Emancipation, revolutionary nationalism, and “everything under the sun”: Chinese internationalism, higher education and the search for alternative modernity

Introduction

Since the 1970s the internationalization of China’s higher education (HE) system has been driven by a desire for modernization through economic reform, to be precise, HE reform would lay the foundation for “the four modernizations” - industry, agriculture, defense and science/technology (Yang, 2016). Moreover, the internationalization of HE in China has been accomplished through three major avenues – study abroad, integrating an international element to teaching and learning, and transnational cooperation programs with foreign universities (Yang, 2016). However, this oversimplified accounting of the oft cited, yet vaguely understood notion of internationalization does not begin to encompass the theoretical, historical, and cultural depth to which this process owes its current manifestation. To say that Chinese internationalism is merely the aforementioned process of internationalization would be to misunderstand not only the past and present trajectory of Chinese modernization, but also the ostensible future development of the global international order. Thus, this article aims to highlight the foundational nature of Chinese internationalism as alternative modernity, rooted in a modernist Marxist concern for human emancipation, undergirded by Maoist revolutionary nationalism turned rational pragmatism, and epistemologically guided by the reemergence of Chinese culturalism - represented by Tianxia, a Sino-centric global reimagining of the current liberal international order.

Burning the old ways: Ideological reconstruction

China’s history is alleged to stretch back 5000 years, where at least twice in its history - at the beginning of China’s unification under Qin Shi Huang (Fang, 2015) and during the Cultural Revolution under Chairman Mao (Dikötter, 2017), the burning of books was used to signify a transition from the old traditional and feudal ways of the past, towards a newly unified China, the latter of which aimed to cement Maoist Thought as the guiding ideology of the republic (Jian, 2019). One of the many misguided reforms brought about during Chairman Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), was an ideologically revisionist cultural movement by the CCP known as the “Smash the Four Olds” campaign (1966). On August 18^th, during the first months of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, a Marshall of the PRC, gave a speech at a massive rally (with Chairman Mao seated next to him) in which the CCP called on Red Guard student revolutionaries to “Smash the Four Olds” – old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas (Dikötter, 2017; Mittler, 2013). The campaign against the “Four Olds” can be summarized as follows:

The Red Guards vandalized bookstores, libraries, religious buildings, museums, historical sites and private homes, and even destroyed family altars and ancestral tablets. They physically beat and killed large numbers of people they accused of being bourgeois, especially those who had had contact with Western people and Western education, and burned their books, artworks and furniture (Perkins, 2013, p. 109).

Sima Qiang, a Chinese historian of the early Han dynasty, stated that for Qin Shi Huang, the erasure of history was perpetrated so as “to make the common people ignorant and to see to it that no one in the empire used the past to criticise the present” (Keay, 2008, p. 97). However, a primary objective of both the “Smash the Four Olds” campaign and the Cultural revolution itself, was an ideological reconstruction of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through a literal and physical destruction of the old feudal and bourgeois traditions, which were seen as threatening the ideological uniformity and continued development of Mao’s socialist revolution (Dikötter, 2017; Perkins, 2013). While not all of them can be said to be as dramatic as these two examples, the PRC’s 90-year history has witnessed numerous significant ideological reconstructions.

From revolutionary nationalism to national security

Marxism can be seen as a critique of capitalist modernity, a search for modernity which aims to resolve the contradictions of capitalism and liberate the proletariat, at once concerned with alternative modernity while being fatefully “locked up” or enmeshed within the capitalist superstructure it wishes to more fully and deeply modernize (Liu, 1995; Wu, 2018b). Some scholars have argued that China’s socialist revolution was primarily a transculturation of Soviet-style socialist modernity (Li, 2012). However, Maoist thought, which absorbs the modern thought and language of Marxism, can be construed more as a search for alternative modernity through cultural revolution, articulated through nationalism, embracing modernity yet longing to move beyond it – an interplay of contradictions described as “anti-modern modernism” (Liu, 1995; Wu, 2018b). To be clear “Cultural Revolution” was Mao’s invention to counter a historical materialism which privileged economic determination in developing modernity (Liu, 1995). The first few decades after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 witnessed a Chinese version of socialist internationalism – revolutionary nationalism, that contained both a Marxist universalist desire for “world revolution” and Maoist penchant for militaristic nationalism (Jian, 2019; Zhimin, 2005). However, in the early 1970s, Mao’s revolutionary nationalism and its ambition toward world revolution would begin to take a back seat to the pursuit of national security, followed in 1978, where for the first time the Eleventh CCP congress prioritized economic modernization and living standards as the top priority of the Chinese government (Zhimin, 2005). This period of “reform and opening up”, as a transformation of Chinese nationalism into a new form of Chinese internationalism can be summarized as follows:

Furthermore, the new policy also abandoned most of the ideological elements in China’s foreign policy. In other words, China’s relationship with other countries would no longer be decided by ideology, but rather by national interest. China therefore could develop a good relationship with any country—regardless of its capitalist or Soviet-style socialist ideology—as long as it did not pose a security threat to China, and could help China’s modernization efforts (Zhimin, 2005).

