Multitemporal materialism. History and unconscious memory, between Freud and Benjamin

ABSTRACT

This article addresses the tense relationship between Sigmund Freud’s thinking and the materialist perspective of history. It presents a theoretical contribution that emerges from this dialogue and thoughtfully considers its contradictions. First, I synthesise Freud’s critiques of historical materialism, with the issue of psychic temporality occupying a key role. I then address the work of Walter Benjamin, who, in my view, has managed to fruitfully integrate a good part of Freud’s insights into the construction of a peculiar heterodox materialism that I call multitemporal. I support this claim in two ways: (a) I demonstrate the relevance of psychoanalysis as an indispensable source of nourishment for Benjamin’s thought; and (b) I identify a shared heritage (with Nietzsche) and some parallels between Freudian thought and Benjaminian materialism with respect to their conceptions of time, history, and unconscious memory, as well as the key differences that both distinguish them and enable them to question one another. I conclude by pointing out that, if we reflect upon what may be its theological impediments in a critical—that is, irreligious or metapsychological—light, Benjamin’s thought can provide a way to explore the contributions of psychoanalysis to critical social theory.

Cet article traite de la relation tendue entre la pensée de Sigmund Freud et la perspective matérialiste de l'histoire. L’article présente ensuite une contribution théorique se dégageant de ce dialogue et examinant ses contradictions. D’abord sont résumés les critiques de Freud au sujet du matérialisme historique, un rôle clé occupé par la question de la temporalité psychique. Ensuite est abordé le travail de Walter Benjamin, qui, à mon avis, a réussi à intégrer de manière avantageuse une bonne partie des idées de Freud dans la construction d’un matérialisme hétérodoxe particulier que j’appelle «multitemporel». L’article soutient cette affirmation de deux manières: a) en démontrant la pertinence de la psychanalyse comme source indispensable d’alimentation de la pensée de Benjamin, et b) en identifiant un héritage partagé (avec Nietzsche), et quelques parallèles entre la pensée freudienne et le matérialisme Benjaminian quant à leurs conceptions du temps, de l'histoire et de la mémoire inconsciente, ainsi qu'aux différences clés qui les distinguent et leur permettent de se remettre en question. La conclusion souligne que, si nous réfléchissons de façon critique à ce qui pourrait être ses obstacles théologiques --c'est-à-dire irréligieuses ou métapsychologiques--, la pensée de Benjamin peut fournir un moyen d'explorer les contributions de la psychanalyse à la théorie sociale critique.

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem angespannten Verhältnis von Freuds Denken zur materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung auseinander. Er präsentiert dann eine theoretische Überlegung, die aus diesem Dialog hervorgeht und dessen Widersprüche genau betrachtet. Zunächst fasse ich Freuds kritische Betrachtungen des historischen Materialismus zusammen, wobei die psychische Zeitlichkeit eine Schlüsselrolle spielt. Im Anschluss befasse ich mich mit dem Werk Walter Benjamins, der meiner Ansicht nach einen großen Teil der Erkenntnisse Freuds nutzbringend in die Gestaltung eines speziellen heterodoxen Materialismus integriert hat, den ich ‘multitemporal‘ nenne. Diese Behauptung untermauere ich zweifach: a) Ich zeige die Bedeutung der Psychoanalyse als unentbehrliche Quelle auf, die anreichernd in Benjamins Denken einfließt und b) Ich stelle einen gemeinsamen kulturellen Hintergrund (mit Nietzsche) und einige Parallelen zwischen dem freudianischen Denken und dem benjaminianischen Materialismus im Hinblick auf ihre Konzeptionen von Zeit, Geschichte und unbewusster Erinnerung fest, aber auch die entscheidenden Unterschiede, die beide ausmachen und die ihnen ermöglichen, sich gegenseitig zu hinterfragen. Ich schließe mit dem Hinweis, dass bei einer kritischen – also irreligiösen oder metapsychologischen – Betrachtung dessen, was theologische Hindernisse sein könnten, Benjamins Denken einen Weg aufzeigen kann, um die Beiträge der Psychoanalyse zur kritischen Sozialtheorie zu untersuchen.

