Civil society as an anti-corruption actor in post-Euromaidan Ukraine

ABSTRACT

Of the instruments available in the anti-corruption arsenal of nations, civil society usually plays an ambivalent role. It may or may not be decisive in helping to counter corruption, depending on other circumstances, although in developed societies with a strong tradition of rule of law it can make a definite contribution. In post-communist Ukraine, where political leadership for reasons of self-interest has been reluctant to pursue anti-corruption policy effectively, and where agencies created specifically for the purpose have been compromised by political interference, infighting, and lack of co-ordination, the question urgently arises whether civil society could compensate for these shortcomings so as to make a significantly positive change. Is civil society Ukraine’s “last best hope” to control political corruption and salvage the legitimacy of the regime? For this to happen, according to the theory put forward by Marcia Grimes and applied here, press freedom, political party competition, and government transparency must all be at a high level. Without these critical sources of support Ukrainian civil society cannot be counted on to manage the struggle against corruption successfully alone. The findings can be applied to other post-communist states.

RÉSUMÉ

De tous les instruments dans l’arsenal anti-corruption des nations, la société civile joue généralement un rôle ambivalent. Elle peut ou non jouer un rôle décisif dans la lutte contre la corruption, cela dépend des circonstances, bien qu’elle puisse y contribuer de façon définitive dans les sociétés développées où l’état de droit est bien ancré. En Ukraine post-communiste, les dirigeants politiques sont peu disposés, par intérêt personnel, à mener efficacement la politique de lutte contre la corruption. Les organismes établis pour lutter contre la corruption ont été compromis par l’ingérence politique, des conflits internes et une manque de coordination. La question se pose : la société civile pourrait-elle compenser ces défauts afin d’apporter un changement significatif et positif? La société civile est-elle « le dernier meilleur espoir » en Ukraine pour freiner la corruption politique et sauver la légitimité du régime? Selon la théorie avancée par Marcia Grimes et appliquée ici, la liberté de la presse, la concurrence entre les partis politiques, et la transparence du gouvernement doivent être toutes à un niveau élevé. Sans ces sources de soutien critiques, on ne peut compter sur la societe civile ukrainienne pour gérer toute seule la lutte contre la corruption. Les conclusions s’appliquent aux autres états post-communistes.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-corruption
• civil society
• corruption
• Ukraine

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Cockcroft, “Global Corruption”; Rothstein and Varraich, Making Sense of Corruption, 8–9.

2. Rothstein and Varraich, Making Sense of Corruption, 12–16; Mungiu-Pippidi, Quest for Good Governance, 2–10; Mungiu-Pippidi et al., Controlling Corruption in Europe, chap. 2; and Higgins, “In Ukraine.”

3. See, for example, Cockcroft, “Global Corruption,” 27; Johnston, “Brief History”; Anderson and Grey, Anticorruption in Transition 3, 82; and Rose-Ackerman, “Introduction.”

4. Vallie, Koruptsiia: rozdumy pislia Maidanu, chap. 13.

5. Waal, “Culture of Corruption.”

6. Transparency International, “How Corruption Weakens Democracy.”

7. Nitsova, Pop-Eleches, and Robertson, Revolution and Reform.

8. Grimes, “Contingencies of Societal Accountability.”

9. Pekar, “How to Overcome Corruption”; and Holmes, “Postcommunist Transitions and Corruption,” 1181.

10. See, for instance, Holmes, Corruption; Philp, “Corruption, Democratization, and Reform,” 57; Gambetta, “Corruption: An Analytical Map,” 35–44; Bull and Newell, “New Avenues,” 174–6; Lancaster and Montinola, “Toward a Methodology,” 190–1; and Panov, “Pecunia non olet?”.

11. Kuper and Kuper, Social Science Encyclopedia, and Fisman and Golden, Corruption, 24–5.

12. See, for instance, Karklins, “Typology of Post-Communist Corruption”; and Vallie, Koruptsiia: Zanepad sotsial'noho kapitalu, 155–6.

13. Fisman and Golden, Corruption, 98–9. See also Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri, “Corruption and Confidence.”

14. Rothstein and Varraich, Making Sense of Corruption, 55–6.

15. Recall, for example, the research findings of the late 1990s by the outstanding team of Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina, “Are the People Victims?”; “What is to be Done?”; and “Confessions.”

