From Enemies to Friends with No Benefits: The Failed Attempt at an Ottoman–Iranian Alliance in the Aftermath of the 1908 Revolution

Abstract

This paper examines the historical developments and the debates revolving around the formation of an Ottoman–Iranian alliance in the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution. It argues that although neither the idea of an alliance between the two states nor the attempt to establish it was new, the way it was discussed, justified, and promoted in this period was different. The previous attempts by the Ottomans were led by the state as part of a broader pan-Islamist project (ittihad-ı İslam) that adopted a heavily religious tone. On the other hand, the main proponents of the alliance during the constitutional period were mostly transnational/international figures and religious scholars, who framed the issue within the context of Ottoman–Iranian relations, focusing on immediate pragmatic, strategic, and ideological concerns, such as protecting the sovereignty and security of the two countries against European imperialism through constitutionalism. Rather than focusing on reconciling the disputes between the Sunnis and Shi’is, and presenting this alliance as the first step towards the formation of a broader Islamic union as Abdülhamid II did in the nineteenth century, these people emphasized brotherhood and solidarity between the two constitutional governments, and tried to establish a strategic partnership based on shared borders, experiences, ideals, and enemies.

Keywords:

• Ottoman–Iranian Alliance
• Ottoman–Iranian Relations
• Revolution of 1908
• Iranian Constitutional Revolution
• Pan-Islamism
• Committee of Union and Progress

Acknowledgement

This work was completed with the help of the Scholarly and Creative Activity grant provided by the College of Arts and Letters at California State University, Sacramento.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the tenth Western Ottomanists’ Workshop at Claremont McKenna College in March 2019. I would like to thank the participants of the workshop for their valuable feedback. I am particularly grateful to Farzin Vejdani and Fariba Zarinebaf, who provided detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewers and editors of Iranian Studies for their suggestions.

Notes

1 Britain gave an ultimatum to Tehran in October 1910, demanding the constitutional government establish security in southern Iran. In the event of Iran’s failure to meet this demand, Britain would maintain its own force in the region. Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 226–7. The meeting, organized by Anjuman-e Saʿadat-e İranian (Society of the Welfare of Iranians) in Istanbul, was a response to this ultimatum. For information about the Iranian community in Istanbul and their activities, see Zarcone and Zarinebaf-Shahr, Les Iraniens d’Istanbul; Minuchehr, “Homeland from Afar”; and Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. “Anjoman-e Saʿadat” and s.v. Fariba Zarinebaf, “Diaspora.”

2 “Ömer Naci Beyefendi'nin Nutku,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 144.

3 Ibid. Ömer Naci was among the emissaries sent to Azerbaijan to establish links with Iranian constitutionalists. For more information on his activities in Iran and his role in the Iranian constitutional revolution, see Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives.” For more information on Ömer Naci, see Tevetoğlu, Ömer Naci.

4 YY, “İngilizlerin Ültimatomu,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910). Among the speakers were Hüseyin Dâniş, Muhammed Tevfik, Kürdistân-ı İranî Şeyhülislâm-ı Sabıkı Hasan Efendi, Ahmed Agayef, Ubeydullah Efendi, Alimcan Efendi, Abdürreşid İbrahim, and Kara Bey.

5 “Almanya İmparatoruna Çekilen Telgraf,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 145. This decision was based on the German emperor’s promise to defend Muslims’ rights during his visit to the tomb of Selahaddin Eyyubî in Damascus, and his previous interventions in Macedonia and Morocco.

6 “Aydın Mebusu Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Nutku,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 140–41. During World War I the CUP assigned Ubeydullah Efendi to Iran and Afghanistan to gather support for the Ottoman war effort. However, the mission failed as the British arrested him in Tehran. For more on Ubeydullah Efendi, see Özalp, Ulemadan Bir Jöntürk; Özalp, Mehmed Ubeydullah Efendi'nin; Alkan, Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Amerika.

7 Bonakdarian, “Edward G. Browne and the Iranian Constitutional Struggle,” 24.

8 Ibid., 2.

9 Amanat, Pivot of the; Keddie, Modern Iran; Ringer, Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform; Marashi, “Performing the Nation”; Perry, “Language Reform in Turkey and Iran”; Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes”; Amin, The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman; Vejdani, Making History in Iran.

