The philosophy of emotions: Implementing character education through poetry

Abstract

This paper investigates the concept of emotion and its relevance to education via character education through the medium of poetry. The objective is to demonstrate the potential implementation of character education through poetry, and to show the intrinsic link between poetry and virtue, knowledge and reasoning. It is argued that poetry serves as a bridge between emotion and character education. The philosophy of emotions is explored through the works of Aristotle, Karin Bohlin and David Carr. Character education is understood in terms of a Neo-Aristotelian approach, drawing on Kristján Kristjánsson, Bohlin and Carr. My position is that, through exercising the craft of poetry, children and young students are provided with tools for exploring emotions, and for discerning and deliberating about virtues and moral contextual nuances in the broader context of human experience.

Keywords:

• Character education
• poetry
• emotion
• philosophy of emotions
• poetry teaching

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 For the sake of brevity, I refer to this approach in what follows simply as ‘Aristotelian’. To be precise, however, it is ‘neo-Aristotelian’ in the sense of having updated many of Aristotle’s own empirical assumptions with findings from contemporary psychology in line with Aristotle’s own naturalistic method, according to which all ethical inquiry is answerable to empirical findings and needs constant updating.

2 Needless to say, the prototypical deontological thinker, Kant, emphasised those very qualities. My above brief critical comments are not directed at him, but rather at the way deontological principles have become formalised and codified in moral education and professional ethics since Kohlbergian times.

3 As with Kant (see previous footnote), this criticism may seem unfair when directed at Mill’s version of utilitarianism. Again, my objection is lodged more at the way utilitarianism has become operationalised in professional ethics and public (cost-benefit-analysis driven) decision-making.

4 It is clear that, for Aristotle, human flourishing rather than virtue as such is the ungrounded grounder of all human activity, the summum bonum. That insight is often lost in versions of character education that are not directly inspired by Aristotle’s teachings and may lead to accounts that are overly individualistic.

5 In many more recent contributions to the literature, Carr seems to be moving from his earlier neo-Aristotelianism towards a Platonic conception of the human good, especially as seen through the lens of Iris Murdoch. However, although Plato’s emotion theory differs substantially from that of his disciple, Aristotle, Carr still seems to think that an Aristotelian notion of emotion can nourish and underpin efforts at character development through the arts.

6 Clearly, Carr does not equate ‘principled’ with ‘codifiable’, either in a Kantian or utilitarian sense. He rather means something like ‘reason-responsive’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kristian Guttesen

Kristian Guttesen is a postdoctoral researcher in the School of Education at the University of Iceland. He has a background in upper secondary education, and has published work on philosophy of education, character ­education, poetry teaching, creative writing, and poetic inquiry.