Setting things right: Emancipation and the science of Mao Zedong thought

A central element of China’s efforts towards initializing this new form of socialist modernization, was a correcting of the sins of the past, or “setting things right”, rebuking the errors Mao had made in his later years (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution), favoring instead a pragmatic reconstruction of party ideology (Zhang, 2015). This meant that a renewed effort was put forth towards repositioning Mao Zedong thought, not as a cult of personality, but rather as a scientific system for dealing with the contradictions inherent within a modernizing socialist society. Mao Zedong thought, rooted in Marxist dialectical materialism, and Soviet pragmatic rationalism, – “practice is the sole standard to examine truth”, now represented both a theoretical and ideological line of the CCP, whose task was now reoriented towards a modernizing socialist concern for the emancipation of economic production, allowing China to “walk a new road according to the actual situation of the country, at greater economic efficiency and in greater favor of the people” (Zhang, 2015). The transition away from revolutionary class struggle towards a historically positioned form of Chinese socialist modernization would continue to rely heavily on Maoist Thought. In particular, Mao’s work - “On Contradiction”, wherein China’s flexible experimentalism and vague policy guidelines (Husain, 2017), seen clearly in Deng Xiaoping’s “feeling the stones to cross the river”, is represented by China’s increasing dedication to a pragmatic, measured, and rational modernization project.

Culturalism: Warding off the barbarians

Governments within the liberal order once rejoiced at China’s transition from revolutionary nationalism towards a pragmatic form of Chinese internationalism, the idea being, that as China became more heavily invested in the protections, rights and great-power authority garnered them through liberal internationalism’s defense of sovereignty, China would move away from authoritarianism towards democratic rule (Ikenberry, 2011). While it was clear that, as its economic and political clout within the system grew, Beijing would attempt to reshape the system to its advantage, the notion still held however that China’s modernization agenda would be best served through a reliance on the pre-established rules, norms, customs, and institutions present within the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2011). Many scholars fundamentally misunderstood China’s system of authoritarian nationalism as a by-product of its recent socialist (see: communist) transformation, rather than stemming from one of the most important ideas in all Chinese political thought - the “Mandate of Heaven”, a Confucian tradition which confers legitimacy to those who rule (Bloom et al. n.d). Moreover, scholars also neglected Chinas’ deeply embedded culturalism, a tradition which dominated China’s approach to foreign relations for over 2000 years (Zhimin, 2005). Chinese culturalism represents the traditional Chinese self-image as “Us” (Huaxia) vis-à-vis the “Other” or barbarians (Yidi), a form of China-centric universalism (Tianxia zhuyi) which mandates a fundamental concern for the preservation of Chinese culture and civilization (Zhimin, 2005). Ironically, rather than conform to the precepts of liberal internationalism, China would maintain its tradition of culturalism, self-rectifying rather than assenting, as it “learned from the barbarian to ward off the barbarian – learning from Western knowledge until it was powerful enough to resume its rightful role as a central power (Yang, 2016).

A destiny shared under the sun

While Chinese internationalism may have deviated somewhat a bit during the 90 years since the founding of the republic, acquiring a Marxist concern for human emancipation, and the Maoist spirit of revolutionary nationalism turned scientific pragmatism, the current epistemology of Chinese Internationalism may be said to inhabit a renewed spirit of Sino-centrism (Tianxia: All under heaven) (Yang, 2016) which harkens back to its traditional culturalist roots. The notion of Tianxia, as China’s possible alternative to liberal internationalism, has been hotly debated since Zhao Tingyang published his treatise, The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution in 2005 (Callahan, 2008). This debate increased in 2013, when President Xi proposed a Community of Shared Future” also known as Community of Common Destiny (CCD) at the 19^th CPC National Congress (Wu, 2018a). However, rather than being met with fear, China’s desire to establish a Sino-centric harmonious world order based on international relationships guided by the Confucian ideals of “self-restraint, mutual respect and mutual accommodation” was lauded internationally, as witnessed by the inclusion of CCD within a 2017 UN Human Rights Council resolution (Wu, 2018a). Further highlighting the readiness of the international community to engage with an alternative to the established international order, China’s BRI, the cornerstone of Chinese Internationalism, has been joined by almost 80 countries across the globe.

Conclusion

China is now mobilizing its vast resources towards an historic restructuring of not just the international order, but also an alternative form of Sino-centric modernity. While looking towards the past for inspiration, Beijing is setting measured, rational goals for the future, highlighting a new form of development known as infrastructuralism (Peters, 2019) to build both physical and ideological institutions in support of those goals. The myriad education initiatives currently playing out all along the Belt and Road, highlight not only China’s continued pursuit of alternative modernity, they also serve as breeding grounds for practical and ideological narrative creation (Peters, 2019), and it is precisely these narratives which will eventually constitute both the true meaning of Chinese internationalism and the future of education.

Benjamin Green
Institute of International and Comparative Education, Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University
[email protected]

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).