16. Chabarai, “Iak ukraintsi spryimaiut' koruptsiiu.”

17. Kiev International Institute of Sociology, Corruption in Ukraine. Incidentally, the researchers employed a standard definition of corruption, which they shared with respondents, as being “the misuse of public office for private gain … It always includes attempts to seek or use influence beyond what is legal.” Ibid., 3.

18. Summarizing the report’s key findings, “40.7% of all the major sectors and institutions in Ukraine are seen by its population as corrupt now … [and] about 65.5% of respondents encounter corruption as participants or witnesses every year.” Ibid., 9.

19. Between 2011 and 2015, statistically significant decreases in levels of extortion were observed in customs, utilities, military draft, and obtaining social security. Increases, on the other hand, were experienced in regard to land use, courts, and state notaries. Ibid., 42.

20. Ibid., 44.

21. Ibid., 45.

22. Markovskaya, Pridemore, and Nakajima, “Laws Without Teeth”; Kuzio, Ukraine, 349–50; and Basantsov and Zubareva, Koruptsiia v Ukraini, 35.

23. Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 3; Vallie, Koruptsiia: rozdumy pislia Maidanu, Dodatok I, 217–59. For an English-language version of these laws, see Fluri and Badrack, Anti-Corruption Measures. See also Basantsov and Zubareva, Koruptsiia v Ukraini, chap. 3, and Saienko, Derzhavne rehuliuvannia antykoruptsiinoi diial'nosti, 81–367.

24. Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 4. For the text of the actual law, updated to 2016, setting up the NACP/NAZK, see Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, “Pro zapobihannia koruptsii.”

25. Walker, “Ukraine Stunned”; “Ukraina shokovana deklaratsiiamy chynovnykiv”; Kapsamun, “E-deklarovani ‘revoliutsionery’”; and Sushko and Prystayko, “Ukraine: Country Profile.”

26. Kotliar, “Druha khvylia”; Pukish-Iunko, “Pokaran' za brekhlyvi e-deklaratsii”; and “NAZK perevirylo 113 e-deklaratsii.” By 1 June 2018, nearly two million declarations had been filed; fewer than 200 had managed to get reviewed. Liemienov, “Druziam use, voroham zakon.”

27. “NABU rozsliduie maizhe 40”; “NABU peredalo do sudu”; Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 6; Sushko, “Reforming Ukraine,” 4; and “How Ukrainian Corruption Fighters.”

28. Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 6.

29. Ibid.

30. Kiev International Institute of Sociology, Corruption in Ukraine, 19–21; Kyivs'kyi mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiolohii, Dumky i pohliady naselennia, 25; and Kyivs'kyi mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiolohii, Tsentr Razumkova, and Reiting, Monitorinh elektoral'nykh nastroiv ukraintsiv, 17.

31. Vallie, Koruptsiia: Zanepad sotsial'noho kapitalu, 182.

32. Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 7. Compared with Georgia and Moldova, in Ukraine “anti-corruption ‘policy’ has become rather chaotic.” Indeed, “there is a huge doubt over the real political will to tackle corruption.” Emerson et al., Anti-Corruption Policies in Georgia, 3–4.

33. These other bodies are the Prosecutor-General’s Office; law courts and judges; national police; security service (Security Service of Ukraine, Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrainy, SBU); National (State) Bureau of Investigation (NBR) (Ukraine’s counterpart to the FBI); and anti-corruption court. On the unreformed nature of some of them, see Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 8; as well as Harasymiw, “Police Reform”; “Dekanoidze oholosyla pro svoiu”; and “Eks-holova Natspolitsii Ukrainy Dekanoidze.”

34. Deprez, “Interview.”

35. Specifically, “competitions [for leading positions] were delayed by late governmental decisions, selection panels sometimes included false CSO [civil society organizations] representatives, and there have been numerous attempts to influence the selection process in favor of politically dependent candidates. Moreover, following the selection of senior management, the government failed to provide new institutions with necessary premises, equipment and funding to undermine their activity.” Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 3.

