Trauma and representation

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the impact of trauma on the capacity for representation. Profound trauma hobble the mind’s ability to represent (give meaning to) emotional experience, which results in a diminished capacity for thinking, the breakdown of symbol formation and the emergence of concrete modes of cognition. The author begins with Freud’s (1920) views on the nature of trauma, in particular his notion of a protective shield (Reizschutz) that envelops the psyche, and moves on to current theories that address the object relational aspects of this ‘shield,’ with a specific focus on the importance of an internal parental couple (Brown, 2011; Herzog, 2005) as a vital component of that protective shield. In addition, a theory of trauma from a Bionian perspective is offered that builds on two previous papers of the author (Brown, 2005, 2006) which are augmented by contributions from the French Psychosomatic School. Lastly, an extensive clinical vignette from the analysis of an adolescent male is offered to illustrate the near total collapse of his psychic functioning and a compensatory regression to a psychosomatic world.

L’auteur explore l'impact des traumatismes sur la capacité représentative. Un traumatisme profond entrave la capacité mentale de représenter (donner sens à) une expérience émotionnelle, entraînant une diminution de la capacité à penser, la rupture de la formation de symboles et l’émergence de formes de pensée concrète. L'auteur commence par présenter le point de vue de Freud (1920) sur la nature du traumatique, en particulier sa notion de bouclier protecteur (Reizschutz) qui enveloppe l’appareil psychique, avant de passer aux théories actuelles de la relation d’objet de ce ‘bouclier’ en accentuant particulièrement l'importance du couple parental intérieur (Brown, 2011; Herzog, 2005), composant essentiel de ce bouclier protecteur. En outre est proposée une théorie bionienne du traumatisme, qui repose sur deux articles antérieurs de l'auteur (Brown, 2005, 2006), complétée par des contributions de l'École psychosomatique française. En fin de compte, une vignette clinique détaillée de l'analyse d'un adolescent est proposée pour illustrer l'effondrement quasi total de son fonctionnement psychique et de sa régression compensatoire dans un monde psychosomatique.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkung des Traumas auf die Fähigkeit zur Repräsentation. Ein schwerwiegendes Trauma schränkt die geistige Fähigkeit ein, emotionales Erleben zu repräsentieren (dem Erleben eine Bedeutung zu geben), was in einer reduzierten Denkfähigkeit, dem Zusammenbruch der Symbolbildung und dem Auftauchen konkreter Formen der Erkenntnis mündet. Der Autor beginnt mit Freuds Betrachtungen zum Trauma (1920) und insbesondere seinem Begriff des Reizschutzes, eines Schutzschildes für die Psyche, und geht dann zu aktuellen Theorien über, die sich mit den für Objektbeziehungen relevanten Aspekten dieses ‚Schutzschildes’ befassen, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung eines inneren Elternpaares (Brown, 2011; Herzog, 2005) als einem wesentlichen Bestandteil dieses Reizschutzes. Dies wird durch eine Traumatheorie aus der Perspektive Bions ergänzt, die auf zwei früheren Beiträgen des Autors aufbaut (Brown, 2005, 2006) und die durch Beiträge der französischen psychosomatischen Schule erweitert werden. Den Schluss bildet eine ausführliche klinische Vignette aus der Analyse eines männlichen Jugendlichen zur Veranschaulichung des nahezu vollständigen Zusammenbruchs seiner psychischen Funktionsfähigkeit und einer kompensatorischen Regression in eine psychosomatische Welt.

