The ethics of arguing

ABSTRACT

Contemporary argumentation theory has developed an impressive array of norms, goals and virtues applicable to ideal argument. But what is the moral status of these prescriptions? Is an interlocutor who fails to live up to these norms guilty of a moral failing as well as an epistemic or cognitive error? If so, why? In answering these questions, I argue that deliberation’s epistemic and cognitive goods attach to important ethical goods, and that respect for others’ rationality, the ethics of joint action, and the importance of consensus join forces with these goods to provide strong reasons for cleaving to high standards of argument. I sketch an illustrative continuum of argument practices of different deliberative-cum-ethical standards, and consider how one should ethically respond when faced with an interlocutor employing less than ideal standards.

KEYWORDS:

• Argumentation ethics
• argument practices
• deliberative virtue
• ethics of belief
• standards of argument
• Immanuel Kant

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this figure.

2 I will generally speak as if the deliberation is occurring between two or more face-to-face interlocutors interacting in real time. However, most of what follows will also apply to more mediated contexts, such as online debates through social media platforms, or the iterated deliberation of academics penning articles responding to each other.

3 Recall we are only concerned here with the creation of consensus across the deliberators themselves, bracketing any questions about larger political legitimacy or civic virtue.

4 Various theorists have previously suggested that argument-practices could be situated on a continuum of higher- and lower-ethical standards. See, e.g., Crawford 2009; Johannesen 1971. Crawford’s taxonomy extends into coercive and non-argumentative terrain.

5 Recall we are bracketing cases with explicit rules and prior agreements about argument norms.

6 Thanks for helpful comments go to Paul Formosa and an anonymous reviewer, as well as to participants at the University of Queensland philosophy seminar series and at the Annual Conference of the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics.