Learning from exemplars in Confucius’ Analects: The centrality of reflective observation

Abstract

Exemplarism – the view that exemplary people, whom we admire, are the bearers of our moral concepts – presents considerable challenges to the (widely-assumed) place of moral theory in how we learn to be moral. Exemplarism has been garnered by Amy Olberding to articulate a Confucian approach to moral learning. This paper extends Exemplarism by considering how it may be put into practice, based on a seminal Confucian text, the Analects of Confucius. To date, the majority of discussions on Confucian ethics that have brought Confucian philosophy to the attention of Anglophone scholars tend to focus on conceptually-based matters. There remain questions regarding how these values may be inculcated and embodied in our moral lives. Central to our proposal is the practice of reflective observation (guan 觀), comprised by three integrated components: observation, evaluation, and emulation. Observing, reflectively, is important not only for an individual’s acculturation to existing norms and practices but also for how they may subsequently exercise some latitude over their moral practices. Our reflections offer a practical approach to Confucian moral learning. In doing so, we demystify moral learning in Confucianism and open up avenues for future cross-tradition dialogues on moral education.

Keywords:

• Exemplars
• Confucian moral life
• observation
• Confucian pedagogy

How might the Confucian Analects, a 3rd century BCE Chinese text, contribute to our understanding of how we learn to be moral? We offer some reflections on how the Analects approaches moral learning through emulating exemplary people, or behaviours, or actions. This view is situated within Confucian philosophy’s claim that, through their actions and behaviours, those who are morally cultivated will inspire and motivate people to develop morally. There is a noticeable gap in scholarly discussions on this prominent theme in Confucian philosophy, concerning how such modelling may be put into practice. This paper engages in a two-way dialogue with the tenets of Exemplarism – the view that we learn to be moral from observing exemplars – to articulate a distinctively Confucian approach to moral cultivation. Exemplarism, first proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2010, 2017), and garnered by Amy Olberding (2017) to discuss Confucian philosophy, holds that our identification of exemplars is conceptually prior to our theoretical constructions of moral value. This paper has a three-fold aim. First, it proposes that Exemplarism serves as an apt explanatory framework for moral cultivation in Confucian philosophy particularly in the practice-first approach of the Confucian Analects. Second, it bridges the gap in Confucian philosophy scholarship, between Confucian’s philosophy’s moral commitments and its embodied practice. Third, it uses examples from the Analects to help demonstrate how Exemplarism could work in practical terms. Central to our proposal is the practice of reflective observation (guan), which incorporates two organically interwoven aspects: observation and evaluation. To observe reflectively is important not only for an individual’s acculturation to existing norms and practices, but also for how she may subsequently exercise some latitude over her moral practices. We also propose a third component of moral cultivation, the process of emulation, which builds upon the two aspects of guan. Through learning to observe, to evaluate, and to emulate the practices of exemplary people (as well as those of people who are not exemplary), individuals develop perspicacity about moral life.

Our argument is set out in three sections. In the first, we briefly discuss the nature of the text before proceeding to demonstrate how its themes on moral learning are fittingly captured by the framework of Exemplarism. The discussions in the second section bring out the place of guan, reflective observation, in the Analects. There are three parts in this second section. The first two focus on observation and evaluation, two aspects of guan, while the third discusses emulation, which is enabled by guan. In the third section, we conclude with some considerations of the place of the individual and their contributions to the cultural tradition, in Confucian philosophy. Apart from enriching debates in Chinese philosophy, we believe our reflections on the practice of guan are relevant to contemporary debates in two other ways. First, they accentuate the importance of attending to the practicalities of moral development, helping us better appreciate the extent to which our moral lives are shaped by our moral environments. Second, we aim to diversify Anglophone debates on moral learning by challenging the more conceptually-focused discussions we tend to find in Anglophone philosophy, with ideas from a more practice-oriented, non-Western philosophical tradition.

1. The Analects and Exemplarism

The Analects is a loose collection of purported conversations between Confucius and his interlocutors, and extant versions were compiled at least two and a half centuries after Confucius’ death in 479 BCE (see Hunter, 2017, p. 6; Makeham, 1996). That the text is composite, with various versions in circulation from around the 3rd century BCE,¹ compounds the question of its relevance for a contemporary readership. How can a collection of dialogues be philosophically significant?