36. Butkevych, “Dystantsiine upravlinnia.”

37. See, for example, Cohen, “Parliament Votes to Weaken Law”; Grytsenko and Sukhov, “Critics: Parliament Passes Law”; and “Deputaty khochut' skasuvaty vidpovidal'nist’.” In December 2017, the Rada removed the chair of its own anti-corruption committee, seen by the administration as an obstacle to its control of NABU. “Antykoruptsiinyi komitet VR proholosuvav”; “Rada zvil'nyla Sobolieva z posady”; and “Rada pryiniala rishennia.”

38. Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 7.

39. “Lutsenko khoche samostiino vyrishuvaty”; Shcherban and Peklun, “Proekty zmin do KPK”; “HPU porushyla kryminal'ne porushennia”; “HPU vidkryla kryminal'nu spravu”; “Kryminal'ne provadzhennia shchodo kerivnytstva”; “HPU vidkryla provadzhennia proty”; “Spivrobitnykiv NABU vyklykaly na dopyt”; “Lutsenko oholosyv ahentiv NABU”; “Lutsenko khoche zminyty zakon”; and “Lutsenko anonsuvav cherhovyi ‘siurpriz’.” A particularly damaging incident occurred in November 2017, when PGO and SBU operatives “disrupted a NABU corruption investigation into the State Migration Service by publishing the data of NABU undercover agents, blowing their cover. The agents were arrested and charged with provoking an official to take a bribe, which the NABU denies.” Sukhov, “Lutsenko Says NABU Investigating.” For details, see “V NABU opryliudnyly video”; “NABU opublikovalo rozmovu detektyva”; “Ahent NABU namahavsia daty”; and “Hlava SBU vpershe prokomentuvav.”

40. Sukhov, “Lutsenko Says NABU Investigating”; “Sytnyk vyznav, shcho HPU”; Mostova, “Dyrektor NABU Artem Sytnyk”; Sukhov, “NABU Says Kholodnytsky Blocking”; and Trepak, “Kholodnyts'kyi & Sytnyk: fatal'ni pomylky.”

41. “Poroshenko vymahaie prypynyty konflikt.”

42. “How Ukrainian Corruption Fighters”; and earlier, Kryvtsun, “NABU ta HPU: borot'ba”; and Kryvtsun, “HPU i NABU: kinets' ‘shou’?” See also Ogarkova, “Why Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption.”

43. Makarenko, “‘War of Anti-Corruptionists’ Intensifies.”

44. “Sered zatrymanykh u 2017.” For some similar earlier data, see Marusov, Anti-Corruption Policy, 7.

45. “Holovu NAZK zvynuvatyly”; “Solomatina zaiavyla pro zaboronu”; Bratushchak, “Vykryval'nytsia NAZK vs ‘kurator’”; and “NAZK podalo v sud.”

46. Molchanova, “Tsynichne ne vyhadaiesh”; and “Z'iavylys' dokazy bezdiial'nosti NAZK.” Based on the curricula vitae of those selected for investigation in connection with irregularities in their e-declarations of assets, it seems that this constitutes more a means of dealing with the president’s opponents than of genuinely curbing corruption. Liemienov, “Druziam use, voroham zakon.”

47. Tsentr Razumkova, “Sotsiolohichne opytuvannia [2016]”; and Kyivs'kyi mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiolohii, “Ukrains'ke suspil'stvo za 25 rokiv.”

48. “Posly krain ‘Velykoi simky’”; Trach, “Dzhovanni Kessler: Iakshcho NABU”; Cohen, “Don’t Mess With Kyiv’s Activists”; Ash, “IMF Stiffens Spine on Anti-Corruption”; Sengupta, “Corruption Overshadows Ukraine”; and Reanimatsiinyi paket reform, “Antykoruptsiini reformy idut' u zvorotnomu.”

49. Ralchev, “Role of Civil Society” on southeastern Europe; and Marat, “March and After” on Kyrgyzstan, are exemplars.

50. Olimpieva and Pachenkov, “Corrupt Intermediaries in Russia.”

51. Schmidt, “Anti-Corruption.”

52. Mungiu-Pippidi, “Experience of Civil Society,” 11 and 21–2.

53. Kleenmann, “European Neighbourhood Policy”; and Guasti, “Development of Citizen Participation.”

54. Kapronczay, “War on NGOs.”

55. “In some Balkan and Caucasus countries it is quite concerning to find very corrupt governments as main sponsors of chief anti-corruption organizations. Even when such major problems do not develop, NGOs which act as service providers to the administration tend to become ‘expert’ NGOs and fail to achieve the grassroots mobilization needed in anti-corruption work.” Mungiu-Pippidi, “Experience of Civil Society,” 24.

