Talents and distributive justice: some tensions

Abstract

For much of its modern history, the notion of talent has been associated with the idea of ‘careers open to talent’. Its emancipatory promise of upward social mobility has radically transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of social status itself. Nevertheless, unlike concepts traditionally associated with distributive justice, e.g. fairness, (in)equality, desert, equality of opportunity as well as justice itself, the notion of talent has received only limited examination. This article discusses some of the most pressing problems and challenges arising out of a reductionist understanding of talents’ anatomy and a distorted characterization of their overall distributive value. In particular, it aims to address those issues revolving around talents’ anatomy existing conceptions of distributive justice leave either neglected or outrightly ignored. The introductory part outlines the basic egalitarian conception of equal opportunities and then proceed with the examination of fairness embedded in it. The central part of the paper identifies the key elements of talents’ anatomy. We then discuss some of the implications egalitarianism either leaves out of the discussion or neglects. In particular, we challenge the idea of moral arbitrariness as the key mechanism to discard talents as a form of unfair advantage in the process of competition for advantaged social positions. In the final part, we outline two fundamental problems that call into question the cogency of egalitarian conceptions of talent(s) as a form of unfair disadvantage.

Keywords:

• Talents
• effort
• distributive justice
• meritocratic (in)equality
• education
• moral arbitrariness

Talents and distributive justice: some preliminary considerations

For much of its modern history, the notion of talent has been associated with the idea of ‘careers open to talent’. Its emancipatory promise of upward social mobility has ultimately radically transformed the distribution of advantaged social positions and has had a lasting influence on the very idea of social status itself. In fact, the idea of ‘careers open to talent’ has played an important role in both the American and French Revolution representing one of the most important ‘innovations’ associated with both of them (Carson, 2007). ‘The crucial achievement of the two revolutions’, as Eric Hobsbawm pointed out in The Age of Revolution 1789–1848, ‘was that they opened careers to talent’ (Hobsbawm, 1996: 189). Article 6 of The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen emphasises that all citizens are ‘being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents’. As Rafe Blaufarb emphasizes in his book, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit, ‘the idea of careers open to talent is one of the most enduring legacies of 1789’ (Blaufarb, 2002, p. 2). In fact, ‘openness of all positions in society to talent’ – as highlighted by S.J.D. Green – has been ‘the most radical of the principles of 1789’ (Green, 1989, p. 5).

Besides its inextricable link with the abolition of hereditary privilege and equality of opportunity in general, the notion of talent came to be associated also with several of the most pressing contemporary issues as diverse as brain drain (Brock & Blake, 2015), ‘war for talent’ (Beechler & Woodward, 2009; Michaels et al., 2001), social mobility (Garnett et al., 2008), desert (Sher, 2012), citizenship allocation [e.g. ‘Olympic citizenship’] (Shachar, 2011, 2013), migration policy (Cerna & Chou, 2019), the ‘ownership’ of talents (Goldman, 1987), personal identity (Petrović, 2009), the American Dream (Hauhart, 2016), higher education (Morehouse & Busse, 2014), ‘talent spotting’ in terrorist recruitment (Bloom, 2017), human resources management (Gallardo-Gallardo & Thunnissen, 2016) neoliberalism (Brown & Tannock, 2009), the ‘ownership’ of natural resources (Armstrong, 2017), talent management (Lewis & Heckman, 2006), ‘ability taxation’ (Hasen, 2006; Lockwood et al., 2012; Markovits, 2003; Roemer, 1996 [ch. 6]; Zelenak, 2006), education of the gifted (Merry, 2008) etc.