10 There is a rich literature on the history of Turkish–Iranian relations. For an overview, see Çetinsaya, “Essential Friends and Natural Enemies.” For Ottoman–Qajar relations in the nineteenth century, see Göyünç, “XIX. Yüzyılda Tahran’daki Temsilcilerimiz”; Shaw, ‘Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire’; Masters, “The Treaties of Erzurum”; Shahvar, “Iron Poles, Wooden Poles”; Williamson, “The Turco-Persian War of 1821–1823”; Ateş, “Bones of Contention”; Gozalova, “Relations Between Qajar Iran and Ottoman Turkey”; Nasiri, Nasireddin Şah Zamanında. For border disputes between the two states, see Kuneralp, “The Ottoman Drang Nach Osten”; Schofie, “Narrowing the Frontier”; Kurt, “Contesting Foreign Policy”; Ateş, The Ottoman–Iranian Borderlands. For Turkish–Iranian relations in the early twentieth century, see Göyünç, “Displays of Friendship”; Marashi, “Performing the Nation.”

11 Tucker, “Letters from Nader Shah,” 393–4.

12 Findley, “Political Culture and the Great Households,” 68.

13 Ibid., 68. Findley states that Ottomans “compared their hold on the caliphate and their 450 years as a ghazi state with Iran’s lack of ghazi tradition and dynastic instability, calling Iran the ‘faithless woman of the world who, marrying first one and then another, passes from hand to hand like a handkerchief’.”

14 Tucker, “The Peace Negotiations of 1736,” 17.

15 Masters, “The Treaties of Erzurum,” 11.

16 Gozalova, “Relations Between Qajar Iran,” 87.

17 Ibid., 88.

18 Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 24.

19 Metin, Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme, 125.

20 Marashi, “Performing the Nation,” 104.

21 Göyünç, “Displays of Friendship,” 57; Nasiri, Nasıreddim Şah Zamanında, 159.

22 Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz,” 169.

23 Kia, “Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Thought.”

24 For more on Pan-Islamism, see Keddie, “Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism”; Keddie, “The Pan-Islamic Appeal”; Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism”; Kia, “Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Thought”; Deringil, “The Struggle Against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq”; Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam; Kia, “Pan-Islamism in Late Nineteenth-Century Iran”; Özcan, Pan-Islamism; Cole, “Shaikh al-Ra’is and Sultan Abdülhamid II”; Çetinsaya, “The Ottoman View of British Presence”; Çetinsaya, “The Caliph and Mujtahids.”

25 Çetinsaya, “The Caliph and Mujtahids,” 562. See also Çetinsaya, “Essential Friends and Natural Enemies,” and Çetinsaya, “The Ottoman View of British Presence.”

26 Çetinsaya, The Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 563.

27 Vejdani, “Contesting Nations and Canons,” 51.

28 Kia, “Pan-Islamism,” 48.

29 Ibid., 32.

30 Keddie, “Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism,” 26.

31 Kia, “Pan-Islamism,” 38.

32 Ibid., 35.

33 Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion,” 289–90.

34 Details of the proposal of Shaykh al-Raʾis can be found in Kia, “Pan-Islamism,” 41. For more information on Shaykh al-Raʾis, see Cole, “The Provincial Politics of Heresy and Reform”; Cole, “Autobiography and Silence”; and Cole, “Shaikh al-Ra’is and Sultan Abdülhamid II.”

35 Abdülhamid II had previously supported the newspaper due to its promotion of pan-Islamism. For more information on this newspaper, see Pistor-Hatam, “The Persian Newspaper Akhtar”; and Lawrance, Akhtar.

36 Çetinsaya, “The Caliph and Mujtahids,” 568–9.

37 Cole, “Shaikh al-Ra’is and Sultan Abdülhamid II,” 182–3.

38 For more on the policies against Shiism in Iraq, see Çetinsaya, “The Caliph and Mujtahids”; and Deringil, “The Struggle against Shiism.”

39 Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, 44.

40 For a comparative study of constitutionalism and the constitutional revolutions in the Ottoman and Qajar empires, see Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism; Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors”; Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions”; Zarinebaf, “Alternatif Moderniteler”; and Zarinebaf, “From Istanbul to Tabriz.”

41 Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 205.

42 Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives,” 322.

