Avner Baz on aspects and concepts: a critique

ABSTRACT

I defend the view that aspect-perception – seeing as a duck, or a face as courageous – typically involves concept-application. Seemingly obvious, this is contested by Avner Baz: ‘aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]’ – In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.

I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall, to his recent recruitment of the discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim: ‘the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual’.

I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell. However, his arguments go too far. Aspect-perception, I argue, typically involves a special kind of application of concepts. Denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized ‘phenomenal’ world which, according to Baz, we normally have in perception, and which he wants to bring into view.

KEYWORDS:

• Aspect-seeing
• Avner Baz
• Wittgenstein
• conceptualism
• perception

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For a discussion about the notion of attitude in Wittgenstein, see Agam-Segal 2018.

2 Note Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘impression’, e.g. in 1953, §536; 1967, 8; 1982 §501.

3 Compare Romdenh-Romluc’s claim, following Merleau-Ponty, that ‘Gestalt perceptions [usual perceptual experiences] are capable of being true and false, whilst seeing-as experiences are not truth-apt’ (2018, 89).

4 The will plays a complicated role in aspect-perception, and in different cases of aspect-perception. Roughly, saying we see aspects at will does not necessarily mean we can make a conscious choice what aspect to see. A conscious choice may help, but is not sufficeint: even if we make a choice to see an aspect, we always have to wait for the aspect to ‘cooperate’ and reveal itself. And such conscious choice is not necessary: what aspect we see may in some cases be forced on us, and even contrary to what we choose or would choose. Alternatively, aspects become visible or invisible via some change in the perceiver – change of attitude towards what they see that may be described as a change in willingness; it is in this way that aspects are subject to the will. Wittgenstein in a related context talks of willing as capable of chaning the limits of the world (Wittgenstein 1922, §6.43). The concept of ‘Will’ here is modified in a way that parallels the way the concept ‘Seeing’ is modified in the case of aspect-seeing (Wittgenstein 1953, 209). See also Agam-Segal 2012a, 91ff; 2014, 48–9.

5 Dinishak uses the conceptual-optical distinction to demonstrate how different aspect-experiences have different grammars and thus resist theoretical generalizations. Dinishak does not register, however, the greater philosophical difficulty in characterizing these experiences: we appear to be forced to use seemingly oxymoronic language—e.g. say that aspects are seen at will, or that nothing and yet everything changed. See §6, and Agam-Segal 2012a.

6 I’m taking the term from Skolovsky 2016, whose discussion resembles Wittgenstein’s in several points.

7 Such connections are a central theme in Cora Diamond’s philosophy. She explores connections in mathematics (Diamond 1991b), science (Diamond 1999), and ethics (Diamond 1991a).

8 On activities as having faces, and seeing the face of one activity in another, see Diamond 1991b.

9 See Baz 2012a for an elaborate explanation of the methodological problems involved in relying on intuitions.

10 Cora Diamond similarly explains the notion of ‘secondary-sense’ in terms of engaging in an activity that is not ‘self-contained’, and says: ‘Where I want to speak of an activity as not being “self-contained”, I will use an expression, the activity of using which will not be “self-contained”’ (Diamond 1991c, 232). And compare Diamond’s remarks about framing nonsense in the Tractatus (Diamond 2000). See also Agam-Segal 2012a, 96–100.

11 I'm claiming that the application of ‘duck’ to the duck-rabbit and ‘fat’ to Wednesday are both secondary. I’m not, however, denying that there is a difference: ‘duck’ in the duck-rabbit case points to a possible routine; applying ‘fat’ to Wednesday doesn’t. See distinction in §5.5 between ‘preparatory’ and ‘non-preparatory’ aspect-perception.

12 The term ‘preparatory’ here echoes Wittgenstein’s talk of an action being ‘preparatory to the use of a word’ (Wittgenstein 1958, §§26, 31, 49), and ‘preparations for a use of language’ (Wittgenstein 1976, 249).

13 For their comments and help, I wish to thank Avner Baz, David Cerbone, Ed Dain, Gary Kemp, Duncan Richter, Dafi Agam-Segal, and an anonymous referee for Inquiry.