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ABSTRACT
This article examines the 2020 election and ongoing protest movement in Belarus by comparing them to the contested election in Bolivia (2019) that led to the overthrow of Evo Morales and his MAS party. In each case, a contested election brought about widespread street protests, which called into question the legitimacy of the governing regime. However, only in Bolivia do we see a turnover in state power. In Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka has defied social movement protests and maintained control of the state. This article analyzes the role of the police and military forces and the geopolitical relations of each country and argues that, unlike Bolivia, where Morales’s key military allies defected, the Belarusian government has managed to stay in power with the combination of strong coercive capacity and the support of a regional “black knight” – Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Such findings open the way for cautious prognoses for the ongoing protests in Belarus.
RÉSUMÉ
L'article examine l’élection de 2020 et le mouvement de protestation en cours en Biélorussie et les compare la situation à l’élection disputée en Bolivie (2019), qui a abouti à la défaite d’Evo Morales et de son parti MAS. Dans chaque cas, lélection disputée a provoqué de nombreuses manifestations qui ont remis en question la légitimité du régime au pouvoir. Mais un changement du pouvoir n’a eu lieu qu’en Bolivie. En Biélorussie, Alexandre Loukachenko a défié les protestations des mouvements sociaux et maintenu le contrôle de l’État. L’article analyse le rôle joué par les forces de l’ordre et les forces militaires, ainsi que les relations géopolitiques de chaque pays. Les auteurs affirment que, contrairement à la Bolivie, où les alliés clé de Morales ont fait défection, le gouvernement biélorusse est resté au pouvoir grâce à une forte capacité de coercition et au soutien d’un « chevalier noir » régional – la Russie de Vladimir Poutine. De telles conclusions ouvrent la voie à un pronostic prudent concernant les protestations en cours en Biélorussie.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Weber, From Max Weber, 78.
2. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 15.
3. Levitsky and Way, “Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion,” 393.
4. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Tolstrup, “Studying a Negative”; Tolstrup, Russia vs. the EU; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
5. Tolstrup, “Black Knights and Elections,” 678.
6. The 1952 National Revolution was a popular uprising that overturned Bolivia’s pre-existing oligarchic regime, seeking to implant a form of mass democratic politics and transform the largely agrarian society’s feudal relations of production in the countryside. The 1952 National Revolution set the parameters for what is now contemporary Bolivia. See, for instance, Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins; Grindle and Domingo, Proclaiming Revolution; Gotkowitz, Revolution for Our Rights; Klein, Orígenes de la revolución; Lora, La Revolución Boliviana; Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution; Rivera Cusicanqui, Oprimidos pero no vencidos; John, Bolivia’s Radical Tradition; and Zavaleta Mercado, Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia.
7. Hylton and Thompson, Revolutionary Horizons.
8. Farthing and Kohl, Evo’s Bolivia.
9. Santiago, When Movements Become Parties.
10. Bautista, Chávez, and Chávez, La Victoria Indígena.
11. McNeish, “Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity.”
12. Prada Alcoreza, Miseria de la geopolítica; Rivera Cusicanqui, Mito y desarrollo.
13. Salazar Lohman, Se han adueñado.
14. Organization of American States, “Preliminary Report,” 94.
15. Organización de los Estados Americanos, “Análisis de Integridad.”
16. Lehoucq, “Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt,” 138.
17. Shipani, “Tension Rises in Bolivia.”
18. Lehoucq, “Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt,” 139.
19. Molina, “Bolivia: ¿golpe.”
20. Slattery, “How Evo Morales Lost.”
21. Postero, Indigenous State; Goodale, Revolution in Fragments.
22. The white-red-white flag was originally adopted in 1918 by the Belarusian People’s Republic. The republic lasted for just a few months. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the white-red-white tricolour became the flag of independent Belarus. In 1995, however, Lukashenka restored the green and red flag of Soviet Belarus (albeit without the hammer and sickle), thereby making the white-red-white flag a symbol of resistance to his rule.
