ABSTRACT
In this response to Kate Nolfi's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's arguments in favor of strict purist invariantism and against pragmatic encroachment. I first defend the negative Argument Argument against pragmatic encroachment by arguing that Nolfi's ingenious cases do not compromise it or my heuristic proxy/directive force account of practical factor effects. Second, I consider Nolfi's suggestion to amend the book's three methodological principles with a fourth Principle of Vindication and argue that while there is a grain of truth to it, it grants too much epistemic force to intuitive judgments about complex cases.
Disclosure statement
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Notes
1 Of course, the shifty patterns of knowledge ascription do not stand alone. For example, arguments from principles such as knowledge-action and knowledge-assertion norms also play a central and congenial role. So, I argue against both these norms and set forth positive alternatives in OFE.
2 I am not just being polite. As far as I am aware, Nolfi is the first pragmatic encroacher to respond to the Argument Argument.
3 One idea that I want to pursue is that the principle should include a self-reflective component that specifies the conditions for its application. This would provide a principled specification of when our ordinary epistemic practices should be conserved by default and when there is a legitimate contention from a revisionist competing account. But it is hard, and I have not made sufficient progress to share an attempted articulation here.