Given the vast array of areas addressing a particular aspect of talents, the scholarly literature is considerably variegated. At the same time, the spectrum of positions over talents ranges from overly idealistic [and rather naïve] to exceedingly pessimistic. On the one hand, part of the academic as well as the business community champions talents as the next currency of the global meritocracy [ultimately to replace capital]. For example, the notion of talent has played a pivotal role in China’s central governement Thousand Talent Program whose main aim has been to recruit both the ‘best and the brightest’ foreign researchers as well as to provide an incentive for Chinese scientists living abroad to return home (e.g. Bentao, 2011; Cao, 2008).¹ Other initiatives aiming to promote the cultivation of talents have mushroomed elsewhere, e.g. the ‘Office for Talent’ initiative of the British government. Moreover, the idea of talent has been a key policy priority for the OECD in the area of global governance (Tuccio, 2019). Interestingly enough, talents have also become a leading ‘currency’ in the entertainment industry as TV shows throughout the globe (e.g. You’ve got talent, American Idol, Britain’s got talent) have incorporated talent as their central marketing idea (Littler, 2017).

On the other hand, some scholars of a broadly egalitarian orientation, e.g. proponents of radical egalitarianism and the associated idea of radical equality of opportunity (Segall, 2013), view talents as a form of ‘unfair advantage’. Given the fact that talents are a morally arbitrary circumstance of one’s identity, they have derived the conclusion that individuals may not deserve the results of the ‘lottery of birth’. As Harry Brighouse explicates the radical conception of educational equality, ‘an individual’s prospects for educational achievement should be a function neither of that individual’s level of natural talent or social class background but only of the effort she applies to education’ (2010: 29). On this interpretation, any outcome in the process of competition for advantaged social positions that are either exclusively or partially the result of talents is therefore questionable as by holding a particular talent, one may be ‘unfairly’ advantaged. Yet, this bold move in eradicating talents from the meritocratic equation has one important shortcoming: a simplistic and reductionist understanding of talents.

This paper identifies some of the most pressing problems and challenges arising out of an oversimplified understanding of talents’ multifaceted nature and a distorted characterization of their overall distributive value. In particular, it aims to address those issues revolving around talents’ basic characteristics existing conceptions of distributive justice leave either neglected or outrightly ignored. The introductory part of the paper situates the discussion over talents by presenting the ‘standard’ egalitarian conception of equality of opportunity and the associated idea of fairness embedded in it. The central part aims to elucidate the multifaceted nature of talents and their anatomy. In particular it aims to advance a dynamic understanding of talents as a hybrid and multifaceted phenomenon. In the final part of this paper, we outline two fundamental problems that call into question the cogency of the radical egalitarian conception of educational (in)equality. Based on the explication of talents’ anatomy and the two problems identified as having a considerable impact on our understanding of the relationship between talents and effort, talents should eventually not be rejected as an ‘unfair advantage’.

Equality of opportunity and fairness

As a form of ‘fair competition among individuals for unequal positions in society’ (Fishkin, 1983: 1) and as ‘a normative standard for regulating certain types of competition’ (Jacobs, 2004: 12), the idea of equal opportunity has a long and venerable history. As James Fishkin emphasizes, equality of opportunity represents ‘the central doctrine in modern liberalism for legitimating the distribution of goods in society’ (Fishkin, 1983: 1). Part of its on-going charm is undoubtedly linked to its appealing rhetoric and straightforward message. As its advocates argue, equality of opportunity is one of the basic mechanisms for a fair distribution of advantaged social positions. One of its most distinctive characteristics has been a set of [interconnected] commitments associated with fairness, i.e.

• [c1] an advantaged social position is to be granted to the best performing person [the assumption on a meritocracy-based conception of excellence];

• [c2] the distribution of advantaged social positions according to merit is mutually beneficial to both the winner and the loser [the assumption of mutual advantage];

• [c3] the process of competition for advantaged social positions should only take into account those aspects of an individual’s characteristics that are the result of his effort or choices but not those factors which he has no merit or is not responsible for [the voluntaristic assumption about the nature of the currency of equality];

• [c4] the individual is solely responsible for the outcome of the process of competing for an advantaged social position and the associated change of an opportunity into an advantage [the assumption of an instrumental nature of transitivity];

• [c5] the rules of competition should be associated exclusively with the performance of tasks associated with the process of competition for advantaged social positions [the assumption about the excellence of the process of competition for advantaged social positions];

• [c6] the outcome of the process of competition for advantaged social positions is legitimate as far as the process of competition is fair [the assumption about the fairness of the process of competition for advantaged social positions];

• [c7] differences between individuals that are independent of individuals’ choices should be neutralized and the undeserved disadvantages [somehow] compensated for [the assumption about the unfairness of morally arbitrary circumstances].