Our interpretive strategy is aligned with the compositional features of the text: we believe that, generally, the Analects presents views of the exemplary figure Confucius from the eyes of his followers. And, thus, we draw on Exemplarism’s framework to understand Confucius as exemplar. This approach to the text has been established in earlier work by Karyn Lai and Amy Olberding, suggesting that we read the Analects as a log of Confucius’ conversations, rather than prescriptively (Lai, 2007, p. 22; Olberding, 2017, p. 2). Both proposals hold that the text provides models of exemplary responses in various socio-political circumstances, suggesting that readers look at the actions and behaviours of the exemplary figures, with a view to emulating them where appropriate. There are behaviours that are to be avoided as well (5.10; 17.21).² This process of moral suasion does not promote normative principles but rather points readers to examples of human decision and action. In doing so, it does not seek to provide the one definitive view on how life should be lived, but rather invites readers to observe and emulate exemplary actions (5.22).³

What are the key features of moral learning shared by Exemplarism and Confucian philosophy? First, a primary tenet of Exemplarism is that exemplars, rather than doctrines or theoretically-defined values, are the bearers of moral concepts. Exemplarism attends to our encounters with exemplary behaviours or people: ‘Good persons are persons like that, just as gold is stuff like that’ (Zagzebski, 2017, p. 15). In Zagzebski’s view, a person’s encounter with exemplars, rather than our theorising about what makes their behaviours good or virtuous, is the locus of key concepts for our moral lives. In relation to the Analects, Olberding (2017) observes that the function of exemplars is ‘primarily pedagogical,’ meaning that exemplars serve as guidance for moral life, doing the work that mainstream western moral philosophy expects from moral concepts (p. 22). She suggests that the Analects exhibits ‘a coherent, stable and relatively unified narrative attitude toward Confucius’ (Olberding, 2017, pp. 31–32), allowing readers to understand the persona of Confucius as a model of moral excellence. We agree that the Analects does not discuss moral life by way of definitions of moral value, for reasons we have articulated above. As we demonstrate below, it is more appropriate to understand many of its conversations as instances of how exemplars might act, rather than as offering a primarily deontological, or utilitarian, or a well-defined virtues-based theory of moral life.

Second, Exemplarism situates individuals within communities of interaction just as Confucian philosophy does. From both perspectives, it is within our social, political and ethical contexts that we encounter exemplary people. Thus, the environments of human interactions are the seedbed of our moral lives (e.g. 2.5; 2.9; 11.22; 12.4). This aspect of moral life, shared by the two views, prompts a critical question: how might individuals operate at a level of detachment from harmful prevailing practices endorsed by their communities? The sway of the majority, or the weight of the collective over the individual, is a pressing question for those projects (including ours) that seek to establish Confucian philosophy’s contemporary relevance. The issue is not simply one wherein an individual establishes their ‘rationality’ or ‘autonomy’, as suggested by Charlene C. Tan (2018), but rather is one that involves recognition of the embeddedness of individuals within their moral environments.

These two aspects of Exemplarism and the Confucian approach to morality will inform our discussion below; we investigate guan more fully in the next section.

2. Guan in the Analects: a tripartite approach to moral cultivation

What is entailed by the character guan? We suggest it is a practice-oriented term that helps illuminate how people learn from exemplars. In the Analects, the character appears infrequently,⁴ and is applied to a range of situations, from viewing a sacrificial ritual, to reflecting on a person’s conduct (e.g. 3.10; 5.10). The Shuowen Jiezi (說文解字),⁵ an early Chinese glossary, describes guan as ‘to discern and to see’ (Xu, 1936, chapter 9, 見部). Guan has a synonym, tai (臺) (Xu, 1936, chapter 13, 至部), which denotes an ancient watchtower built on defensive walls to monitor the surrounding area. The watchtower serves to provide an observer with an advantageous vantage point, to scan – guan – the landscape (for potential threats).⁶ Analogously, guan in moral life helps an individual position herself not so much to detect threats, but to grasp the features of her moral landscape.

Our discussion below focuses on three integrated components of Confucian moral learning. The first two, observation and evaluation, are aspects of guan, and are specifically mentioned in the Analects. We propose that the third, emulation, is an extension of guan; that is, guan is a prerequisite for emulation. Emulation does not have specific corresponding terms in the Analects but is embedded in some of the conversations. Before we investigate each component more closely, we demonstrate how the three are intertwined in a conversation in Analects 3.26. Confucius criticises the way some people handle their tasks, saying he gets no benefit from reflectively observing them:

The Master said, ‘Holding positions of influence without tolerance, performing rituals (li 禮) without respect, and engaging in mourning rites without grief; how am I to reflectively observe them?’ (trans. Lai, K)

Confucius has observed the ways in which these tasks have been handled. Having evaluated them, he surmises that they are undertaken without appropriate emotional engagement. His rhetorical question, ‘how am I to reflectively observe them?’, is not about his inability to observe or evaluate others’ behaviours, but rather that there is nothing in their behaviours that may be emulated. In developing the three integrated components of Confucian learning below, we aim to evoke a sense of progression in an individual’s moral life, working toward their meaningful participation in society.

