Freud's view of death and repetition as grounds of a Kleinian approach to narcissism: Implications for clinical practice

ABSTRACT

Central to a Kleinian view of the person and the analytic process is the notion that narcissism is mainly pathological, involving the denial of the object, of his existence as independent of oneself or of his having value. The author will argue that the study of how this view is grounded in Freud's thinking, especially his thinking on the death instinct, and particularly in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle, deepens the understanding of this Kleinian view and points to its complexity. Also, through this study what essentially characterizes Kleinian practice, distinguishing it from other kinds of analytic practice is highlighted and Freud's ongoing relevance and contribution to contemporary Kleinian practice is made apparent.

Au cœur même de la vision kleinienne de l’individu et du processus analytique se trouve la notion de narcissisme comme essentiellement pathologique, impliquant le déni de l'objet, de son existence indépendante de soi-même ou de sa valeur. L’auteur soutiendra que l'examen de la façon dont cette vision est fondée sur la pensée de Freud, en particulier sa pensée sur la pulsion de mort, surtout dans Au-delà du principe de plaisir, approfondira la compréhension de cette vision kleinienne et en soulignera sa complexité. En outre est mis en évidence, à travers cet examen, ce qui essentiellement caractérise la pratique kleinienne en la distinguant d'autres pratiques analytiques, ainsi que la pertinence continuelle de Freud et de son apport à la pratique kleinienne contemporaine.

Im Mittelpunkt einer kleinianischen Sicht der Person und des analytischen Prozesses steht die Vorstellung, dass Narzissmus vorwiegend pathologisch ist und mit einer Leugnung des Objekts, dessen vom eigenen Selbst unabhängigen Existenz und dessen Wert einhergeht. In diesem Beitrag werde ich argumentieren, dass die Untersuchung, in welcher Weise sich diese Auffassung auf Freuds Denken, insbesondere seine Gedanken zum Todestrieb vor allem in seinem Werk Jenseits des Lustprinzips stützt, das Verstehen dieser kleinianischen Sicht vertieft und auf deren Komplexität hinweist. Diese Untersuchung beleuchtet außerdem, was im Wesentlichen die kleinianische Praxis ausmacht und sie von anderen Formen der analytischen Praxis unterscheidet und zeigt auf, dass Freuds Relevanz und sein Beitrag in der kleinianischen Praxis nach wie vor fortbestehen.

L’idea che il narcisismo sia fondamentalmente patologico nella misura in cui implica la negazione tout court dell’oggetto, oltre che della sua esistenza indipendente dal soggetto e del suo intrinseco valore, è un assunto centrale del modo in cui gli analisti kleiniani guardano alla persona e al processo analitico. Nel presente articolo sosterrò che esaminare a fondo il modo in cui queste idee sono radicate nel pensiero di Freud – e specialmente nel suo pensiero relativo alla pulsione di morte in Al di là del principio di piacere – aiuta a comprendere più in profondità l’approccio kleiniano, mettendone in luce la complessità. Il presente studio sottolinea anche gli elementi che caratterizzano la pratica kleiniana nella sua essenza, distinguendola quindi da altri tipi di pratica analitica, e al tempo stesso mostra chiaramente la pertinenza del pensiero di Freud e l’apporto che esso tuttora offre alla pratica kleiniana contemporanea.

En una perspectiva kleiniana de la persona y del proceso analítico es fundamental la idea de que el narcisismo es principalmente patológico, y que implica la negación del objeto, de su existencia como independiente de uno mismo o como portador de valor. En este artículo la autora sostiene que el estudio de cómo esta perspectiva se basa en las ideas de Freud, sobre todo sus ideas sobre el instinto de muerte, y en particular en Más allá del principio de placer, profundiza la comprensión de esta visión kleiniana y muestra su complejidad. Este estudio, además, destaca lo que caracteriza esencialmente a la práctica kleiniana y la distingue de otros tipos de práctica analítica, y muestra la continua pertinencia y contribución de Freud a la práctica kleiniana contemporánea.

Notes

1 Melanie Klein's discussion of the manic patient's tendency to idealize and devalue his objects is based on a similar dynamic. Through this, what is denied is his “impulse to make extensive and detailed reparation because he has to deny the cause for the reparation; namely, the injury to object and his consequent guilt and sorrow” (1940, 352).

2 Freud's comments on what happened “when primaeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend” are relevant here (1915, 293). Freud affirms that primaeval man “undoubtedly loved [this person] as we love ours, for love cannot be much younger than the lust to kill. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission; for each of these loved ones was, after all, a part of his own beloved ego. But, on the other hand, deaths such as these pleased him as well, since in each of the loved persons there was also something of the stranger” (ibid.).

3 It should be understood that in this process it is not that a loving part of the ego becomes an observer of a part related to the death instincts. Rather, it is a situation in which a conflicted mind in which love prevails summons up and integrates split-off or denied parts.

4 I have described this in the contexts of working in the “here and now” and the implications of Kleinian phantasy for analytic work. By considering them under the heading of the death instinct, emphasis is placed on an essential qualitative dimension of the immediate encounter between patient and analyst that takes place in the analytic situation. There is no observing ego, no neutral cognitive capacity to receive interpretations, not only because the mind is constituted of phantasy, but from another perspective, because the mind is driven by love and hate, by pulls towards life and towards death. And the pull towards death, which finds concealed expression in so many ways in the analytic encounter, must be recognized for interpretations to have an effect. In this context it should be noted that the ideas of working in the “here and now” and the conflicted nature of the ego are not exclusive to Kleinian thinking. However, it may be seen that in non-Kleinian frameworks these ideas have been understood and applied in ways that allow or encourage the analyst concerned with the interpretation of psychic reality to assume the existence of a reasonable observing ego and to address interpretations to that part of the patient (Auchincloss and Samberg 2012; Busch 2011; Gray 1986; Greenson 1967, 2008; Kernberg 1998). Accordingly, interpretations in these non-Kleinian frameworks tend to be “about” what is going on in the “here and now” with an aim of making the patient more “aware” and “reflective” regarding his predicament. In turn, Kleinians have been taken to task for failing to do so or alternatively (under the assumption that doing so is inevitable) for failing to adequately conceptualize how they go about doing so (Busch 2011; Greenson 1974; Kernberg 1969; Schafer 1994).

5 In light of this view it may be suggested that in his distinction between libidinal and destructive narcissism Rosenfeld took a step away from the basic Kleinian worldview in regard to limitation; that the distinction allowed him, in effect, to be more tolerant of the patient's denial of limitation so long as it did not involve overt aggression.

6 It may be suggested that Freud's very speculative stance in this book, which he both acknowledges and encourages in his readers, his claim that on these matters of life and death one must go beyond what is known clinically and turn to metaphors from other fields, in some respects exemplifies his non-narcissistic position in the area of thought. In this context, Freud’s last line in the book is of special interest. Following comments on the limitations of his speculations, he humbly concludes, citing a translation of an excerpt from al-Hariri, “What we cannot reach flying we must reach limping … The Book tells us it is no sin to limp” (64).