43 Ibid., 322.

44 Bonakdarian, “Iranian Constitutional Exiles,” 183–4. According to Bonakdarian, Edward Browne was critical of the Anglo-Russian Entente (1907) and believed that as the president of La Fraternite Musulmane, the Young Turk leader Ahmet Rıza could help with the “general mobilization of Muslim opinion in support of the Iranian constitutionalists,” leading to a change in British foreign policy in favor of Iran. That is why he introduced him to Taqizadeh. Taqizadeh, who was familiar with the political and intellectual developments in the Otoman Empire, later lived in Istanbul with Mehmed Emin Resulzade for several months, helped set up a society of Iranian immigrants, and even attended a session of the Ottoman parliament. Zarinebaf, “From Tabriz to Istanbul,” 166.

45 Zarinebaf, “From Tabriz to Istanbul,” 166. While pro-constitutional Persians in Istanbul established the Iranian Union and Progress Committee, “Iranian expatriates in Switzerland adopted the regulations of the CUP, as a guideline for their secret organization.” Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution, 498.

46 Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives,” 334–5.

47 Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. Zarinebaf, “Diaspora.”

48 Dihkhuda established the Persian newspaper Sorush in Istanbul in 1909, the official organ of Anjuman-i Saʿadat. Zarinebaf, “From Tabriz to Istanbul,” 166. Salmasi traveled to Istanbul with Ömer Naci through Eastern Anatolia. On his way, he met with other revolutionaries and spoke at conferences organized by the CUP and the Iranian diaspora. Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives.”

49 Zarinebaf, “From Tabriz to Istanbul,” 166.

50 Atamaz, “Constitutionalism as a Solution.”

51 Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives,” 327.

52 Iranian revolutionaries consisted of various social, ethnic, and religious groups with different interests and priorities, which later led to inner conflicts and power struggles once the parliament opened. For more on these groups and the political scene in Iran, see Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution.

53 Although the CUP originally consisted of different groups, ranging from extreme westernists to Islamists and non-Muslims to conservative nationalists, it gained a centralist, westernist, and nationalist character after it came to power under the leadership of revolutionary figures like Talat Bey, Enver Bey, Cemal Bey, Dr. Nazım, Hüseyin Cahit, and Ziya Gökalp. Having achieved their goal under the umbrella of the CUP by establishing a constitutional regime, other groups that were dissatisfied with the policies of the Unionists started to leave the party and formed their own political organizations. For more on the political scene in post-revolutionary Ottoman Empire, see Kansu, Politics in Post-revolutionary Turkey. The rhetoric and policies of the CUP were so complex and variable that scholars have long debated the true nature of this organization and the real intentions of its members. While some scholars like Ramsaur and Akşin have argued that the CUP was originally Turkish nationalist, others like Georgeon and Kayalı have claimed that the CUP favored Ottomanism, but had to follow Turkist policies due to the circumstances caused by the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. On the other hand, without denying the Turkist tendencies among the CUP members, scholars like Ahmad and Hanioğlu have asserted that the Unionists regarded Turkism, just like Ottomanism, as an instrument that could save the empire, since they were pragmatists who were little concerned with ideology. Meanwhile, Atabaki states that the CUP was spreading pan-Turkist propaganda in Iran and the Caucasus as early as 1908. Atabaki, “Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism,” 125. For a detailed study of the CUP and its policies, see Ramsaur, The Young); Ahmad, The Young Turks; Zürcher, The Unionist Factor; Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki; Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition; Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks; and Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution.

54 As Shissler points out, the time period in which these people were shaped was a fluid one as borders changed, populations and ideas moved, and terms of identity shifted quite often. She states, “their world was quite cosmopolitan, their political and intellectual consciousness spreading out in ways that did not respect imperial frontiers or narrow communal cultural or linguistic boundaries,” leading them to adopt overlapping or competing identities. Shissler, Between Two Empires, 4. Agayef, for example, could interchangeably identify himself as Persian, a Turk, and a Russian or Turkish Muslim, and play an important role in the pan-Turkist movement in the Ottoman Empire along with other emigres of Azeri background such as Ali Hüseyinzade and Mehmed Emin Resulzade, who served as the editor of Iran-i Naw, a socialist newspaper in Iran. Vejdani, “Contesting Nations,” 61–2.

55 “Aydın Mebusu Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Nutku,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 140–41.

56 For an intellectual biography of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, see Shissler, Between Two Empires.

57 “Ahmed Bey Agayef Efendi’nin Nutku,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 126–7.

58 Ibid.

59 “Alimcan Efendi'nin Nutku,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 112 (October 1910): 134–5.

60 “Şeyh Esedullah Efendi'nin Nutku,’ Sırat-ı Müstakim, 5, no. 112 (November 1910): 132–3.

