Do Revolutions Bring Revolutionary Changes? Replacement in the Ranks of Ukraine’s Parliament, 1990–2014

Abstract

This article concerns stability and change in the ranks of the Ukrainian political elite from 1990 to 2014. We use East European Parliamentarian and Candidate (EAST PaC) data for Ukraine as a detailed, longitudinal source of information on the evolution of candidates and members of parliament (MPs). In particular, we focus on the degree of reshuffling represented by reproduction and replacement. This is especially intriguing in the context of three recent revolutionary events: Independence in 1991, the Orange Revolution in 2004, and Euromaidan in 2014. We follow the shifts in support for different political forces (the “demand” side of political representation) vis-à-vis strategies employed and efforts made by different parties and blocs (the “supply” side of political representation). We closely examine the electoral results of parties that later proved to be key players in the unfolding of the most important turns in Ukraine’s political life.

Electoral politics in post-Independence Ukraine shows how mass revolutions do not necessarily translate into deep changes to the political elite. Revolutionary events, both in 2004 and 2014, have not brought sudden and substantial replacement in the Verkhovna Rada (VR) ranks. Theoretically, the outcomes can be characterized as quasi-replacement (Higley and Pakulski 1999).

Keywords:

• Parliamentary elections
• party scene
• political elites
• revolution
• Ukraine

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research for this article was funded, in part, by Poland’s National Science Centre (Sonata Bis decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556) within the grant, “Who Wins and Who Loses in the Parliamentary Elections? From Formal Theory to Empirical Analysis.”

Notes

East European Parliamentarian and Candidate Data (EAST PaC) for Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine, 1985–2014. Version 1.0. Funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556).

There might be a question regarding why we give the results of logit modeling instead of raw percentages. The answer lies in the idea of statistical control. Coefficients resulting from modeling help us to judge a “pure” influence of particular factor. For example, when we see that a party with many managers on its list becomes very successful, we might wonder whether it was due to the general effectiveness of staking on managers, or it was the party’s general image that helped certain managers to ride the tide of popularity. Statistical control helps disentangle this puzzle through comparisons across all included variables. When the interactions are put in place, the results are very close to the actual observed distribution of cases.

One may note (which is a practical guide for interpretation) that odds below 0.1 converge with corresponding probabilities; odds of 1.0 are equivalent to 50 percent probability while those of 2.0 equal 66 percent probability; probabilities higher than 90 percent are connected with odds higher than 9.0.

The first secretary of the CPU at that time was Vladimir Ivashko, a close associate of Gorbachev.

The loose coalition that supported the rule of Kravchuk was composed mostly of former high-ranking administrative apparatus officials (see Wolczuk 2001).

The averaged odds for both groups would correspond to a coefficient of 2.34; it would be higher for the opposition alone, and lower for members of the “group of 239,” although placing those variables along party membership would make little sense.

Led by Medvedchuk and supported by ex-president Kravchuk, with Nestor Shufrych and Hryhorii Surkis among MPs, as well as Petro Poroshenko as an endorsed independent MP from Vinnytsia.

Basing on the perception of voters, Hinich et al. (1999) defined “political center” as those who did not oppose the reforms, supported close economic relations with Russia, and defended the equal status of the Russian language.

The president played the major role. Kuchma followed a maneuver very similar to that applied by his predecessor. While during the 1994 presidential elections Kuchma appeared to be left-leaning and pro-Russia-oriented, he then leaned toward the center and right of the political scene by embracing a more nationalistic orientation (Kuchma felt threatened by the consolidation of the left forces in the VR, which effectively blocked the reforms); he played on the opposition of “communist” versus “democrats” as an issue of turning back to the Soviet Union if the left forces won. By playing the nationalistic card, he is also believed to have in fact promoted the CPU, see Haran’ and Majboroda 2000). Both moves can be seen from different perspectives as directed at securing a broad support base, suppressing the leftist forces, or achieving a unified state-building agenda, but both were in tune with and strengthened the public’s attitudes. The outcome of the 1999 presidential elections showed that the maneuver proved successful. Kuchma won reelection in large degree thanks to the support he received in the west of the country. At that time this result could have been seen as a continuation of an alliance between the political right and the “party of power” that first emerged during the struggle for independence. As Taras Kuzio (2000) argues, this alliance can be traced back to the divide within the pre-1991 CPU, which was centered around the issue of the degree of influence of the pro-Russian wing in the Ukrainian power apparatus.

Georgiy Gongadze, a journalist of Georgian descent and one of the founders of Ukrayinska Pravda, was kidnapped and murdered in 2000.

The role of Mykola Azarov, the head of the State Tax Administration since 1996, was recognized as crucial.

The swapping of power became possible in part because Kuchma did not take sides during the unfolding events, a position that might have been interpreted by Yanukovych as straightforward betrayal (it is worth noting that the judicial case against Kuchma in connection with the Gongadze murder did not open until 2011). The revolution created new opportunities for the existing political elite—both opposition and coalition—to achieve their electoral ambitions. Only one month before the 2004 elections, Yanukovych promised to make Russian an official language in Ukraine. He intended for this move to strengthen his support base in the east and south of the country. As Kulyk argues (2009), in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, this move added to separatist sentiments in the east. It was also a sign that it was no longer the western oblasts that were the most politically distinct; the horizon of national unity shifted farther to the east, as was signified by the geographical pattern of support in the 2004 elections. Tymoshenko’s candidacy for the post of prime minister received an overwhelming majority of votes (373) in the same parliament that had previously endorsed Yanukovych (by 234 votes). At least 161 MPs significantly reoriented their views, choosing to stay loyal to power rather than political programs and ideologies.

The Venice Commission gave some critical opinions on the new electoral laws, stating that they were made not in the spirit of democratic consensus. See “Joint Opinion on the Draft Law on Election of People’s Deputies of Ukraine,” October 17, 2011. Retrieved June 16, 2015 (http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282011%29037-e).

Throughout the 1990–2014 period there were instances of reproduction and quasi-replacement. One might speak about signs of classic circulation as well, but the latter was denied by the persecution of the opposition (especially Tymoshenko’s case).

During the Viktor Yanukovych presidency there was an obvious rise of national finances allocation in Donbas (“Biudzhet-2013: zoloti hory dlia skhodu, zakhodu – mizer,” December 24, 2012. Retrieved June 16, 2015 [http://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2012/12/24/352306/view_print/]), which added to greater regional economic inequality (see Sokolovska and Sokolovskyi 2014).

It can be argued that blocs invite a stronger focus on personal composition and transfers than on loyalty and programs.

Including manipulation of electoral results, which is easier in SMDs with the first-past-the-post rule, as illustrated by the infamous 2002 electoral victory of the FUU candidate in district 108, achieved thanks to the complete support received in special precincts within state prisons (see D’Anieri 2006).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ireneusz Sadowski

Ireneusz Sadowski is an adjunct professor at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His studies encompass analyses of politics, institutional change. and social structure in Poland and Ukraine. He has authored more than 30 articles and 2 books, of which the most recent publications concern attitudes in Ukraine, sociopolitical cleavage in Poland, and Polish state reforms.

Nataliia Pohorila

Nataliia Pohorila is a lecturer at Catholic Lviv University, a senior analyst at the public opinion company SOCIS, and a former lecturer at National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Ivan Franko University of Lviv. Her main scientific interests lie in political culture, regional studies, and protest attitudes in Ukraine.