The desirability of institutionalized rivalry

ABSTRACT

Many social institutions function with rivalry, whether it is the legal adversarial system, the electoral system, competitive sports or the market. The literature on adversarial ethics (with authors such as Arthur Applbaum, David Luban and Joseph Heath) attempts to clarify what is a good behavior in these situations, but this work does not examine if institutionalized rivalry is desirable given its good and bad aspects. According to Monroe Freedman, for instance, the confrontation between lawyers in a trial may help discover important facts about a case. Most economists believe that competition in the market increases economic efficiency. But institutionalized rivalry can also lead to morally wrong acts such as violence, deception or coercion. The aim of this article is to identify the conditions under which rivalry may be more or less desirable in our social arrangements. First, it will be necessary to clarify what is institutionalized rivalry and what is an adversarial scheme. Then, this article will explain what are the generic advantages and problems of adversarial schemes. Finally, this analysis will be used to outline a series of minimal requirements to consider that an adversarial scheme is desirable.

KEYWORDS:

• Institutional design
• rivalry
• adversarial ethics
• market
• competition
• cooperation

Acknowledgements

I am very much indebted to Daniel Weinstock, Axel Gosseries, Wayne Norman and Joseph Heath for their valuable inputs at many levels. Daniel and Axel have supervised the research project leading to this paper. Wayne’s and Joe’s work has been an important source of inspiration. I would also like to thank the Montreal Health Equity Research Consortium and the University of Toronto’s Centre for Ethics for financial support for this work.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Examples include Anthony Atkinson (2015), Thomas Piketty (2013), Michael Sandel (2012) and Deborah Satz (2010).

2 An exclusive desire is different than a desire for a rival good. The expression generally refers to a good whose consumption reduces or prevents the possibility of consumption by others. On the other hand, a good is non-rival if, ‘given the supply of the good in question, the consumption possibilities of one individual do not depend on the quantities consumed by others’ (Sandmo 2008). Goods like information and security are non-rival in this sense. A desire for a rival good will be exclusive only if the number of agents wanting to consume the good is larger than the number of agents able to consume it. An equal or lower number of agents will make the desire non-exclusive. But the good will remain a rival good nonetheless. For instance, there might be enough sandwiches at the cafeteria to satisfy every customer’s desires, but a sandwich is a rival good no matter what. Resources like bread, vegetables and cheese are available in finite quantities.

3 On incentives, what they are and the role they may play in our social arrangements, see Oliver Hart (1983), Joseph Stiglitz (1986), Julian Le Grand (2003, 2007), Thomas Pogge (2011) and Ruth Grant (2012). For some distinctions between rewards, awards, monetary compensation and how they map to agent’s desires, see also Frey and Gallus (2014).

4 I have discussed some of these ideas elsewhere and I have defined a scheme with incentives as a scheme where agents receive ‘performance-sensitive benefits’ (Martin 2016, 4). It seems more accurate, however, to speak in terms of a desire instead of a benefit because it is the desire for a benefit that ultimately acts as a motivator of performance.

5 What Barry Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983, 22) call a ‘competitive compensation scheme’ is a similar idea, although I think greater clarity can be achieved if these schemes are defined in terms of rivalry and exclusive desires and not a competition for a compensation.

6 The last real judiciary duel, that is, a duel used as an extension or a replacements of a trial, is said to have taken place between Jean de Carrouges and Jacques Legris in 1386. But it is said that these duels took place unofficially, in France, at least until the 16th century under Charles IX’s regime (Campigneulles 1835, 52).

7 Another example comes from Edmund Burke who argues that partisanship in politics may create good checks and balances. According to Nancy Rosenblum (2008, 121), Burke ‘recognized organized parties as a political development that might mitigate rather than aggravate the evils that lead to violent political strife [… it] supplemented what came to be the standard view of separation of powers as a checking apparatus designed ‘to encourage good behavior in the absence of good character’.

8 Thomas Pogge (2011, 121) raises similar concerns: ‘Competitive/adversarial systems contain the seed of their own demise by providing powerful incentives to reward-focused players to attempt to manipulate the rules or to interfere with their impartial application’.

9 According to Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983, 23), the ‘use of a contest as an incentive device can induce agents to abandon their natural risk aversion and adopt ‘riskier’ and more profitable production techniques’.

10 But this is debatable. It depends on how the goals of the competition are defined. If competitions are a ‘mutual quest for excellence’, as they are often perceived, drug consumption may prevent a proper assessment of the ‘physical and mental qualities of athletes’ (Simon 2007, 250). If they are a form of entertainment, it might be more difficult to show why drug consumption is contradictory to the goals of the competition, for using performance-enhancing substances may help produce a better show (see also Brown 2007; Lavin 2007). My intention is not to take position on this question, but simply to show that even in cases were drug consumption is considered unacceptable there will still be a pressure to adopt that behavior.

11 In Rawls' own words, we ought to promote an ‘institutional division of labor between the basic structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and associations and to be followed by them in particular transactions. If this division of labor can be established, individuals and associations are then left free to advance their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure, secure in the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary corrections to preserve background justice are being made’. (1977, 268–269). According to Liam Murphy (1998, 258), Rawls’ goal is ‘to take the business of securing justice off people’s plates in their day-to-day lives’, by limiting the extent of the moral obligations imposed upon people, and placing the burden of protecting justice on our social institutions. Or, as claims Thomas Porter (2009, 174): ‘the pursuit of some values is assigned to institutions and not to individuals outside these institutions’. For further developments on the concept of a division of moral labor, see also Rawls (1999, §2, 2001, §4, §15 and §16), Thomas Nagel (1991, chap. 6), Gerald Cohen (1997, 2008, chap. 3). For more developments on the division of moral labor in Rawls’ theory of justice, see Samuel Scheffler (2005) and Thomas Porter (2009).

12 For more extensive definitions of these concepts, see McMahon (1981, n. 5 and 35, especially) and Alan Donagan (1977, 180–189).

13 On the duty of confidentiality, see Freedman (1975, chap. 1) and Luban (1988, chap. 9).

14 For a more contemporary account, one may turn to Alan Gewirth (1978, 121–124 and 141–144, especially).

15 See for instance Michael Walzer (2006), Thomas Hurka (2005) and David Rodin (2011).

16 Evaluating whether or not a proportionality condition is met is a challenging exercise in the sense that each case is different and should be subjected to its own analysis. But in spite of its complexities, this condition cannot be avoided. Furthermore, if it is possible to evaluate the acceptability of wars, self-defense, or even human rights infringements, this suggests it is also be possible to evaluate the desirability of adversarial schemes. Evaluating the proportionality between goods and evils involves some indeterminacy, claims Thomas Hurka (2005, 66), but it is not immeasurable; thinking otherwise would be like claiming: ‘what cannot be measured precisely cannot be measured at all’.