ABSTRACT
This paper analyses, from the perspective of the political sociology of policy instruments, the adoption and re-contextualisation of School Autonomy with Accountability (SAWA) reforms in Spain, with a particular focus on the region of Madrid. Over the last few decades, Madrid has adopted a wide range of education policies that have contributed to consolidate a market-oriented approach in the governance of the educational system. This paper analyses the instrumentation and complex interaction between standardised tests, test-based accountability, school choice and school autonomy in advancing this governance shift. The main objective of the paper is twofold: first, to trace the policy trajectory of SAWA reforms in Spain and Madrid, and second, to identify the rationale of the reform and its related policy ontology in relation to the selection and articulation of different policy instruments as well as the governance implications of these choices. Methodologically, we have conducted a policy analysis case study, analysing data from a set of 35 original interviews with education policymakers and key policy actors, combined with document analysis. The results of our research show how the policy preferences of domestic political actors and the legacies of the politico-administrative regimes mediate the final form and uses of the SAWA policy instruments. These policy instruments can be conceptualised as ‘life objects’ whose development and uses are attached to context specific – and sometimes contradictory – political objectives and rationales.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The concept of accountability is defined as a “relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, Citation2007, p. 450).
2. By rationale we refer to taken for granted ideas about a given policy problem, the main reasons, ideas and principles behind the selection and subsequent privileging of a certain policy option and the projected expectations as a result of a policy solution.
3. The historical retreat of the State from education provision and the traditional role of the Catholic Church in providing education had configured a dual system of schooling. According to Verger et al. (Citation2016) in areas such as Madrid, regional governments took advantage of this legacy to consolidate a dynamic of “education privatization expansion” (p. 115). As a result, and according to official data, the percentage of students enrolled in publicly funded private schools is 37% in Madrid, while the average in Spain is 29%. In the case of private schools, the percentage of students in Madrid is 10% while the average in Spain falls to 4%. Although traditionally publicly funded private schools were Catholic, from 2005 to 2012 this trend may have changed. According to Carpintero and Siemiatycki (Citation2015), among the new private schools funded by the educational authorities during this period, only 24% were institutions related to the Catholic church, while 34% were cooperatives of teachers, and 42% private companies. However, most publicly funded private schools are still Catholic institutions.
4. Regarding the regulatory framework of publically subsidised private schools, two main aspects have traditionally played a key role in terms of school autonomy. First of all, the funding scheme is de facto a co-funding model between the state and families. Although in legal terms publicly funded private schools must be free for families and students, these schools usually ask for a voluntary contribution, with amounts that vary depending on the type of school and the socioeconomic profile of the families. Despite the voluntary character of the contributions, most of the families assume it is what gives these schools greater economic and management autonomy. Secondly, these schools have traditionally enjoyed autonomy in the recruitment of teachers, in contrast to public schools, which get their teachers from a centralised system. Both types of management autonomy, economic and teachers’ selection, tended to benefit publicly funded private schools, which can often better adapt to families’ demands.
6. Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea de Madrid Nº 419/4 de mayo de 2005, p. 12,147
See: https://www.asambleamadrid.es/static/doc/publicaciones/VII-DS-419.pdf
7. Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea de Madrid Nº 492/22 de junio de 2005
See: https://www.asambleamadrid.es/static/doc/publicaciones/VII-DS-492.pdf
8. Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea de Madrid Nº 419/4 de mayo de 2005, p. 12,148
9. DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA DE MADRID/Nº 419/4 de mayo de 2005 p. 12,158
See: https://www.asambleamadrid.es/static/doc/publicaciones/VII-DS-419.pdf
10. This position is well exemplified in several public statements of President Aguirre, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 5eOmdh21bUs
11. DIARIO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA DE MADRID/Nº 810/16 de diciembre de 2010, p. 23,622.
See: https://www.asambleamadrid.es/static/doc/publicaciones/VIII-DS-810.pdf