56. Sadiku, “Civil Society and Anti-Corruption.”

57. Grødeland, “Public Perceptions of Corruption.”

58. Grimes, “Contingencies of Societal Accountability,” 381.

59. Ibid., 397.

60. Ibid., 397–8.

61. Tavits, “Clarity of Responsibility”; Schatz, “Fighting Corruption with Social”; Mungiu-Pippidi, Quest for Good Governance, 159; Andion, Moraes, and Gonsalves, “Civil Society Organizations”; and Themudo, “Impact of Civil Society.”

62. Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory; Edwards, Oxford Handbook of Civil Society; and Edwards, Civil Society. On the view of civil society as a misapprehension of the political, see Bartolini, Political, 7–10.

63. Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 564.

64. Edwards, “Introduction,” 4.

65. Howard, “Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe”; and Stoner-Weiss, “Monitory Versus Managed Democracy.”

66. Palyvoda et al., Defining Civil Society, 26.

67. Ghosh, “In Search of Sustainability,” 2–4; and Palyvoda et al., Defining Civil Society, 20–1.

68. Ghosh, “In Search of Sustainability,” 4; Palyvoda et al., Defining Civil Society, 5, 21; and Solonenko, “Ukrainian Civil Society.”

69. Palyvoda et al., Defining Civil Society, 22.

70. Ibid., 20, 22.

71. Ibid., 27.

72. Ibid., 38.

73. Worschech, “New Civic Activism,” 29.

74. Ibid., 27, 43.

75. Palyvoda et al., Defining Civil Society, 16–17 and 27–8. Palyvoda et al. define public organizations, based on the legal description, as “voluntary organizations … for the implementation and protection of rights and freedoms, and who work for (or serve) the interests of the public.” Ibid., 27.

76. Ibid., 38.

77. United States Agency for International Development et al., 2017 Civil Society Organization is my source for this entire paragraph.

78. Ibid., 219; and Ghosh, “In Search of Sustainability,” 6.

79. “At the national level, the biggest focus in 2017 was on anti-corruption efforts, pension reform, judicial matters, education, health, electoral reform, and decentralization. However, CSOs faced difficulties advocating at the national level for issues related to electoral reform, repeal of e-declarations for activists, and anti-corruption reform, largely because of the absence of political will to address these topics. Meanwhile, advocacy at the local level improved as authorities became more willing to pursue reforms.” United States Agency for International Development et al., 2017 Civil Society Organization, 224.

80. “During the year, RPR worked in seven major areas: judicial and anti-corruption reforms, decentralization, reform of public administration and law enforcement agencies, election law reform, and key economic transformations. It engaged with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process and managed to advocate for the adoption of some reforms and important laws, including ones related to education, health, and pension reforms.” Ibid., 225. See also Nitsova, Pop-Eleches, and Robertson, Revolution and Reform, 5.

81. United States Agency for International Development et al., 2017 Civil Society Organization, 227.

82. Vallie, Koruptsiia: Zanepad sotsial'noho kapitalu, 194.

83. Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop, Analysis of Civil Society. My paragraph is based on this source.

84. Ibid., 10. “The strongest example of government resistance to reform efforts is through the corrupt judicial system. Several organizations cited examples in which corrupt courts directly targeted civil society groups to prevent reform or otherwise took action to limit civil society influence in government. However, this is viewed as happening much less frequently in recent years.” Ibid.

85. “Sustainability is defined as the ability of CSOs to pursue their missions and strategic plans in the long term effectively, regardless of international donor funding.” Ibid., 19.

86. “When asked to approximate the number of local CSOs that are fake, virtually all of the CSO representatives said ‘the majority’ or ‘most’ were fake. A CSO leader of IRF in Odesa went so far as to say that 75 percent of the more than 10,000 CSOs registered in Odesa are fake.” Ibid., 5. IRF is the International Renaissance Foundation, a Ukrainian NGO founded in 1990 by George Soros.