2.1. Observation

Confucius in Analects 5.10 expressed disappointment with one of his followers, Zaiwo (宰我), who slept during the day. For Confucius, Zaiwo’s patterns of behaviour revealed much about his moral commitments:

Zaiwo was still sleeping during the daytime. The Master said, ‘You cannot carve rotten wood, and cannot trowel over a wall of manure. As for Zaiwo, what is the point in upbraiding him?’

The Master said further, ‘There was a time when, in my dealing with others, on hearing what they had to say, I believed they would live up to it. Nowadays in my dealing with others, on hearing what they have to say, I then watch [guan] what they do. It is Zaiwo that has taught me as much.’ (5.10, trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, pp. 97–98)

Confucius’ severe criticisms of Zaiwo were made on the basis of Zaiwo’s behaviours. This is not the only instance of Zaiwo’s attempting to cut corners in his undertakings (see 17.21). The idea of a person’s consistency in action (in Zaiwo’s case, a negative one) is an important theme in the Analects. It is expressed in the term xin (信) and often articulated in terms of the consonance between a person’s words and their deeds (4.22).⁷ Xin has been translated as ‘trustworthiness’ (Slingerland, 2003) or ‘reliability’ (Lai, 2018). Confucius himself was said to be morally reliable (5.28), in exactly the way Zaiwo is not.⁸

The term xin articulates Confucian philosophy’s emphasis on the practical, observable aspects of a person’s moral commitments. In Confucian thought, how an individual responds to and interacts with others is the enactment of their humanity. And it is within this conception of a relational and interactive life that guan has a central role in moral learning. In Analects 2.10, Confucius encourages readers to ‘Watch [people’s] actions, observe [guan] their motives, examine wherein they dwell content; won’t you know what kind of person they are? Won’t you know what kind of person they are?’ (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, pp. 97–98). The rhetorical question is repeated to emphasise the seamlessness between a person’s moral commitments and their behaviours. In this regard, 5.10 is as much about Zaiwo’s moral life, as it is about the place of observation in our interactions with others.

According to this view of moral life, how do we observe the behaviours and practices of others? The term guan works in tandem with a range of other activities such as listening, reading, having discussions,⁹ so as to learn broadly (boxue 博學: 6.27; 9.2; 12.15; 19.6). These practices allow access to the moral resources that guide us in our moral lives, particularly as, according to Exemplarism, exemplars (and negative examples, too) have conceptual priority over definitions and abstractly-defined values. However, in and of itself, acquiring information about others’ practices is not sufficient for us to gain moral insights, in the relevant sense. Capacities for discernment are needed, to distinguish between the exemplary and the deplorable.

2.2. Evaluation

What do the conversations in the Analects say about the evaluation process? Here, we discuss two issues. The first concerns how we may develop evaluative capacities within our socio-ethical environments. The second examines how an exemplary person’s evaluative practices can contribute to the well-being of others.

The Analects weaves together learning (xue 學) and reflection (si 思) as essential components in morally orienting oneself:

Confucius said, ‘Learning without due reflection leads to perplexity; reflection without learning leads to perilous circumstances’ (2.15; trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, pp. 79)

Learning and reflection correspond to the first two aspects of guan, observation and evaluation, respectively. The passage emphasises the pointlessness of simply acquiring a large and unwieldy volume of information without also reflecting on it (see also 15:31).^10,11

How do we sharpen our evaluative capacities? Previously, we noted that a person may exercise a range of capacities in observing others’ practices; these include listening, reading, and having discussions with others. The Analects often emphasises the importance of learning collaboratively. It is in this light that friendship has significant moral underpinnings, whereby readers are advised not to have friends who are not their (moral) equals (9.25; see also 1.1; 1.4; 1.6–8; 12.23; and 16.4). A person’s quest to engage critically with moral issues takes place interdependently, with support from others:

Zigong inquired about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). The Master replied, ‘Tradesman wanting to be good at (shan 善) their trade must first sharpen their tools. While dwelling in this state, then, we should serve those ministers who are of the highest character (xian 賢), and befriend those scholar-apprentices (shi 士) who are most authoritative in their conduct.’ (15.10; (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 186)

These comments on friendship accentuate the importance of a moral community that shapes our moral lives. Many of our early experiences of behaviours or actions that are right and wrong, or appropriate and inappropriate, have involved significant others – parents, teachers and other significant adults – pointing to exemplars, admiringly, or to negative exemplars, disapprovingly. In Exemplarism, too, encounters with admirable people are the backbone of our moral life and inform our moral concepts. In a community as conceived in Confucian philosophy, human interactions are guided by norms that promote behavioural propriety (li 禮).¹² Practices such as handshakes or a greeting to say ‘hello’ acculturate individuals to prevailing ways of negotiating relationships.

