics and policy analysis, especially social and labour reforms, migration and human trafficking, state–society relations, and civil society development.