23. Bekus, “Belarus’s Winding Path.”
24. Razumovskaya, “Belarus Is Emerging.”
25. Balmaceda, “Living the High Life.”
26. Kulakevich, “Belarus Government.”
27. Yaromich, “PPE for the People.”
28. Aleksejeva, “‘People’s Quarantine’.”
29. Charter 97, “Belarusian Spring.”
30. Ash, “Election Trap.” The Belarusian People’s Republic, the first independent state unit of Belarusians, was proclaimed on 25 March 1918 and lasted until 1 January 1919, when the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was declared.
31. Silitski, “Preempting Democracy.”
32. “Lukashenko’s Opponent Viktor Babariko”; Human Rights Centre “Viasna,” “Siarhei Tsikhanouski”; “Former Belarusian Presidential Candidate.”
33. “Tens of Thousands Rally”; “‘We Love, We Can’”; “Another Record.”
34. Lukashenka was declared president with 76% of the vote in 2001, 83% in 2006, 80% in 2010, and 83% in 2015.
35. Pravaabaronchy tsentr “Viasna,” “Administratyuny peras′led.” The figure is current as of 18 June 2021.
36. Ilyushina and Khurshudyan, “In Belarus’s Withering Crackdowns.”
37. See note 35 above.
38. Żochowski, “Belarus: A Police State.”
39. Global Firepower, “2021 Military Strength Ranking.”
40. Burkovskii, “Skol′ko v Belarusi militsionerov?”
41. “BYPOL raskryl.”
42. See note 39 above.
43. Aliaksandr Taraikousky, Aliaksandr Vihor, Genadz Shutau, and Raman Bandarenka are considered victims of the protests. The circumstances of the deaths of Kanstantsin Shyshmakou, Mikita Kryutsou, Aliaksandr Dziamidau, and Artsiom Parukau are unknown. Their relatives and friends believe they could have been killed during the protests.
44. See note 35 above.
45. “U.N. Experts Alarmed.”
46. Molina, “La oposición rechaza.”
47. Andean Information Network, “Rough Sketch.”
48. Quoted in Otis, “Veteran President’s Rift.”
49. “Los militares le recuerdan.”
50. Romero, “Fiel a Evo hasta”; “Ministro de Defensa.”
51. iSANS is an international expert initiative established in 2018 and aimed at detecting, analyzing, and countering hybrid threats against democracy, the rule of law, and the sovereignty of states in Eurasia. https://isans.org/about-us-en.
52. “Employment Law in Belarus.” The current (as of 17 June 2021) maternity leave in Belarus consists of 126 paid days (140 if there are medical complications or if two or more children are born) and three years of unpaid maternity leave. If another child is born during these years, the maternity leave entitlement starts again. In addition to salary, law enforcement personnel in Belarus receive monthly and quarterly bonuses, financial assistance with housing, 30–45 days of vacation, medical support, and other benefits depending on the zeal of the employee and his/her experience. International Strategic Action Network for Security, “Situation in Law Enforcement.”
53. “Lukashenka Named the Consequences.”
54. Kłysiński and Żochowski, “Legalisation of Terror.”
55. International Strategic Action Network for Security, “Situation in Law Enforcement.”
56. “Poland Calls for Extraordinary.”
57. Council of the European Union, “Belarus: Declaration.”
58. Kulakevich, “Belarus Plane Hijacking.”
59. US Congress, House of Representatives, “Belarus Democracy.”
60. Organization of American States, “Preliminary Report,” 94.
61. Krygier, “Bolivia Election.”
62. Organización de los Estados Americanos, “Análisis de Integridad.”
63. Cashman et al., “What Happened.”
64. Curiel and Williams, “Bolivia Dismissed Its October Elections.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Tatsiana Kulakevich
Tatsiana Kulakevich is a lecturer at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, as well as a research fellow and affiliate faculty member at the USF Institute on Russia.
Aaron Augsburger
Aaron Augsburger is an assistant professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and an affiliate faculty member at the Institute for the Study of Latin America and the Caribbean at the University of South Florida.