To sum up: (in)equality arising out of the process of competition for advantaged social position is legitimate as long as this process is fair. One of the most important elements of the fairness argument is the voluntaristic assumption about the nature of the currency of equality [c3]. Among the most important aspects distinguishing different conceptions of equality of opportunity is the very nature of what represents an unfair advantage. The egalitarian conception of fairness is based on the distinction between forms of inequality that are beyond an individual’s will [involuntary aspect of inequality] and those forms of inequality that are the result of individuals’ choices and effort. As Larry Temkin emphasizes, it would be both unjust and unfair, ‘when one person is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own’ (Temkin, 1993: 13).

While there are a number of different versions of the fairness argument they all share a common ideal, as Samuel Scheffler argues, what ‘inequalities in the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if they derive from the choices that people have voluntarily made, but that inequalities deriving from unchosen features of people’s circumstances are unjust.’ (Scheffler, 2003: 5). This idea, as Shlomi Segall points out, is based on the assumption ‘that is unfair for one person to be worse off than another due to reasons beyond her control’ (Segall, 2008: 10). A basic question that arises here is to determine ‘which factors should be counted among people’s circumstances and which should be subsumed within the category of choice’ (Scheffler, 2005: 6).

That natural differences are undeserved – as Alan Goldman points out – ‘means that they should not in themselves be the basis for differential rewards’ (Goldman, 1987: 378).² As S.J.D. Green emphasizes in his article ‘Taking Talents Seriously’:

Individuals do not deserve those gifts because they did not earn them; they are not the product of the effort, or the virtue, or the moral worthiness of those who command them. They are privileges, gratuitously endowed. More important, they are unequally distributed privileges, and the inequality of that distribution is a fundamental and incorrigible cause for the unfairness of the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare between persons in a political community. (Green, 1988: 206–207)

Based on these observations, advocates of radical egalitarianism come to the conclusion that individuals may not deserve the results of ‘natural lottery’ together with associated benefits [or disadvantages]. ‘What seems bad’ – as Thomas Nagel emphasizes in Equality and Partiality – is not that people should be unequal in advantages or disadvantages generally, but that they should be unequal in the advantages or disadvantages for which they are not responsible (Nagel, 1979, p. 71).

While noble in intent, the radical egalitarian conception of equality of opportunity has problems of its own. One of the most pressing has been its extension of claims for fairness from ‘social’ to ‘natural’ factors that might interfere with the process of competition for advantaged social positions and the legitimacy for whatever outcome might occur. The rejection of the meritocratic conception of educational equality and the adoption of its radical alternative is premised on the conception of talents as an unfair advantage. How therefore to square the requirement of fairness embedded in egalitarian conceptions of equality of opportunity with talents’ moral arbitrariness. It is this simplistic conception of talents based on the ‘lottery of birth’ premise that turns out to be a strategic misstep that ultimately hampers the egalitarian claims for fairness. Is there a more elaborated conception of talents?

The anatomy of talents

In one of his well-known essays, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’, the prominent British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart made ​​an insightful comment on punishment, one of the most controversial and pressing public issues in the UK of the 1950s. As he eloquently emphasized, the ‘[g]eneral interest in the topic of punishment has never been greater than it is at present and I doubt if the public discussion of it has ever been more confused’ (Hart, 2008: 1). Contemporary discussions over talents share much the same fate. Part of this straightforward comparison can be associated with the fact that the notion of talent remains to a large extent absent from the voluminous literature on distributive justice [and related issues]. Unlike concepts traditionally associated with this area of scholarly research, e.g. fairness, (in)equality, desert, equality of opportunity as well as justice itself, the notion of talent has received only limited examination leading to a sort of ‘conceptual ambiguity’ (Robb, 2020: 1).³ Most interestingly perhaps, as Neven Sesardić emphasizes in his article ‘Egalitarianism and Natural Lottery’, talents have only recently ‘came to be regarded as a political problem’ (Sesardic, 1993: 58).