Having explored the ethico-social contexts of moral learning, we turn to consider the role evaluation plays in edifying others. We do this by way of an example, that considers the narrative in Confucius’ interchanges with others. In Analects 11.22, Confucius advises Ran You to act promptly, as Ran You is diffident. In contrast, Confucius advises Zilu to hold back on action, as Zilu tends to be headlong. Here is the passage, quoted in full:

Zilu inquired, ‘On learning something, should one (immediately) put it into practice?’

The Master said, ‘While your father and elder brothers are still alive, how could you, on learning something immediately put it into practice?’

Ranyou asked the same question.

The Master replied, ‘On learning something, immediately put it into practice.’

Gongxi Hua said, ‘When Zilu asked the question, you noted that his father and elder brothers are still alive, but when Ranyou asked the same question, you told him to put what he has learnt immediately into practice. I am confused – could you explain this to me?’

The Master replied, ‘Ranyou is reticent and cautious, and so I urged him on. But Zilu has the energy of two, and so I sought to rein him in.’ (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 100).

The author of the above passage has deliberately included an observer, Gongxi Hua, who seeks Confucius’ comments on why he gives different responses to the two men. In his answer to Gongxi Hua, we learn of Confucius’ intent to give counsel to these two men. We suggest that this passage portrays the superior evaluative capacities of Confucius, not only in his perspicacity, but also in his commitment to help the men improve the efficacy of their undertakings. Regarding the latter point, the Analects makes a distinction between giving wise counsel and being judgmental; the latter has potential negative impacts on others’ wellbeing (see 14.29, and Olberding, 2017, p. 165).

Concerning perspicacity, we take it to be an aspect of guan,¹³ referring to a person’s refined awareness, engaging not only in looking, but in seeing. Confucius, portrayed as an experienced and reliable judge of people, knows what to observe, and how to observe. In this, we see how the first two aspects of guan, observation and evaluation, work in tandem. In some cases, the two processes may occur in progression: first observing, then evaluating. But Confucius’ observations in 11.22 are critically informed, that is, he is observing, and evaluating, simultaneously. His evaluative capacities are engaged in his observations, as he sees what is salient in a person’s behaviours.

We have so far examined two aspects of guan. The first, observation, centres on a person’s familiarisation with the exemplary behaviours of others within her community. In doing so, a person will encounter many exemplars, even negative exemplars, and therefore they will require critical capacities to understand, compare and evaluate the behaviours they come across. We have examined some resources mentioned in the Analects for developing evaluative capacities, as well as how the figure Confucius uses these capacities to edify others.

Another important aspect of Exemplarism, which also features in the Analects, is the situational focus of our experiences in encountering exemplars. The Confucian approach to moral learning does not seek to provide an overarching conceptual space that explains our experiences. Rather, in the Analects, the Confucius figure uses exemplary (and non-exemplary) persons as his points of reference from which to impart lessons. Given that our encounters with exemplars are situation-specific, how do we learn from them? Which aspects of their behaviours will we incorporate into our moral lives?

2.3. Emulation

The most important way to learn from exemplars is to apply what is admirable, to our own practices. We use the word ‘emulate’ to help accentuate two ideas in Confucian philosophy that underlie these processes. The first focuses on how exemplars take situationally-appropriate actions. In our view, the Analects provides interesting angles on the complexities of navigating moral life in response to specific circumstances. The second focuses on the processes involved in emulating exemplars. We suggest that emulation functions differentially according to an individual’s moral maturity.

