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Abstract
Tibetan activists and their supporters are interpreting the lyrical and visual symbolism of contemporary Tibetan music videos from China as a call for Tibetans to return to a shared Tibetan identity, centered around religious piety and implied civil disobedience, in order to counter fears of cultural assimilation. As the popularity of some videos on social-networking sites dovetailed with the 2008 protests in Tibet, viewers employed a progressive hermeneutical strategy which demanded a sectarian political interpretation of the lyrics and imagery of the most popular videos out of Tibet. Within China, Tibetans have begun to add these videos to the growing canon of an emerging uncivil religion, which emphasizes Tibetan cultural, linguistic, and religious autonomy within China. Through comparing online and offline ethnography, this article explores the relationship between offline and online worlds and the connections between Tibetans in China and their supporters.
Acknowledgements
I would like to briefly thank the anonymous reviewers, the editors of Ethnos, and my colleagues at Aarhus Universitet for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Holly Gayley, Sarah Schorr, and especially Arthur McKeown for their assistance during two research trips to Tibet in 2006 and 2010.
Notes
1 Lyrics by Lo Jamyang (Blo 'jam dbyangs): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pNuIhgCU7Q8
2 Unless stated otherwise, all translations are my own.
4 Cf. Bernal (Citation2005) who argued in her work on Eritrea that diaspora and digital technologies stand in a ‘homologous relationship’ because one's ‘location is ambiguous, and to be made socially meaningful, it must be actively constructed.’ On how native and diasporic indigenous peoples have used the internet to create new communities and put forward their agendas, see Landzelius (Citation2006).
5 For an example among Tibetan-speaking muslims in India, see Magnusson (Citation2011).
6 The 10th Pa
chen Lama was an ambiguous figure. The P.R.C. government celebrates him as a Communist collaborator. Tibetan nationalists remember him for his support for Tibetan culture through self-sacrificing attempts to protect Tibet from the excesses of Communist rule.
7 Khenpo Jigmé Phuntsok was a charismatic leader of the Buddhist revival in Eastern Tibet before the government restricted his institute's activities and put him under house arrest. His picture is widely displayed across the Tibetan plateau, including Lhasa, not just in his home region. The proliferation of his image testifies to the intensification of pan-Tibetan identity in China.
8 The popularity of singers like Kunga and Sherten in and outside of Tibet contradicts Shakya (Citation2008: 22), “There is a huge social and cultural gap between Tibetans in Indian and those in the TAR, illustrated even by their taste in music.”
9 On the 2008 protests in Tibet, see Barnett (2009) and Makley (2009).
10 On how the study of digital media transforms the possibilities and limitations of fieldwork, see Burrell (Citation2009).
11 Cf. Scott (Citation1990) and Magnusson (Citation2011) on hidden and public transcripts.
12 Cf. Lama Jabb (Citation2011: 1) who argues that Tibetan music itself is an ‘embryonic public space within which Tibetans are expressing their common concerns and collective identity under difficult political circumstances.’
13 Even now Tibetans computer-savvy enough to use a VPN (virtual private network) client can bypass the Great Firewall, which I witnessed many times in particular among Tibetan Facebook users.
14 The P.R.C. periodically blocked YouTube before 2009. The terminus a quo for the permanent block on YouTube in the Tibetan Autonomous Region might date to March 2008.
15 Jigdo's video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZv67scGLjs.
16 Performed live by Yadong, Gangzhuk, Kunga, and Tséwang (Ya dung, Gangs bzhugs, Kun dga’, Tshe dbang) with lyrics by Druk Lhagyal (Tib. 'Brug lha rgyal, Ch. Zhul Ajia).