Given the fact that contemporary conceptions of meritocracy rely on an ‘essentialized and exclusionary notion of “talent”’ (Littler, 2017), this negligence of consideration represents an important omission that comes at a considerable price at the practical, policy and theoretical level. As Lucie Cerna and Meng-Hsuan Chou point out in reviewing the scholarly area of talent management and migration studies literature, ‘the lack of conceptual rigor in defining “talent” has real-world implications: it can lead to corrupted practices in internal human resource management, or differentiated policies/packages offered to attract and retain individuals perceived or identified as “talented.” (Cerna & Chou, 2019, p. 7). As they emphasise further,

once a term such as “talent” is loosely defined, this has important consequences for indicator development and measurement. A conceptual looseness can result in diminished purpose of the design process because of the failure to scientifically conceptualize, design, select instruments, and then measure “talent.” As a result, the initial ambiguity and plethora of definitions only contribute to further confusion during the policymaking and design processes for talent management programs. (ibid., p. 17)

The elucidation of the notion of talent is therefore of vital importance not only in this area of scholarly research but for discussions on distributive justice more generally. Most importantly, it requires to raise some basic questions that would help to clarify the characteristic features of talents and its relationship with the other key variable that are part of the meritocratic equation, e.g. what are talents’ most important [and distinctive] characteristic features? In what way talents differ from effort? What is the relationship between these two variables of the meritocratic equation?

Talents’ characteristic features

The first [and perhaps most important] characteristic feature of talents is their non-voluntaristic nature most commonly associated with the idea of moral arbitrariness and the ‘lottery of birth’. In contrast to effort an individual may deliberately chose to ‘invest’ in carrying out a specific task or achieve a particular goal, one’s talents are beyond the volitional power of individuals’ holding them. Talents, as George Sher emphasizes in his article ‘Talents and Choices’ – designate ‘any unchosen ability that has an impact on how well or badly its possessor is capable of performing any task’ (Sher, 2012, p. 16). On this interpretation, talents are largely [or even exclusively] the result of factors that are beyond an individual’s control. In fact, no individual can influence which talents one is supposed to possess [and to what extent].

The second characteristic feature associated with talents is their unequal distribution. It is most likely that no two individuals would possess similar or equal talents [or to the same degree]. In fact, any equalization of talents would have as an effect that they would cease to function as an advantage. As Steven R. Smith emphasizes, ‘talents (however they are conceived substantially) are qualities or characteristics that can only be talents if not everyone possesses them to the same degree’ (Smith, 2001, p. 28). Differences in individuals’ ‘natural’ abilities [including talents] are therefore a condition of their social desirability. Actually, an equal distribution of talents among individuals would undermine their overall distributive value as well as function as a possible source of envy between the untalented and the talented [or vice versa] (Christofidis, 2004; Dworkin, 1981). Unlike goods whose equal distribution would have positive effects, the unequal distribution of talents is a fundamental condition for their socially desired status and distributive value.

The third characteristic feature talents share in common is their social status. As Alan Goldman emphasizes, what counts as a talent ultimately ‘depends on social demand at a time for the use of a particular ability or characteristic’ (Goldman, 1987, p. 392). What qualifies as a talent in a given socio-historical circumstance is actually dependent on a variety of different factors. For example, a talent’s social status is to a large extent dependent on how widely a particular characteristic might be available at a given point in time. The inequality of talents, as Douglas Rae points out, ‘is not a phenomenon of nature, but a phenomenon of nature as mediated and reified by human culture. Nature creates a wide variety of human capacities; culture picks out certain of those capabilities to treat as relevant or important’ (Rae, 1983, p. 70 [author’s emphasis]). Talents are therefore not temporally fixed dispositions: what qualifies as a talent in this day and age may not qualify as a talent in another period of time or under other circumstances. What ultimately qualifies as a talent is therefore a socio-historical contingency.