First, an exemplary person acts responsively to contextual cues. This is an important characteristic of the junzi (君子), a Confucian scholar-official who is, indeed, an exemplary person:

…exemplary persons (junzi 君子) in making their way in the world are neither bent on nor against anything; rather, they go with what is appropriate (yi 義) (4.10; trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 91).¹⁴

The idea of acting appropriately has important moral overtones. It is contrasted with profit (4.16; 14.12) and explained in terms of a range of moral dispositions including loyalty (zhong 忠) and trustworthiness (xin 信), among others (7.3; 12.10; 12.20; 14.12; 15.18; 16.11; 17.23; see Lai, 2012, pp. 349–50). ‘Timeliness’ (shi 時) also captures the idea of situational-appropriateness in the Analects (e.g. 10.27). The term refers not to the chronological measure of time, but to the idea of an action’s being fitting. Indeed, Confucius is known as the ‘timely sage’,¹⁵ acting and responding fittingly in a wide range of situations.¹⁶

In contrast to Confucius’ timeliness, there is a discussion of ill-fitting responses arising from a failure to perceive (jian 見)¹⁷ salient situational factors, as if one were blind (16.6). Not having the right priorities might also impact on a person’s capacity to act in a timely manner or to respond appropriately (9.6; 13.4;1 9.4). There is also a passage in which Confucius is disappointed by his followers who seem unable to adapt their learning to the circumstances (5.22). This passage uses the character cai (裁), meaning to ‘tailor’, metaphorically to refer to the exercise of discretion, just as a tailor would cut and sew an outfit to fit a specific person. Confucius notes that ‘… with the lofty elegance of the literatus, they put on a full display of culture, but they don’t know how to cut and tailor [cai] it.’ (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 101). The followers seem to lack the experience and perspicacity (and perhaps the confidence) to adapt their actions to the situation.

The above reflections on situationally-appropriate actions demonstrate the complexity of the emulation process: learners must understand the actions of exemplary people not only in terms of particular outcomes, or of a person’s fundamental commitments, but also the salient contextual considerations of their deliberations. In the remainder of this subsection, we explore a related question: how do learners emulate exemplary people?

Earlier, we discussed the Confucian idea of a community as providing support for individuals in moral cultivation. The term li, behavioural propriety, refers to the normative patterns that guide interactions. Li pertains to relationships both within and outside the family context, prescribing practices that are appropriate for the expression of emotions (for example, in grief, or in gift-giving, or in a person’s interactions with parents). Therefore, they are an irreducible aspect of the Confucian socio-ethical context, as indicated in the comment that ‘[a person] who does not understand the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮) has no way of knowing where to stand’ (20.3; trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 229).

A young learner in such an environment might emulate the behaviours of those upheld as exemplary by significant adults. Teachers might suggest prominent persons in the community, and parents might from time to time point to an older sibling as embodying exemplary conduct. The mode of emulation at this stage might be primarily imitative or act-focused, such as disposing of rubbish appropriately.

More mature forms of emulation may involve reflection on which aspects of a certain action are considered exemplary: it might be a person’s being attuned to behavioural propriety within a particular context (3.15), or their thoughtfulness about the impact of their actions on others, or the fitting expression of grief rather than mere compliance with ritual formalities in a mourning ceremony (3.4), and so on. In such cases, emulation involves understanding and evaluating situations on the basis of the rationale for the practice in question. In Analects 9.3, Confucius speaks authoritatively about modifying certain practices, providing justification for doing so:

The Master said, ‘The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮). Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of frugality. I would follow accepted practice on this.

A subject kowtowing on entering the hall is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety (li 禮). Nowadays that one kowtows only after ascending the hall is a matter of hubris. Although it goes contrary to accepted practice, I still kowtow on entering the hall.’ (Analects 9.3; trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 126).

Two ritual practices are discussed here. In the first, Confucius diverges from customary prescriptions to follow current practices on a silk cap. In the second, he rejects the then popular practice for a more customary approach, bowing before ascending the steps to a hall with an altar. The author of this passage would have deliberately incorporated both scenarios to demonstrate Confucius’ independence from either custom or convention. A morally mature person might emulate Confucius’ decision-making processes, in contrast to the young followers of Confucius, unable to tailor their actions fittingly to the situation at hand.

To summarise our discussion in this subsection, we first demonstrated that the ability to consider salient situational factors is an important characteristic of exemplary persons. This, we believe, complicates the emulation process as learners will need to observe not only which actions are taken, or for what reasons, but also which situational factors might have weighed in on particular exemplary actions. Secondly, we have proposed a differentiated view of the process of emulation, showing how it may involve simple imitation as well as more reflective engagements with prevailing norms about exemplary conduct. A morally mature person is likely to exercise both aspects of guan: observation and evaluation, and to apply it to the way in which they emulate exemplary people. In the following section, we place these considerations within a bigger-picture perspective, examining how guan is manifest in exemplary lives within a moral community.

3. Reflective observers and exemplary lives

Looking through the lens of guan in its various dimensions has enabled us to bring out the progressive nature of moral cultivation, and to convey a sense of agency for those who live exemplary lives. The question of agency is particularly important as, both in Confucian philosophy and Exemplarism, individuals are learning from exemplars within specific social environments. In this section, we aim to consider how individuals may contribute to their prevailing moral traditions. To do this, we first consider the weight of tradition within Confucian philosophy before we discuss questions about moral progress.