Prendendo in esame una serie di tensioni che caratterizzano il rapporto tra il pensiero di Sigmund Freud e la prospettiva materialistica della storia, il presente articolo propone un contributo teorico che scaturisce precisamente da questo dialogo, considerandone anche gli elementi di contraddizione. Presenterò innanzitutto, in forma sintetica, le critiche di Freud al materialismo storico, mettendo in primo piano il ruolo fondamentale che in esse ricopre il concetto di temporalità psichica. Procederò quindi a esaminare l'opera di Walter Benjamin, che a mio parere è riuscito a integrare fruttuosamente buona parte delle intuizioni freudiane nella sua costruzione di un particolare materialismo eterodosso a cui darò il nome di materialismo "multitemporale." Sosterrò questa mia tesi in due modi: a) dimostrando quanto la psicoanalisi abbia rappresentato un'indispensabile fonte di nutrimento per il pensiero di Benjamin; b) individuando una filiazione comune (a partire da Nietzsche) e alcuni parallelismi tra il pensiero freudiano e il materialismo di Benjamin rispetto alla concezione del tempo, della storia e della memoria inconscia, oltre a una serie di fondamentali differenze che, laddove distinguono i due autori, fanno anche sì che il pensiero dell'uno possa interrogare quello dell'altro. Concluderò il mio articolo osservando che, quando si riflettesse da una prospettiva critica (ossia non-religiosa, o metapsicologica) su quelli che potrebbero essere considerati impedimenti teologici nel pensiero di Benjamin, l'opera benjaminiana potrebbe indicare una strada per esplorare il contributo della psicoanalisi alla teoria critica della società.

Este trabajo aborda la tensa relación entre el pensamiento de Sigmund Freud y la perspectiva materialista de la historia para luego identificar un aporte teórico que surge de ese diálogo y asume reflexivamente sus contradicciones. Se sintetizan, en primer lugar, las críticas de Freud a dicha corriente del pensamiento, en las que la cuestión de la temporalidad psíquica ocupa un lugar protagónico. Luego, se aborda la obra de Walter Benjamin, quien, afirmamos, ha logrado integrar con fecundidad buena parte de las intelecciones freudianas en la construcción de un peculiar materialismo heterodoxo que llamamos multitemporal. Para fundamentar esta idea: a) se demuestra la relevancia del psicoanálisis como una fuente indispensable que nutre el pensamiento de Benjamin, y; b) se señalan una filiación común (con Nietzsche) y algunas homologías entre el pensamiento freudiano y el materialismo benjaminiano en lo referente a las concepciones del tiempo, la historia y la memoria inconsciente, sin dejar de mencionar las diferencias claves que los singularizan y que les permiten cuestionarse recíprocamente. Se concluye afirmando que, volviendo reflexivo su eventual lastre teológico, el de Benjamin es un camino para explorar los aportes del psicoanálisis a la teoría social.

KEYWORDS:

• Materialism
• temporality
• psychoanalisys

Acknowledgements

This research is a revised version of two previous texts (Drivet 2010, 2013a).

Notes

1 In Anti-Dühring, Engels (1878) attempts to articulate the materialist perspective of social history with the natural sciences. Freud does not seem to be aware of these differences. At the same time, it is no less true that none of the great revolutionary theorists understood psychoanalysis, with the partial exception of Trotsky, who showed some sympathy and understanding but, after 1923, lost his authority in the orthodox circles of communism.

2 In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (1930) accepts that the complete satisfaction sought by the pleasure principle is unattainable, and not only due to external factors. Roazen (2001, 246 ff) notes that this not at all encouraging message was partly intended to dispute Reich, or, in other words, communist “anthropology.”