87. “According to the Ukrainian Unified National Register of Companies and Organizations (UUNRCO), there were 80,461 public associations, 1,254 associations of citizens, 25,223 religious organizations, 27,601 trade unions, 311 creative unions, 17,726 charity organizations, and 1,552 self-organized bodies registered in Ukraine as of January 1, 2018.” United States Agency for International Development et al., 2017 Civil Society Organization, 220; and cf. Table 2 here.

88. Cleary, “Half Measures,” 16–20.

89. Grimes, “Contingencies of Societal Accountability,” 389–97. Incidentally, political participation and media freedom have also been identified as critical by other researchers independently. See, for instance, Edwards, Civil Society, 118–21; and Stoner-Weiss, “Monitory Versus Managed Democracy,” 133–4. Note, however, that external assistance is not included as one of Grimes’s crucial elements, a point taken up later.

90. On the basis of examining two samples (40 and 118 countries, respectively) regarding the non-profit sector and civil liberties, from 2000 to 2010, the author’s “findings lend compelling support to the hypothesis that press freedom conditions the effect of civil society on corruption … Where the press is free, civil society organizations are better able to uncover and expose corruption as well as mobilize public support against it.” Themudo, “Reassessing the Impact,” 79. “Press freedom,” he reasons, “should be an important condition for the ability of civil society to impact corruption through a public pressure mechanism. By helping to provide a wide-reaching platform for civil society groups’ anti-corruption message, press freedom plays a key part in the creation of the political will needed to change the institutional arrangements and the deep-seated culture of impunity that commonly accompanies widespread corruption.” Ibid., 69.

91. Ibid., 82.

92. Freedom House, “Press Freedom in Ukraine.”

93. Sushko and Prystayko, “Ukraine: Country Profile,” 8.

94. Ibid. See also Dyczok, “Threats to Free Speech.”

95. Sushko and Prystayko, “Ukraine: Country Profile,” 8.

96. “Sud areshtuvav kerivnyka ‘RIA’.” For some other examples, see Bentzen, “Media Freedom Trends 2017,” 7; Freedom House, “Press Freedom in Ukraine”; and Talant, “World Press Freedom Day.”

97. Waal, “Fighting a Culture of Corruption,” 2; and Freedom House. “Press Freedom in Ukraine.”

98. Budivska and Orlova, “Between Professionalism and Activism,” 142.

99. Ibid., 152. The troubled state of the media in Ukraine is spelled out also in Vannay, Ukraine, which ends (p. 5) with the categorical and rather pessimistic conclusion that “all current government actions regarding the media are designed to limit media freedom and lower journalism standards even further, at a time when a communication channel linking all the inhabitants of Ukraine is much needed.”

100. Bentzen, “Media Freedom Trends 2017,” 6. On the Freedom House scale, where a higher score means less press freedom, and vice versa, Ukraine’s scores for the following selected years were, correspondingly: 60 in 2002; 59 in 2012; 63 in 2014; and 53 in 2017. Freedom House, “Ukraine,” 2002; Freedom House, “Ukraine,” 2012; Freedom House, “Ukraine,” 2014; and Freedom House, “Press Freedom in Ukraine.”

101. Reporters Without Borders, “Ukraine: At the Crossroads.” In 2019, it went down a notch to 102nd place. World Press Freedom Index, “Index Details.”

102. Grimes, “Contingencies of Societal Accountability,” 389.

103. Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan, 11. Original emphasis.

104. Robertson, Theory of Party Competition, 3; and Powell, Contemporary Democracies, 177–84. For instances where such measures are used, see Taşkin, “Voter Turnout in Turkey,” 476; Freire, Martins, and Meirinho, “Electoral Rules,” 197–8; and Hinchliffe and Lee, “Party Competition and Conflict,” 179–83.

105. Fedorenko, Rybiy, and Umland, “Ukrainian Party System.” The rest of my paragraph draws freely on this source.

106. For domestic Ukrainian political commentary amplifying some of these features, see, for instance: Kapsamun, “Chomu v Ukraini nemaie?”; “Naikrashcha partiia”; Kuchyns'kyi, “Za vse khoroshe”; Malko, “Partiina kryza”; and Karmazina, “Partii v Ukraini.”