The weight of tradition on individuals is an important question in Confucian philosophy, particularly as the normative practices of propriety (li) hold sway over a range of interactive contexts, including the ceremonial (e.g. 3.9; 3.17), filial (e.g. 2.5), official (e.g. 3.18; 3.19), and even affective (3.8; 17.11). As these practices are imbued with moral import, it can be doubly difficult to challenge them as one would also be challenging prevailing values.

However, although there are conversations in the Analects that promote adherence to ritual and tradition (3.17; 7.1), there are others that emphasise fitting emotions or affect as the motivating reason for ritual practices (3.4; 17.11). Importantly, the conversations also recognise the importance of reinvigorating practices in new social contexts, as we have seen (5.22; 9.3). Analects 17.14 makes a clear statement against blind adherence to what one has heard, ‘Those who repeat whatever they hear in the streets and alleyways are at odds with excellence (de 德).’ (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 207).¹⁸ Confucius in Analects 2.11 speaks out against traditionalism: ‘[t]o revise the old to realise the new; such is a teacher’ (trans. Lai, K). This terse passage highlights important aspects of the Confucian tradition. First, tradition is important. The idea of inherited traditions, with their normative ideals and pursuits, is an important consideration in Confucian philosophy. Secondly, the passage cautions against assuming that questions about moral value or conduct are determined once for all, and therefore it highlights the new. Particularly as the Confucian tradition upholds authority figures such as Confucius (see 12.19),¹⁹ it is important that some recourse is available for individuals to challenge the force of tradition.²⁰ From a bigger-picture perspective, it is important that traditions not stagnate, and that moral progress may be initiated by individuals. As we have seen above, exemplary individuals such as Confucius are equipped to challenge tradition. While noting that such opportunities would not have been available to all during the time of the Analects, contemporary discussions in Confucian political philosophy lean toward the view that Confucian views on moral cultivation may be extended to all, in contemporary contexts.²¹

The idea that individuals participate in shaping their ethico-cultural traditions is also expressed by David Hall and Roger Ames. Their discussion of dao (道) as ‘world-making’, though in somewhat different terms, aligns with our themes of acculturation to, participation in, and contribution to a tradition. For them, dao is the process that ‘embraces all historical aspects of the process of organizing and structuring human experience,’ and these are ‘unified by the basic coherence of all humans’ ongoing achievements’ (Hall & Ames, 1987, p. 229). We follow in the path of these arguments to propose a more inclusive view of moral learning, that all people may potentially be exemplary and, in being so, they may contribute directly to moral progress. What might this process look like? Here, we use the idea of a play script and its performance to illuminate the idea of revising the old to realise the new. We propose that existing ethico-cultural conventions are akin to play scripts: there are contextual features, such as the period of the play, the issues it addresses, the narratives and the conversations, the characters in the play and their relationships. Some of these features, and more (such as the costumes, the set, and so on), are subject to interpretation and available for appropriation. In light of these considerations, producers, directors and actors would craft performances with a view to their performances speaking to their audiences in relevant and compelling ways. This is the process of realising the new: experienced and insightful artists, in this case, are akin to the exemplary people who understand that great performances are not about acting out exactly what the author intended for the script (if that is possible), but rendering it in such a way that its key elements speak to a contemporary audience.

How might an individual who is embedded in their tradition extemporise appropriately, especially in the Confucian context, which values learning from the past? Or, how might we ensure that exemplarism does not whittle down to mere imitation?²². We suggest that, in the case of individuals developing a moral compass, there are necessary conditions for individuals to develop appropriate detachment from existing practices. In the Confucian scheme, these include an individual’s having robust significant relationships, and their being embedded in a moral community that supports a participatory approach to a flourishing life. In the ideal scenario, individuals would look for guidance from exemplars within their ethico-cultural tradition. This is affirmed by exemplarism, as Olberding states, ‘the exemplar functions as both inspiration for, and expression of, communally shared moral aspiration’ (Olberding, 2017, p. 97). Some level of guided detachment between exemplars and learners – not unlike Confucius’ relationship with his favourite disciple, Yan Hui²³ – would offer a viable and contemporary Confucian approach to a conception of autonomy that embraces interdependent relationships and proper recognition of authority (see, e.g. Stalnaker, 2019).