L’articolo esamina l’impatto del trauma sulla capacità di rappresentazione. I traumi profondi mutilano la capacità della mente di rappresentare l’esperienza emotiva, di darvi cioè significato, e hanno tra le varie conseguenze una ridotta capacità di pensare, il crollo della formazione simbolica e il presentarsi di modalità concrete di cognizione. L’Autore prende le mosse dalle teorie di Freud (1920) sulla natura del trauma, e in particolare dalla sua idea di uno scudo protettivo (Reizschutz) che avvolgerebbe la psiche, per procedere poi a esplorare le teorie contemporanee sugli aspetti di questo ‘scudo’ che coinvolgono le relazioni oggettuali, sottolineando a tal proposito il ruolo di grande importanza della coppia genitoriale interna (Brown, 2011; Herzog, 2005) in quanto componente vitale dello scudo stesso. Si presenta qui inoltre una teoria del trauma in chiave bioniana che, traendo spunto da due lavori già pubblicati dall’Autore (Brown 2005, 2006), li sviluppa ulteriormente integrandoli in queste pagine con alcuni contributi della scuola psicosomatica francese. Segue infine la lunga vignetta clinica di un’analisi con un adolescente in cui si mostra il crollo pressoché totale del funzionamento psichico del paziente accompagnato da una regressione compensativa verso un universo psicosomatico.

Este artículo explora el impacto del trauma en la capacidad de representación. El trauma profundo menoscaba la capacidad de la mente de representar (dar significado a) la experiencia emocional, lo cual disminuye la capacidad de pensar, colapsa la formación simbólica y da paso a la emergencia de modos concretos de cognición. El autor presenta las ideas de Freud sobre la naturaleza del trauma (1920), en particular su noción de “escudo protector” (Reizschutz) que envuelve la psique, y avanza hacia teorías actuales que abordan aspectos objeto-relacionales de este escudo, centrándose sobre todo en la importancia de la pareja parental interna (Brown, 2011; Herzog, 2005) como componente esencial de aquel escudo protector. Asimismo, brinda una teoría del trauma desde una perspectiva bioniana, basada en dos trabajos previos suyos (Brown, 2005, 2006), ampliados por aportes de la escuela psicosomática francesa. Finalmente, una extensa viñeta clínica proveniente del análisis de un adolescente ilustra el colapso casi total del funcionamiento psíquico y la regresión compensatoria a un mundo psicosomático.

Notes

1 Hiram Johnson (1918): “The first casualty, when war comes, is truth.”

2 Breuer and Freud (1893) add the emotions of anxiety and shame to fright as possible instigators of hysterical episodes.

3 It is not clear what Freud means by “associative psychical activity.” Perhaps he is referring to the memory, now divested of excess emotion through abreaction, joining with other memories in associative networks accessible to conscious thinking?

4 This strikes me as an early version of what Klein (1946) would later call “projection into reality.”

5 This concept was first mentioned in “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1950 [1895]) and was not used again until “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920).

6 Is Klein’s “combined parental figure” a paranoid-schizoid version of what will evolve into the “internal parental couple” in the depressive position? My sense is that Klein’s concept refers to a deeply pathological situation and is a significant divergence from ordinary development.

7 Niedecken (2016) reminds us that Freud initially assumed that trauma resulted from actual experiences felt to be overwhelming (see above), especially those arising from the child observing the primal scene.

8 I have taught Bion over the years and whenever the War Diaries are read, many of the seminar members are moved to tears.

9 He knew I had a family and imagined my home was happy and intact.

10 As fortune would have it, years later my wife was purchasing a new car and told me about the gentlemanly salesperson who helped her. He needed to see her driver’s licence and noticed that the address was my home. He said his name was Max and that he had seen me in treatment. He quickly added that when he was seeing me he was kicked out of his father’s home by his stepmother and that he appreciated coming to my office, which was a “second home.”

11 I am indebted to Dr Riccardo Lombardi for formulating this insight when I presented Max’s treatment to him.

12 Bion’s theory of alpha function is essentially a creative reworking of Freud’s notion of dream-work. This evolution in Bion’s thinking can be seen in Cogitations (1992) and I have discussed this in greater detail elsewhere (Brown 2012, 2013).

13 This “hypercathexis of the factual and of reality” is also seen in Asperger’s children (Brown 2016b), which raises an interesting question of a possible connection between Asperger’s and psychosomatic patients; however, this query is beyond the scope of this contribution.