61 “İran’da Bir Miting ve Mukarreratı,” Servet-i Fünun 40, no. 1020 (December 1910): 142.

62 Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: İçtima 3 Cilt 1, 284–5. For British–Ottoman relations during the constitutional period, see Ahmad. “Great Britain’s Relations with the Young Turks”. Ünal, “Britain and Ottoman Domestic Politics”; Ünal, “Young Turk Assessments of International Politics.”

63 Berberian, “The Dashnaksutiun and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution,” 30. Among them were Hnchakists, who believed that the Young Turk government had “adopted the way of Abdülhamid,” meaning that they wanted to expand their rule into Iran. Berberian, Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 70. For the role Armenians played in the constitutional revolutions in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, see Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries.

64 Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: İçtima 3 Cilt 1, 284–5.

65 Ibid., 307.

66 Rıfat Paşa was a controversial figure, because he was married to a Russian woman and wanted to expel the Iranian constitutionalists who took refuge at the Ottoman consulates a few years earlier. Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives,” 332.

67 Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: İçtima 3 Cilt 5 (TBMM Basımevi: Ankara, 1990), 441–2.

68 Ibid., 553. Among those who were skeptical about Ottomans’ intentions in Iran were Hnchakists, who believed that the Young Turk government had “adopted the way of Abdülhamid,” meaning that they wanted to expand their rule into Iran. Berberian, Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 70. For the role Armenians played in the constitutional revolutions in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, see Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries.

69 Bonakdarian, Britain and the Iranian, 228. Stokes was the British military attaché in Tehran and an ardent supporter of the Iranian constitutionalist cause.

70 Ibid., 228.

71 Ibid., 210.

72 Bonakdarian, “Edward G. Browne and the Iranian,” 27.

73 Abdullah Cevdet, “İran Viran,” İctihad 1, no. 28 (August 1911): 792–4.

74 Ibid.

75 Vejdani, Making History in Iran, 130. While the Iranian majles sought the assistance of the Ottomans upon the Russian ultimatum, there were those who were distrustful and critical of foreign interference in general because Iran had suffered more than enough at the hands of foreigners.

76 Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi: İçtima 4 Cilt 2 (TBMM Basımevi: Ankara, 1991), 186.

77 Ibid.

78 It is worth mentioning that the coverage of the latest developments in Iran in the publications associated with the government, such as Tanin and Sabah, was in line with government policy, despite the fact that both newspapers supported the constitutionalists in Iran in the early days of the Ottoman revolution. While Tanin was silent about the meeting at the Odeon Theatre and published an article that tried to explain the presence of Ottoman troops in Iran with the power vacuum there, Sabah made the point that the salvation of Iran was in the hands of Iranians, and not Germany. “İran’ın Taksimine Dair,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 5, no. 113 (November 1910): 144.

79 S. M. Tevfik, “Ruslar İraniler Meşhur Bombardımanı,” Sebilürreşad 8, no. 193 (May 1912): 203–5; “Osmanlı-İran İttifakı,” Sebilürreşad 8, no. 198 (May 1912): 305–7; “Osmanlı–İran Hududu,” Sebilürreşad 8, no.186 (March 1912); “İslam Düşmanları Ne Yüzle Müslümanlardan Sadakat Bekliyorlar?,” Sebilürreşad 13, no. 318 (December 1914): 43–5; “İran Hala mı Bitaraf Duracak,” Sebilürreşad 13 (February 1915): 125.

80 S. M. Tevfik, “Osmanlı-İran İttifakı” Sebilürreşad 8, no. 198 (May 1912): 305–7.

81 Ibid.

82 Mehmed Emin Resulzade, “İran Tarihçe-i İnkılabı,” Sebilürreşad 9, no. 215 (October 1912): 129–31.

83 Mehmed Emin Resulzade, “Hükümet-i Osmaniyye ile İran Beyninde Maddî ve Manevî Rabıtalar,” Sebilürreşad 9, no. 213 (October 1912): 92–4.

84 Mehmed Ragıb, “Zavallı İran,” Sırat-ı Müstakim 6, no. 132 (March 1910): 26–9.

85 “Ahmed Bey Agayef Efendi'nin Nutku.”