To conclude our discussion, we return to observation, evaluation and emulation, centring on guan, to articulate the practical processes of Confucian moral learning. When we guan (observe) others’ behaviours, we access a repository of practices in our ethico-cultural environment. Experienced guides point to examples exemplary and negatively-exemplary behaviours. Under their guidance, we may also be introduced to the methods and resources for training our own guan (evaluative) capacities. With practice, this enables us to think independently, and to stand back to reflect on what we have observed. In emulating the practices of exemplary people, we may adapt what we have learnt, both creating our own repertoire of actions and, ideally, making positive shifts in our moral traditions. Over the course of an individual’s moral development, she becomes more consistent and reliable in evaluating existing practices and norms, and herself lives in exemplary ways. This is how she contributes to the continuing development of that cultural tradition.

We discussed previously the importance of the opportunity for individuals to contribute to moral progress. Here, in closing, we highlight the significance of a Confucian approach to moral learning, in terms of how it conceives of human achievement. Notably, it works with a plurality of exemplars, resisting the view that there is a single normative way to meaningfully be human. We illuminate this point by drawing on Herbert Fingarette’s discussion of the idea of a game, which he applies to a discussion on the exemplary person (Fingarette, 1981). He alludes to the idea of a ‘model game’, that it cannot be defined by rules (Fingarette, 1981, p. 44). Likewise, an exemplary person should never be assessed in terms of what is complete and sufficient, but rather in terms of his or her ‘unrepeatable uniqueness’ – as in a model game (p. 34). We believe that, in articulating the different aspects of guan, we have highlighted not only the processes associated with Confucian moral learning but also the assumptions embedded in this approach, that embrace diversity in human achievements and that are also conducive to moral progress. Our focus on the practices and processes associated with moral learning also rectifies a tendency in contemporary scholarship – in both Confucian philosophy and Anglophone moral ­philosophy – to focus on conceptually-based matters. We hope that our deliberations on a practice-first approach to moral life have augmented the Confucian tradition and enriched contemporary cross-tradition debates on moral learning.

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Notes on contributors

Yu-Yi Lai

Yu-Yi Lai specializes in Chinese philosophy, especially in contemporary debates on Confucianism, elements of feminist philosophy in Chinese philosophy, and moral education. She received her PhD award from the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Her dissertation focused on bridging the practice gap in Confucian cultivation by proposing a theory of reflective observing.

Karyn Lai

Karyn Lai is Professor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Languages. Her research investigates the nature of moral life in the Confucian and Daoist traditions to engage with and interrogate conceptions of ethics in contemporary Anglophone debates. She has also been exploring the Daoist text, the Zhuangzi, to understand its views on mastery, action, knowledge and agency. Karyn Lai is editor of the Chinese Comparative Philosophy section, Philosophy Compass (Wiley-Blackwell), co-editor of the Chinese philosophy section, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Associate Editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Notes

1 See Brooks and Brooks (1998) and Lai (2017, pp. 21–22 esp. notes 3, 4 and 5). Csikszentmihalyi and Kim (2014) discuss the various versions of the text during the Han period.

2 References to the Analects are from the ICS concordance (refer to ‘Lunyu’ in the Bibliography (Lunyu 1995)). Passages in the Analects are compiled into ten ‘books’, with varying numbers of passages in each book. Following convention, our references to the Analects are labelled as ‘book.passage’. That is ‘2.3’ refers to Analects book 2, passage 3.

3 The proposal to understand moral life in concrete terms, situated in contexts of interaction, is articulated by Roger Ames in his idea of ‘ars contextualis’—the art of contextualization: ‘[The Classical Chinese] began from an acknowledgement of the uniqueness and importance of the particular person and the particular historical event to the world, while at the same time, stressing the interrelatedness of this person or event with the immediate context’ (Ames, 1986).

4 Guan appears ten times in the ten-chapter text. Terms cognate with guan include: seeing (jian 見), watching or looking (shi 視), and examining (cha 察).

5 The Shuowen Jiezi is ‘neither a dictionary of pronunciations nor indeed a dictionary of meanings’ (Bottéro & Harbsmeier, 2008, p. 250). Bottéro and Harbsmeier suggest that Xu Shen (許慎), the alleged author of the glossaries, applied a systematic approach to analysing graphic etymology. Our study draws on the Shuowen Jiezi as a resource that indicates word usage, rather than word meanings.

6 Sarah Mattice suggests that guan can be understood as purposeful and deliberate observation practice. For her, in the Shuowen Jiezi, guan captures the activity of observation: ‘from a specific perspective and height give careful and detailed attention to the surroundings, observing and contemplating their significance in relation to oneself and one’s context’ (Mattice, 2013, p. 202).

7 Analects 4.7 points out that a person’s errors and their moral commitments are closely intertwined: if you observe (guan) the mistakes they make, you will understand the kind of person they are.

