The unexamined student is not worth teaching: preparation, the zone of proximal development, and the Socratic Model of Scaffolded Learning

Abstract

‘Scaffolded learning’ describes a cluster of instructional techniques designed to move students from a novice position toward greater understanding, such that they become independent learners. Our Socratic Model of Scaffolded Learning (‘SMSL’) includes two phases not normally included in discussions of scaffolded learning, the preparatory and problematizing phases. Our article will illuminate this blind spot by arguing that these crucial preliminary elements ought to be considered an integral part of a scaffolding model. If instructors are cognizant of the starting position of students, then students are more likely to develop a proper sense of autonomy. We turn, then, to examples from Socrates, the archetypal teacher, that cast light on the importance of preparation and problematizing for the student. Finally, we address the concern that integrating these preliminary elements into scaffolded learning would unnecessarily complicate a useful and effective pedagogical method. Ultimately, if it is effective and autonomous learners we wish to cultivate in the classroom, then something like SMSL must include preliminary elements that calibrate the instructor’s approach to the members of the class. After all, the unexamined student is not worth teaching.

Keywords:

• Scaffolded learning
• learning theory
• pedagogical preparation
• Socrates

Notes

1. The use of Socrates as a pedagogical archetype is ubiquitous, and his influence as a teacher is widely acknowledged. As Brickhouse and Smith say, ‘Socrates is widely regarded as one of the greatest teachers of all time’ (2000, p. 53). This is echoed by others, such as Mintz who says ‘The Socratic practice of questioning others in order to make them examine their beliefs, has led many to view Socrates as a teacher par excellence’ (2009, p. 476). Numerous attempts to bring Socrates into the field of pedagogy have come about through the years, including Mortimer Adler’s The Paideia Proposal (1982) and Ball and Brewer’s Socratic Seminars in the Block (2000). For a brief, but useful, summary of these movements, see Mintz (2009, pp. 476, 478). Insofar as our project attempts to locate a particular emphasis on Socrates into pedagogical practice and theory, it is not new. However, we hope that the argument presented in this article reflects a unique model of scaffolded instruction that is informed by what we have come to learn from Socrates as a teacher.

2. Philosophers have published on scaffolded learning, providing a variety of innovative ways in which the pedagogical method may be used. For example, Coe (2011; cf. Fishman, 1985, 1989) has illustrated an efficacious way of introducing scaffolding in lower division philosophy classrooms to show students how writing assignments are a part of the practice of intellectual maturity. Concepción (2004) has introduced some strategies novices might employ to improve their comprehension of an argument appearing in a philosophical text. Finally, Biondi (2008) has summarized guidelines for how instructors might function as an exemplar of philosophical engagement.

3. Interestingly, a number of prominent scholars of Plato and Socrates seem not to think the exchange is important enough to include in discussions of knowledge as recollection. The exchange is not examined at all by Fine (1992), Nehamas (1998), Scott (1995), or Vlastos (1965), the first bit is not included as part of the illustration by Moravcsik (1994).

4. Translation is that from Cooper, ed. (1997).

5. This aspect of our discussion, prima facie, resembles the notion of the doxastic requirement explicated by Vlastos (1983) and further developed by scholars such as Benson (2000). Equating these with our notion of a ‘shared starting point’ would, however, be a mistake. Perhaps closer is Fine’s (1999a) in Fine (1999b) notion of dialectical requirement, which she describes as follows: ‘If [an argument] is to be genuinely dialectical, then, as Plato explains in the Meno (75d), it should only use claims that are (believed to be) true, and that the interlocutor accepts’ (Fine, 1999, p. 217). While these various formulations of the requirement emphasize the importance for Socrates of examining beliefs genuinely held by his interlocutors, in order to truly examine them and their own lives as informed by genuinely held beliefs (a point emphasized by Vlastos (1983, pp. 35, 36)), our notion of a shared starting point involves Socrates ascertaining background beliefs of his interlocutors (which is where the two notions are similar), but, more importantly for our purposes, Socrates determining the cognitive and conceptual capacities and repertoires of his interlocutors. This is the crucial point for instructors to observe, and is essential for establishing the lower bounds of the ZPD.

6. Socrates is here making a distinction between learning and recollecting, which is, of course, important for consideration of Plato’s ‘theory of recollection’. There has been a good deal of scholarly work on the claim that all learning is simply recollecting. See, for example, Scott (2006). We are simply ignoring the majority of this issue.

7. A similar point seems to be raised by Wittgenstein (2001) in Philosophical Investigations, Pt. 2, XI. He writes: ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him’. Incorporating Wittgenstein’s quotation into our thesis, the point seems to be this: even if a lion could speak English and communicate with us using a common language, there still would be ways in which we would not comprehend what the lion said because our starting points, our experiences (lion v. human experience), would be so different that we would be incapable of robust communication.

8. There is much debate on how earlier and later dialogues of Plato differ, but we will not pursue our interpretation of that discussion here. Suffice it to say, that interested readers could refer to Kraut, 1992.