Making and Finding Values in Nature: From a Humean Point of View1

1. Thanks are due to Annette Baier, Charles Pigden, Robert Young, Tim Oakley, and Edwin Coleman for their comments on earlier versions of this article, and to the Philosophy Program of La Trobe University for their support for the production of this article. As always, I give special thanks to Andrew Brennan.

Abstract

The paper advances a Humean metaethical analysis of “intrinsic value” – a notion fundamental in moral philosophy in general and particularly so in environmental ethics. The analysis reduces an object's moral properties (e.g., its value) to the empirical relations between the object's natural properties and people's psychological dispositions to respond to them. Moral properties turn out to be both objective and subjective, but in ways compatible with, and complementary to, each other. Next, the paper investigates whether the Humean analysis can support non‐anthropocentric environmental ethical theories, which attribute intrinsic value to nonhuman natural entities. It argues that one of the most useful resources from Hume for non‐anthropocentrism is his account of justice as an artificial virtue, which is a plausible model for the internalization of various environmentally friendly conventions and the creation of environmental values. Finally, the paper concludes that any Humean account of intrinsic value is empiricist all the way down. Moral questions about what things are intrinsically valuable, and to what extent they are so, are ultimately empirical questions about complex psychological capacities and dispositions of human beings, which cannot be single‐handedly answered by philosophers a priori; and that ethics is more appropriately seen as an interdisciplinary investigation, requiring collaboration among the various psychological and social sciences, human biological and neurological sciences, and history and philosophy.

Notes

1. Thanks are due to Annette Baier, Charles Pigden, Robert Young, Tim Oakley, and Edwin Coleman for their comments on earlier versions of this article, and to the Philosophy Program of La Trobe University for their support for the production of this article. As always, I give special thanks to Andrew Brennan.

2. The term “intrinsic value” is often used to mean non‐instrumental value. I use the term to mean just that. But there is no uniform usage of the term among different writers. Some writers equivocate between intrinsic value in the sense of non‐instrumental value with that in the sense of the value possessed by things in virtue of their non‐relational properties. This non‐relational notion of intrinsic value should be contrasted with “extrinsic value” instead – i.e., the value possessed by things in virtue of their extrinsic or relational properties. See O'Neill (1993) and Elliot (1997) for different uses of the notion “intrinsic value” in environmental ethics.

3. For exceptions, see Norton (1991) and (1995), and Light and Katz (1996), who are pragmatists, arguing that the question of whether the value of the natural environment is merely instrumental or also intrinsic is of little importance for environmental ethics as a practical subject. For either way, we have strong duties to protect the natural environment. So, environmental ethicists should rather devote their energy into investigating how environmental conservation can be done more effectively on the ground, for example, by devising better models for environmental policies and management. Cf. de Shalit (1994).

4. Næss (1973).

5. Næss and Sessions (1985).

6. Routley (1973). Cf. Routley and Routley (1980).

7. Leopold (1949).

8. Rolston (1975). Also see Rolston (1988), (1989). See Brennan and Lo (2002) for a fuller description of the early development of environmental ethics.

9. Taylor (1981) and (1986). Attfield (1983, Ch. 9) also maintains that the realization of a living being's good is intrinsically valuable. But he argues that not all instances of such realization are of equal intrinsic value.

10. Callicott (1980), (1986b).

11. Callicott (1988), (1994), (1999). Also see Lo (2001a) for an overview and critique of the development of Callicott's ethical system over the last two decades.

12. Brennan (1984), (1988). Cf. Katz (1997), Lo (1999).

13. Elliot (1983), (1985), (1997).

14. See, e.g., Aristotle (1954) 1097a15– b25.

15. See, e.g., Taylor (1986).

16. See, especially, Hume (1739–40), (1751), (1741–77).

17. See Hunter (1962) for a subjectivistic descriptivist reading of Hume. See Flew (1963), Ayer (1980) and Blackburn (1984) for subjectivistic expressivist readings of Hume. See Ardal (1966) for a discussion of various subjectivist readings of Hume. See Mackie (1977), (1980) for a nihilist reading of Hume. See Carter (2000) for an application of the nihilist reading of Hume to environmental ethics.

18. See Callicott (1980), (1982), (1985), (1986a), (1992a), (1992b), (1995).

19. See ibid. and Callicott (1984), (1987).

20. Lo (2001b), (2001c), (2004). Cf. Varner (1991), Partridge (1996), Carter (2000).

21. Callicott (1999).

22. For simplicity, I shall hereafter use the term “value” and “valuable” to mean “intrinsic value” and “intrinsically valuable”, unless otherwise indicated.

23. Briefly, A is ontologically dependent on B if and only if it is necessary that A exists only if B exists. See Lewis (1973) for a discussion of different kinds of necessity.

24. The term “ideal” in “ideal condition” does not suggest that it is impossible or too difficult for those conditions to be satisfied. Indeed, if it is impossible for a being to satisfy a condition, then it will be false to say that the being is disposed under that condition to do such‐and‐such. A cat, for instance, is not disposed, under the ideal condition of being well‐informed about stock market, to do anything! For in principle the cat is incapable of satisfying that condition. Ideal conditions, in the context of the dispositional theories, are more appropriately understood as the standard conditions under which subjects can most accurately identify values.