107. Fedorenko, Rybiy, and Umland, “Ukrainian Party System,” 615.

108. Ibid., 618.

109. Ibid., 628.

110. Grimes, “Contingencies of Societal Accountability,” 389.

111. Berliner, “Political Origins of Transparency,” 480.

112. FreedomInfo.org, “Ukraine Parliament Adopts Access.” “The 2011 law on access to public information, reinforced by a number of other laws,” Freedom House commented, “is considered one of the best of its kind in Europe, though implementation remains problematic.” Freedom House, “Press Freedom in Ukraine.”

113. FreedomInfo.org, “Amendments Approved to Law”; and Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, “Latest Amendments in Legislation.”

114. FreedomInfo.org., “Ukraine Passes Open Data.”

115. FreedomInfo.org., “Transparency International Evaluates Five.”

116. Ibid.

117. Another is the ProZorro public procurement system involving a switch from paper to electronic and openly accessible, as well as saving the government an estimated $60 billion to date.

118. Prokopenko, “Why Ukraine’s Major Achievement.” One sabotage technique, she says, is by undermining the selection of an independent technical auditor, which opens the way for the agency – seen as clearly subservient to the regime – to select an auditor at its own discretion, probably from a government service or affiliated company. Thus the government would be auditing itself. The other is a draft law which would “exempt from the e-declaration requirement nearly all law enforcement officials and the employees of other state agencies, including prosecution bodies, Security Service, National Police, State Bureau of Investigation, National Anti-Corruption Bureau, State Fiscal Service, the diplomatic service, military officers of the armed forces, State Special Communications Service, state criminal-executive service, tax police, command staff of civil protection bodies, and officials of other state agencies and local self-governing bodies.” Ibid.

119. Schaaf and Cooper, “NGOs Need EU Help”; Amnesty International, “Ukraine: Authorities Must Stop”; FIDH, “Ukraine: Stop Persecution”; Transparency International Secretariat, “Persecution of Anti-Corruption Activists”; Makarenko, “Government vs Civil Society”; Makarenko, “Venice Commission, G7 Slam”; “EK vymahaie vid Ukrainy’”; “Khan rozkrytykuvav proval skasuvannia”; “‘U deputativ shkurnyi interes’”; “Rada vidkhylyla prezydents'kyi proekt”; and Rohachuk and Sukha, “My ikh dushyly-dushyly.”

120. Nitsova, Pop-Eleches, and Robertson, Revolution and Reform.

121. Ibid., 10.

122. “Konstytutsiinyi sud skasuvav stattiu”; Grytsenko, “Media: Constitutional Court Abolishes”; Bonner, “Transparency International”; Khilobok, “Zlochyn i kara”; Tsentr protydii koruptsii, “Zakryttia 65 sprav NABU”; “Konstytutsiinyi Sud dyskredytuvav sebe”; and Interfax-Ukraine, “NABU on Constitutional Court’s.” In response, apparently anticipating the IMF-related consequences, Poroshenko hastily introduced a bill to re-legalize such penalties. “Koruptsioneriv sadytymut' na p'iat'.”

123. Hale, Patronal Politics; Kudelia, “Corruption in Ukraine; and Huss, “Perpetual Cycle of Political Corruption.”

124. United States Agency for International Development, “Civil Society and Media.”

125. Ibid.

126. In a survey conducted in May 2018, 26% of respondents identified the mass media and journalists as most active in fighting corruption; 11% named NABU; and only 1% identified the courts. For a full account of all aspects of the promise and challenges facing the media in Ukraine, see the Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop study, Analysis of Civil Society, 36–50.

127. Internews, Media Freedom in Ukraine.

128. For the 24 countries common to both tables, Spearman’s rho, the coefficient of rank-order correlation, is +0.63, significant at p < .01, meaning that the probability of a chance relationship is less than one in 100.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bohdan Harasymiw

Bohdan Harasymiw is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Calgary, and Senior Advisor to the Contemporary Ukraine Studies Programme at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. As a Sovietologist, he specialized in the study of the Soviet political elite. Since 1991 he has turned his attention to democratic transitions, and is author of Post-Communist Ukraine (2002). His current research focuses on crime, corruption, and law enforcement. A long-time member of the Canadian Association of Slavists, he served as its president in 1980–81, and program chair in 2016. During 2017–21, he is a member of the provincial Advisory Council on Alberta–Ukraine relations. His very first published scholarly article on the Soviet political patronage system, the nomenklatura, celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2019.