8 The multifaceted characteristics of xin are discussed in ‘Learning to be Reliable: Confucius’ Analects’ (Lai, 2018, pp. 194–197).

9 A person may learn through reading texts (dushu 讀書; 11.25; see also 1.15; 3.8; 7.18; 8.8; 13.5; 16.13), listening (wen 聞; 1.10; 2.18; 4.8; 5.9; 7.3; 7.28), asking questions (wen 問; 3.15; 5.15; 10.14; 16.10; 19.6), and having discussions (yan 言; 1.15; 3.8; 7.18).

10 Our being critically informed by our observations has been noted in scholarship (e.g. Cheng, 2016; Van Norden, 2007). Van Norden observes that, in the Analects, learning has two aspects: academic and role-modeling (Van Norden, 2007, p. 129).

11 Other terms relating to the exercise of critical capacities include examination (cha 察; 2.10; 12.20; 15.28), discretion (cai 裁; lit.: tailoring; 5.22) and prioritisation (quan 權; also meaning to measure. 9.30, 18.8). ‘Quan’ referred to the weights used in a steelyard, which was applied with discretion (Lai, 2012, p. 350).

12 For example, Alexus McLeod (2012) proposes that Confucian ren (仁), closely associated with li, is a property mainly manifesting in communities (p. 505).

13 Antonio Cua suggests that Confucian perspicacity is comparable to the insight of Aristotle’s paradigmatic individuals: ‘to Aristotle, then, living [paradigmatic individuals] are important to moral agents since they seem to possess in some way a sort of vision and keen perception of the significance of particular situations’ (Cua, 1978, pp. 45–46; Irwin, 1999, p. 37).

14 Analects 16.10 highlights circumspection. ‘Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) always keep nine things in mind: in looking [shi 視] thy think about clarity, in hearing they think about acuity, in countenance they think about cordiality, in bearing and attitude they think about deference, in speaking they think about doing their utmost (zhong 忠), in conducting affairs they think about due respect, in entertaining doubts they think about the proper questions to ask, in anger they think about regret, in sight of [jian 見] gain they think about appropriate conduct (yi 義)’ (trans. Ames & Rosemont, 1998, p. 199).

15 Confucius is dubbed the ‘timely sage’ in the Mencius (5B1). Slingerland (2003) comments on Analects 10.27, that Confucius’ actions ‘accorded perfectly with the demands of ritual propriety, no matter what the circumstances’ (p. 110).

16 Corollary to this view of moral life is the moral epistemology of the Analects, which Lai has characterised as ‘knowing to act in the moment’ (Lai, 2012). In Lai’s account, knowledge is understood in practical terms, in a person’s acting in the moment.

17 In the Shuowen Jiezi, jian (見) is a cognate of guan (觀), having in common the element of seeing with the eye (mu 目) (Xu, 1936, chapter 9, 見部). Shi is associated with zhan (瞻), overseeing from a vantage point (Xu, 1936, chapter 9, 見部). This renders shi very close in meaning to tai (臺), the idea of seeing from a watchtower.

18 In this light, rote learning and mechanical application are rejected. An influential thinker Huang Kan (皇侃; 488–545) is emphatic about this point. Commenting on 17.14, he argues that teachers must engage in close study and extended revision in order to be able to successfully transmit their words (Huang, 1998). Refer to the discussion on Huang Kan’s views (Slingerland, 2003, p. 206).

19 De Bary (1996) is concerned that the burden of preserving traditional Zhou culture falls solely onto noble men (p. 44).

20 Refer to the discussions by Fingarette (1981), Schwartz (1985; chapter 3 and 7), De Bary (1996), Chan (2002), Chong (2003), Hershock and Ames (2006), and Brindley (2011).

21 For example, Bai (2013, 2020) defends a model of Confucian meritocratic government that every individual has equal chances to be educated and upward mobility is determined by performance in education. In Bai (2013)’s view, the potential application of this Confucian government is not limited to China but ‘all the civilized people’ in the world (p. 306). Bell (2015) proposes a Chinese model of political meritocracy to potentially expanded to contemporary democratic countries. Tan (2017) casts doubt on the practicality of Confucian meritocracy, and instead advocates a Confucian reformist approach toward capitalism and global democracy.

22 Here, we take some lessons from the use of exemplars in education, which highlights that learning from exemplars is most effective when properly scaffolded (see, e.g. Dixon et al., 2020; To et al., 2021).

23 Yan Hui had a frank and respectful relationship with Confucius (2.9; 6.3; 7.11; 9.11).