The fourth characteristic feature of talents is their nontransferability. In contrast to individuals’ transferable resources that may be sold, borrowed, inherited or otherwise transferred, talents [like individuals’ other nontransferable characteristics, e.g. handicaps] are both nontransferable and nonalienable (Roemer, 1996, p. 123). This distributive limitation has important implications for the overall perception of talents and has been viewed as one of its characteristic features that raises a range of separate questions. It is due to their nontransferability that talents cannot qualify – at least on a radical egalitarian conception – as a legitimate currency of equality.

Moreover, a talent’s overall value – in contrast to factors such as higher socio-economic status that enables individuals a direct advantage compared to those from a lower socio-economic position – lay in its potential. The advantage a particular talent provides to an individual is therefore not direct, but conditional. As Hillel Steiner emphasizes, ‘talents are labour products: their creation and development requires the application of gestational, nutritional, medical, educational and training services’ (Sardoč, 2019, p. 1394 [emphasis in the original]).

Furthermore, another important feature to be emphasized is talents’ interconnection with effort. While the ‘standard’ understanding of the relationship between talents and effort views the two variables as distinct entities, there are scholars emphasizing that their relationship is far more complex and dynamic. As Alain Trannoy points out, a talent is a ‘cumulative variable’ comprising ‘past-effort, current effort and innate talent’ (Trannoy, 2019, p. 1). At the same time, this relationship between the two variables that are part of the meritocratic conception of educational equality is not a fixed one. A talent, as Trannoy argues, is present in its ‘purest’ form at the beginning of one’s life and over time becomes blurred with effort (2019, p. 2).

There is another important differentiating characteristic between talent and effort that needs to be pointed out. Effort is a type of variable that depends [each time] on an individual’s performance, whereas a talent represents a constant variable or a permanent potential advantage in the set of individuals ‘natural’ abilities. As Alain Trannoy emphasizes, ‘[t]alent is different from luck because the latter is occasional, while talent is recurrent’ (2019, p. 5).

To sum up: talents’ characteristic features explicated above provide a considerably more complex [and puzzling] picture compared to some of the main characterizations in the existing scholarly literature on equality of opportunity. ⁴ In contrast to the ‘standard’ view that uses a simplified and reductionist understanding, talents are neither natural, inborn or fixed [at least in the traditional understanding]. The elaboration of talents as a ‘hybrid’ and ‘fluid’ variable explicated above has important repercussions for our understanding of the requirements of fairness associated with equality of opportunity [in particular the radical egalitarian alternative]. In fact, this shift towards a ‘hybrid’ and ‘fluid’ conception of talent leads to major conceptual repercussions associated with distributive justice. As Rawls emphasizes in A Theory of Justice

The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself. (Rawls, 1971, p. 74).

Conclusion: the triangulation of talent

Acknowledging talents’ multifaceted nature and its complex anatomy leaves scholars of a broadly egalitarian orientation with a set of problems as it undermines one of the most important distinctions associated with fairness and social justice in general, i.e. the distinction between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ inequality. While the rejection of the meritocratic conception of educational equality and the adoption of its radical egalitarian alternative would have important implications for social policy, there are important conceptual issues that are in need of further elucidation. Despite the fact that the meritocratic conception of educational equality is neither ideal nor optimal, the elimination of talents from the equation would actually open several other problems while allegedly solving one. Its reliance on a simplistic conception of talents actually turns out to be a strategic misstep that ultimately hampers its [otherwise legitimate] claims for fairness.