25. For examples of dispositional theories of value, see Firth (1952), Brandt (1959), Lewis (1989), Johnston (1989), Smith (1994).

26. See, e.g., Ayer (1936), Gauthier, D (1986), Lewis (1989).

27. See e.g., Johnston (1989), Smith (1994).

28. See e.g., Blackburn (1984), McDowell (1985), Korsgaard (1986), Smith (1994).

29. Foot (1972), Brink (1986), Lewis (1989), Lo (2006 forthcoming).

30. Hume (1739–40) 3.1.1.26 (cited by book, part, section and paragraph numbers) (emphasis added).

31. Hume (1751) Appx. 1.10 (cited by section and paragraph numbers) (first emphasis added, the rest original).

32. It seems that Hume uses the terms “approbation” and “disapprobation” not simply to name one particular pair of opposite emotions but as overarching labels for various opposing moral sentiments towards actions and behaviours, such as esteem and contempt, affection and disgust, delight and uneasiness, benevolence and anger, love and hatred, pride and shame. See Hume (1739–40) 2.1.1‐7, 2.2.1‐3, 3.1.2, 3.3.1.

33. Ibid. 3.3.1.14.

34. Hume (1751) Appx. 1.11 Also see Hume (1739–40) 2.3.2.2.

35. Hume (1751) Appx. 1.13 (emphasis added).

36. Hume (1739–40) 3.3.1.15 (emphases original).

37. Ibid. 3.3.1.17.

38. Ibid. 3.3.1.16. C.f. ibid. 3.3.1.21.

39. Ibid. 3.1.2.4.

40. Facts about human nature are facts about basic human needs, capacities and limitations, which in Hume's view include, among other things, the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure (ibid. 1.3.10.2; 2.1.1.4; 2.1.10.8; 2.3.3.3; 2.3.9.1; 3.3.1.2), the regard to self‐interest or what Hume sometimes calls “selfishness” (ibid. 3.2.2.16), “limited generosity” (ibid. 3.2.2.16), the tendency to “overlook” the value of things “to which we have been long accustom'd” (ibid. 2.1.6.3).

41. For Hume's examples of “correcting our sentiments, or at least correcting our language”, see ibid. 3.1.2.4, 3.3.1.16‐21. Also see Hume (1751) 1.9.

42. According to Hume, it is via the psychological mechanism of sympathy (or what we now call empathy) that human beings form the sentiments of approbation/disapprobation towards virtues/vices. He considers the proper functioning of sympathy as a condition of being a typical and normal human being. The mechanism of sympathy explains how people come to experience moral sentiments just as certain physiological mechanisms explain how people come to experience bodily sensations such as colour, smell, sound, and heat. It is important to note that the term “human beings” in H refers to typical and normal human beings, i.e., those whose mechanism of sympathy functions properly.

43. Hume (1739–40) also uses the terms “good” to name virtuous actions and characters, and “bad” and “evil” to name vicious actions and characters.

44. Hume (1751) 9.6 (emphases added).

45. Thomas (1998) p. 582.

46. Hume (1751) Appx. 1.13.

47. See Damasio (1994), (1999) for an account of emotions as collections of chemical and neural responses of certain regions and organs of our body.

48. Hume (1751) appx. 1.11 (emphasis added).

49. Cf. MacIntyre (1959) and Williams (1985).

50. Lewis (1989) p. 129.

51. Mackie (1977) p. 106.

52. Hume (1739–40) 3.2.2.19.

53. Ibid. 3.2.2.21.

54. Ibid. 3.2.2.16.

55. Ibid. 3.2.2.6‐8.

56. Ibid. 3.2.2.22.

57. Ibid. 3.2.2.24.

58. Ibid. 3.2.2.10 (original emphasis).

59. Ibid. 3.2.1.2‐4 and 3.3.1.4.

60. An example due to Hume (ibid. 3.2.1.11) is the case of loan return where “the loan was secret, and […] it is necessary for the interest of the person, that the money be restor'd in the same manner (as when the lender wou'd conceal his riches)”.

61. Ibid. 3.2.1.17. Cf. 3.2.2.20‐3.

62. Ibid. 2.1.11.7. Cf. 1.1.1.1.

63. Ibid. 2.1.11.4‐5.

64. Ibid. 1.3.8.2, 2.1.11.4.

65. Ibid. 2.1.11.4.

66. Ibid. 2.2.5.4.

67. Ibid. 3.3.1.7 (emphases original).

68. Ibid. 3.2.2.24.

69. Ibid. 3.2.2.24.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid. Cf. ibid. 3.3 1.11.

72. Ibid. 3.2.2.25‐6. Cf. 2.1.11.1‐2.

73. See ibid. 3.3.1.9.

74. The later Hume (1751, appx. 3.9, n. 64) abandons the language of “natural” vs. “artificial” virtues and considers the disputes about whether justice be natural, or not, as “merely verbal” – although the considerations which have previously led him to call justice an “artificial” virtue remain largely the same.

75. Cf. Hume (1739–40) 3.2.2.22.

76. Ibid. 3.2.2.25 (emphases original).