86 Agayef, “İran’ın Mazi ve Haline Bir Nazar-1,” Sebilürreşad 4, no. 103 (August 1910): 426–7.

87 Mehmed Emin Resulzade, “Hayat-ı Akvam-ı İslamiyye (İran Nedir),” Sebilürreşad 9, no. 212 (September 1912): 41–2. While Resulzade explained Iran’s endurance with its cultural and spiritual superiority, Agayef gave most of the credit for Iran’s resurrection to Turks, who, to the detriment of their own identity, had a tendency to adopt and improve the religion and culture of the places and peoples that came under their rule instead of trying to Turkify them. Ahmed Agayef, “İran’ın Mazi ve Haline Bir Nazar-2,” Sebilürreşad 4, no. 104 (September 1910). Atabaki states that having become disillusioned with the constitutional movements in Iran and Russia, both Azerbaijani figures were drawn to the CUP’s “call for unity among Turkic peoples,” and became “the pioneers of pan-Turkism in Caucasia and Azerbaijan.” Atabaki, “Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism,” 126–7.

88 Agayef, “İran’ın Mazi ve Haline Bir Nazar-2.”

89 Resulzade, “Hayat-ı Akvam-ı İslamiyye”: “Arablar İslamiyetin müvellidi, İraniler mürebbisi, Türkler de müdafiidir.”

90 Abdullah Cevdet, “Kuvadis İran?,” İctihad 5, no. 106 (May 1914): 105–8.

91 E.V., “İran, Acaba Yeni Bir Lehistan Mı Olacaktır?,” Mecmua-yı Ebuziyya 31, no. 126 (November 1912): 296–300.

92 Landau, Pan-Turkism, 46–50; Landau, Politics of Pan-Islamism, 90–91.

93 See Reynolds, “Buffers, Not Brethren.”

94 Britain gave an ultimatum to Tehran Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi, “Resm-i İran Hâlâ mı Sükût Edecek?,” Sebilürreşad 13, no. 327 (February 1915): 121–2.

95 Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi, “Resm-i İran Hâlâ mı” Sebilürreşad 13, no. 327 (February 1915): 121–2.

96 Arıkan, “Harb-i Umûmî’de,” 7.

97 Landau, Politics of Pan-Islamism, 135.

98 Atabaki, “Going East,” 42.

99 Cronin, “Iranian Nationalism and the Government Gendarmarie,” 50.

100 For more information on Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, see Yiğit, “The Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa and World War I”; and Safi, “The Ottoman Special Organization Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa.” For a discussion of their activities in Iran during the war, see Arıkan, “Harb-i Umûmî’de Osmanlı”; Sarısaman, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı”; Sarısaman, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İran”; and Atabaki, “Going East.” Atabaki argues that occupation was motivated by pan-Turkish and pan-Turanian sentiment, and aimed “to penetrate Central Asia and Afghanistan not only as a threat to British India but also to extend the Ottoman Empire to what were referred to as its natural boundaries.” Atabaki, “Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism,” 124.

101 Ettehadiyyeh, “The Iranian Provisional Government,” 22. Among those who were open to working with Turks were Kasravi, Dawlatabadi, and some members of the provisional government.

102 Katouzian, “Ahmad Kasravi and the Revolt,” 101.

103 Katouzian, “The Revolt of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyabani,” 160.

104 Arıkan, “Harb-i Umûmî’de,” 13.

105 Cronin, “Iranian Nationalism and the Government Gendarmarie,” 58.

106 For more information about the Jangali movement, see Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. Pezhmann Dailami, “Jangali Movement”; and Afary, “The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan.” For the Khiabani Revolt, see Katouzian, “The Revolt of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyabani”; and Katouzian, “Ahmad Kasravi and the Revolt.”

107 Afary, “The Contentious Historiography,” 11.

108 Katouzian, “Ahmad Kasravi,” 165.

109 Vejdani, “Contesting Nations,” 54.

110 Ibid., 54.

111 “Osmanlı-İran Münasebat-ı Hazıra ve Atiyeleri,” Sebilürreşad 15, no. 368 (September 1918): 71–2.

112 “Osmanlı ve İran İttihadı Hakkında İran Dahiliye Nazırının Beyanatı,” Sebilürreşad 15, no. 369 (September 1918): 94–5.

113 Landau, Pan-Turkism, 46–50; Landau, Politics of Pan-Islamism, 90–91.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Serpil Atamaz

Serpil Atamaz is Assistant Professor in the Department of History at California State University, Sacramento. Her research interests lie in early twentieth century Turkey and Iran, with particular emphasis on women, nation-building, press, modernity, and Turkish–Iranian interactions.