In particular, two problems challenge the cogency of radical equality of opportunity and radical egalitarianism in general, i.e. [i] the delimitation problem and [ii] the disconnection problem. On the one hand, the key challenge associated with the ‘delimitation problem’ lays in setting out criteria that would enable us to determine whether a particular element influencing the process of competition for advantaged social positions is either part of chance or that of choice. This distinction, as George Sher argues in his book Equality for Inegalitarians, enables us ‘to make the cut between just and unjust inequalities’ (Sher, 2011, p. 2–3). On the other hand, the disconnection problem challenges the very relationship between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ inequality and its basic assumption that ‘natural inequalities are caused by differences in natural resources, while social inequalities are caused by differences in social resources’ (Lewens, 2010, p. 270).

Without providing conclusive evidence to these two problems, egalitarianism [at least its radical alternative] looses much (if not all) of its intuitive appeal. As Neven Sesardić emphasizes,

It is ironical that contemporary egalitarians find differences in talents so embarrassing if we recall that, historically, egalitarians themselves demanded the removal of all impediments to the full expression of different natural abilities. So, one of the pillars of the eighteenth century egalitarianism was the thought that persons are entitled to the fruits of the exercise of their personal capacities and talents. (Sesardić, 1993, p. 58).

Conceiving talents primarily as a form of unfair advantage therefore remains trapped in the relation best described by Thomas Nagel in his article ‘Justice and Nature’ ‘between natural unfairness and social injustice’ (Nagel, 1997, p. 304). As he points out, ‘[t]he more one regards nature as a given, the less one will regard society as accountable for those inequalities in whose generation nature plays a central role’ (Nagel, 1997, p. 305).⁵ The basic question is therefore not how to square the requirement of fairness embedded in egalitarian conceptions of equal opportunity with talents’ moral arbitrariness but how to ensure that the ‘race’ for advantaged social positions is fair and inequalities that are the result of a process of competition legitimate as equality of opportunity and inequality are not mutually exclusive.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mitja Sardoč

Mitja Sardož, PhD, is Senior Research Associate at the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana (Slovenia) where he is member of the ‘Educational Research’ research program. He is author of scholarly articles and editor of a number of journal special issues on citizenship education, multiculturalism, toleration, radicalization and violent extremism, equality of opportunity and patriotism. He is Managing Editor of Theory and Research in Education [http://tre.sagepub.com/], Editor-in-chief of The Handbook of Patriotism [http://refworks.springer.com/Patriotism] published by Springer and Editor-in-chief of The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration to be published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Tomaž Deželan

Tomaž Deželan is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana and Advisor to the Rector of the University of Ljubljana for quality assurance and development. He is a research coordinator of the Centre for Social Entrepreneurship at the University of Ljubljana and coordinator of the INOVUP project (www.inovup.si), all-national teaching and learning in higher education initiative. He serves as Quality Assurance Coordinator of EUtopia 2050 European Universities’ initiative and is a member of Advisory Group on Learning and Teaching of the Bologna Follow-Up Group 2018–2020 (BFUG).

Notes

1 For a critical analysis of China's 'governance' of talent and its genealogy, see Zhao (2020). A detailed presentation of China's 'multi-layered talent schemes' including sponsors & targeted talent is elaborated on page 6 of this article.

2 The distinction between 'social' and 'natural' forms of inequality is a complex and problematic one so it cannot be adequately addressed in this article (e.g. Lewens, 2010). For a discussion of justice and nature, see Nagel (1997).

3 A rare exception to this trend include Christman (2015), Dworkin (1981), Steiner (2002), Green (1988), Merry (2008), Meyer (2014), Robb (2020), Roemer (1996), Sadurski (1990), Sesardić (1993), Sher (2012) and Trannoy (2019).

4 The list of talents' characteristic features explicated in this section does not claim to be exhaustive. For an explication of talents' characteristic features present in talent management and migration studies literature., see Cerna and Chou (2019).

5 For a critical examination of Nagel's article 'Justice and Nature', see de los Santos Menéndez (2020).