17 Whereas an ethno-symbolist like Anthony D. Smith (Citation2003: 31ff.) might views lyrics like these as evidence of nationalistic sentiment, because of the ‘cult of authenticity’ i.e. the attachment to a holy land, yearning for a golden age, belief in a glorious destiny for the people, I argue that labeling these phrases ‘nationalistic’ actually obscures the dynamic at play for it disconnects this discourse from others that point directly at these ideas in relation to Tibetan religion, such as Tibet's patron deity. This discourse has arisen in Tibet not from a transition away from institutional religion as the dominant force in Tibetan society, but out of an effort to preserve its place.
18 My colleague, Arthur McKeown, and I attended the 2010 lharu with Tibetan friends from Jyekundo, Xining, and Rebkong. We filmed possession performances, lived with a Tibetan family who are proud supporters of one village temple, and followed festival processions through nearby villages and in and out of people's homes over a course of six days in Rebkong.
19 During the 2010 lharu festival, Arthur McKeown and I interviewed the mayor of Rebkong and monks from Rongpo and Yama Tashikhyil monasteries on their reasons for eschewing the festival.
21 http://www.highpeakspureearth.com/2009/01/what-kinds-of-songs-are-reactionary.html (Accessed 01.09.2011).
23 A key term in Tibetan discourse on unity is la rgya, a sense of pride in one's nationality/ethnicity (Tib. mi rigs/ Ch. minzu). Earlier, Kunga sung about ethnic pride in The Future of the Children of the Snowland (Tib. Gangs 'phrug gyi mdun lam), echoing the poetry of Dondrup Gyal and the music of Yadon.
24 In 2008, the government briefly detained Go Shérab Gyatso (Sgo She rab rgya mtsho for his 2007 work), We Need to Wake-Up (Nga tsho sad ran), even though a government publishing house released his book.
25 The references to the ‘three provinces’ of Tibet (Amdo, Kham, and U-Tsang) are also provocative because it expresses support for the Tibetan view of the entire plateau as one entity, even if it has not existed as such for centuries. For Beijing ‘Tibet’ is the only equivalent to U-Tsang province.
26 In China, the State attempts to clearly define religion, ethnicity, and territory for Tibetans, and therefore it is reasonable to work from a Durkheimian perspective of relatively bounded categories when discussing civil religion as it relates to Tibetan experience in the P.R.C (Barnett & Spiegel Citation2009; Warner Citation2011b). Though Tibetans might have heterogeneous motives for protest, the religious content of political expression in Tibet is dominantly about the Dalai Lama, who was the religious leader and/or the head of state for most Tibetans before 1949.
27 In my use of the term ‘uncivil religion,’ I depart from Bellah and Frederick Greenspahn's (1987) use of the term to refer to sectarian conflict and competition between religious groups.
28 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me that Buddhism in contemporary Tibet is in a complex dialogue with the State, the history of Buddhism in Tibet, as well as modernist, rationalized, and universalized notions of Buddhism mediated through the Dalai Lama's efforts in exile.
29 Civil religion is not dependent upon a historical context similar to that of Rousseau. On recent attempts to use Confucian scholarship as the basis for civil religion in China, see Nakajima (Citation2009).
30 Rousseau's conception of civil religion presupposed a democractic polity, however the contemporary use of civil religion post-Bellah does not.
31 Recent discourse among Tibetans seeking ethnic unity goes to great lengths to be inclusive towards Bon, the minority religion in Tibet. However, as Cristi would predict (2009: 71), despite attempts at inclusion, Tibetan uncivil religion interprets and represents the more dominant tradition in Tibet, Buddhism, especially the Gelukpa variety.
32 See Warner (Citation2011b) for a summary of literature on the Chinese term minzu and Tibetan use of it.
33 Ninety percent of protests in Lhasa in 1980s were led by monks and nuns. In 2008, 72% of protests were led by lay, mixed or student groups. Protests spread through the use of new media technologies (Barnett & Spiegel Citation2009: 7–11).
34 Certainly this shift in the origins of Tibetan identity and nationalistic discourse realizes the potential of a literate populace new secular educational and cultural institutions in India and China have created (Kolås Citation1996: 57–58).