ABSTRACT
The present brief commentary to Englert’s recent article on Kant’s distinction between practical ideas and ideals extends the significance of its contribution by considering the psychological dimensions underpinned by those ethical concepts. According to regulatory focus theory, in the moral domain the prevention focus subsumes duties and obligations, whereas the promotion focus underlies aspirations toward virtue. I argue here that prevention motives induce the enactment of behaviours consistent with ethical rules corresponding to Kant’s practical idea, and that promotion motives inspire imitation processes aimed at advancement toward the archetypal excellence of Kant’s practical ideal. I conclude discussing the relevance and value, beyond Kant’s ethical conception, of a psychological analysis of the main Western normative theories through the lens of regulatory focus and the other motivational primitives.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Data availability statement
No data sharing applicable. This is a theoretical article with no direct involvement of human participants and no generation or analysis of primary data.
Notes
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