3 This was already clear by 1921 for German readers, yet not for readers of the French translation of Freud’s “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), in which, according to Roudinesco and Plon (1997), the translators Samuel Jankélévitch and Angelo Hesnard transcribed “extremist party” where Freud had written “socialist tie.” The error was corrected in the new translation by James Strachey, but not until 1981.

4 The relevance of Benjamin’s reading of Freud for the field of history is strangely absent in Freud for Historians (Gay 1986).

5 Ibarlucía (1998) informs us of at least one exception: Benjamin’s “task of ‘expound[ing] the nineteenth century in fashion and advertising, in buildings and politics—as the outcome of its dream visions’ emerges, writes Winfried Menninghaus, from the amalgam of the concept of myth and the Marxist interpretation of the psychoanalytic theory of dreams” (Ibarlucía 1998, 63).

6 Anzieu (1986, 93–94) establishes an order of priority in Freud’s formative elements, mentioning (1) his Jewish spiritual upbringing, (2) his literary and philosophical education, and then (3) his positivist, scientific training.

7 Concretely, in a footnote added in 1907 to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life: “all impressions are preserved, not only in the same form in which they were first received, but also in all the forms which they have adopted in their further developments. This is a state of affairs which cannot be illustrated by comparison with another sphere” (Freud 1901, 273).

8 The comparison to Nietzsche’s critique is no arbitrary occurrence: Benjamin (2003b, 343) says towards the end of the essay that Baudelaire’s poetry shines like “a star without atmosphere”—an expression taken from point seven of Nietzsche’s (1874) second untimely meditation.

9 There is also a Nietzschean tone in the Benjaminian critique of modernity in Benjamin’s critique of newspapers, which he accuses of preventing individuals from appropriating their experience—a reproach that is analogous to Nietzsche’s critique of the press in his writings about the future of educational institutions (Nietzsche 1872b). Nonetheless, we must add nuance to the comparison: for Benjamin, the experience of shock also entails a “promise,” because if on one hand it is a sign of the devaluation of experience in modernity, it also points to a path for transformation. For Benjamin (2008), the dissolution of the aura due to the effect of mechanical reproduction is also dialectical. See Buck-Morss (1979) for a detailed study.

10 “‘I did that’, says my memory. ‘I could not have done that’—says my pride, and refuses to yield. Finally—memory gives in” (Nietzsche 1886, §68, 65).

11 Nachträglichkeit: a noun/concept translated into English as “deferred action” by Strachey in the Standard Edition’s complete works of Freud, and into Spanish as “retroactivity,” “delayed effect,” “deferred action,” “posteriority,” and “retroactive posteriority.” Sources agree that it was Lacan who conferred the definitive status of “concept” to this term in his analysis of a Freudian case history (that of the “Wolf Man”), translating it into French as après-coup, and Braier notes that later, Laplanche would demonstrate its validity in all Freudian theory.

12 Rieff (1951) emphasises the double register—“historical” and “analogical”—of temporality in Freud. See also the interesting disagreements between Freud and Lacan pointed out by Acha (in Acha and Vallejo [2010, 267–282]). Jara (1998) has attempted to demonstrate that it is the consideration of the body as a centre of gravity that transforms the notion of historicity in Nietzsche, and it is safe to say that in Freud, a reader and admirer of Nietzsche, something similar happens. I have explored this point in Drivet (2013b).

13 This idea was present in Schopenhauer, one of the few philosophers Freud admired. The author of The World as Will and Representation believed that it was reflection that distinguished people from animals, and this modified our temporal positioning: “Animals live only in the present; human beings in addition in the future and past simultaneously” (Schopenhauer 2008, 68).

14 Countertransference is of special value for historiography. When he noted it, Freud defined it as an affect that arises in the analyst as a consequence of the patient’s influence on the analyst’s unconscious feelings. The analyst would realise that it was a resistance that had to be diagnosed and overcome: “It does to the psychoanalyst what unacknowledged bias does to the historian,” says Gay (1988, 254).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET).